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The Electoral College has served its purpose under the
Constitution for more than 150 years. It has operated quietly,
smoothly and effectively-so much so that the general public is
hardly aware of its existence. But it is there behind the scenes as a
great bulwark of our representative form of government.
Neither the Negroes nor any of the groups which support them
can alone, or in conjunction with each other, give assurance of control
of a single vote in the Electoral College.'
I. INTRODUCTION
African-American voters in the United States have never held much sway
in the election of the President. Although they often exert considerable
influence in presidential primaries, their status as a racial minority ensures that,
in the general election, their voices are frequently drowned out by the majority.
In the electoral college, where the President is actually chosen, the preferences
of minority voters count for almost nothing. The overwhelming majority of
states provide that the presidential candidate who wins the popular vote in the
state claims all of its electoral votes. Thus, so long as minority voters have
different political preferences than the majority-a fact that is almost self-
evident in many parts of the country-their votes will be virtually meaningless
in the final selection of the President. This problem is perhaps most acute in
the South, where the political disparities between African-American and white
I. CHARLES WALLACE COLLINS, WHITHER SOLID SOUTH? A STUDY IN POLITICS AND RACE
RELATIONS 279, 258 (1947).
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voters have historically been most pronounced.2 As one pair of commentators
has recently noted, African-American voters in the South "have had little more
influence on most modem presidential general elections than Bulgarians. Their
votes, although technically cast, have not usually counted."3
This Article examines the mechanics of this phenomenon and advances a
novel legal claim with potentially far-reaching implications for the American
political system. I contend that many states-including California, New York,
Illinois, and much of the South-may be conducting presidential elections in
a manner prohibited by federal law. Specifically, I argue that, in these states,
the so-called "winner take all" system of choosing presidential electors
(sometimes referred to as the "general ticket" or "unit vote" system)4
potentially violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which, as amended
in 1982, prohibits electoral systems that limit or dilute the ability of racial and
language minorities to elect candidates of their choice.5
As this Article will demonstrate, voting in presidential elections is highly
polarized along racial lines. Consequently, choosing presidential electors
through the winner-take-all system results in a paradigmatic example of the
kind of discrimination that § 2 was meant to eliminate. Its all-or-nothing
character prevents the formation of politically cohesive blocs of African-
American voters-and possibly blocs of other minority voters as well--even
in states where they clearly could choose one or more electors under an
alternative system.6
2. For a recent study that thoroughly documents the persistence of racially polarized voting patterns
in eight Southern states, see QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) [hereinafter QUIET REVOLUTION].
3. DAVID V. ABBOTT & JAMES P. LEVINE, WRONG WINNER: THE COMING DEBACLE IN THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE 94 (1991); see also NEIL R. PEIRCE & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE PEOPLE'S
PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE
127-30 (rev. ed. 1981) (describing electoral college bias against African-Americans based on their
geographical distribution).
4. Judith Best has implicitly suggested that the term "winner-take-all" has pejorative connotations. See
JUDITH BEST. THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE 27 (1975). I disagree. This Article uses the term "winner-take-all" because it accurately describes
the way in which the prevailing electoral system functions: The winner of a state takes all of that state's
electoral votes. By contrast, the terms "general ticket" and "unit vote" seem vague and confusing.
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
6. The proper definition and labeling of minority groups present thorny problems in any context, but
particularly in the context of voting behavior, where individual preferences must be analyzed in the context
of group behavior. For the sake of simplicity, this Article focuses primarily on the behavior of African-
Americans, a group that is relatively well defined within the context of American society. I use the terms
"African-American" and "black" interchangeably to refer to that group of people identified in the U.S.
census as non-Hispanic black.
At times, however, this Article refers to other racial or ethnic groups protected by the Voting Rights
Act, including Asian-Americans and Hispanics. I use the term "Hispanic" to refer to the group of people
classified by the census as Hispanic, regardless of race. I have chosen this term, rather than alternate terms
like "Latino" or "Chicano," because it emphasizes the linguistic link between the members of this large and
diverse minority group, rather than any geographic or ethnic characteristics. Readers should be aware,
however, that "Hispanic" is a catchall term comprising several ethnic groups, including Cuban-Americans,
Mexican-Americans, and Puerto Ricans, and that Hispanics may be of any race.
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The key to understanding this phenomenon is to recognize that, under the
Constitution, the people do not vote directly for presidential candidates.
Instead, they vote for slates of candidates for the office of presidential elector.
Under the winner-take-all rule, the slate that receives the most votes statewide
wins the election in that state. Although this method of election is not
constitutionally required, it is currently used by forty-eight states and the
District of Columbia. Since the slates are chosen by the political parties that
nominate the presidential candidates, the net effect is to give the candidate who
wins the statewide popular vote all of that state's electoral votes. Political
minority groups are thus unable to choose even a single presidential elector.
In the memorable phrase of Justice Douglas, their ballots are "counted only for
the purpose of being discarded. ' 7
As a point of comparison, consider the following hypothetical. Suppose
that a state with a large minority population decided to adopt the winner-take-
all rule for elections to the House of Representatives-as, under the
Constitution, states are entitled to do.8 Under this system, each party would
nominate a slate of congressional candidates, and voters would simply vote for
one party or the other. In that case, the majority faction in the state would be
able to choose all of the state's congressional representatives in the House and
the Senate. If voting were polarized along racial lines, it seems evident that the
votes of racial minorities would be almost worthless, and that they would be
virtually unrepresented in the national legislature. Such a system would seem
patently unfair-and yet it is precisely the same system that we currently
countenance for the selection of presidential electors.
Electors, of course, exercise a very different political function than
members of Congress. Most voters are scarcely aware of their existence. Those
few who do understand how the electoral system functions tend to dismiss the
role of the electors as a mere formality. In a sense, these observations are
valid. After all, electors customarily do not exercise any independent judgment,
or perform any of the other tasks that one typically expects of elected
representatives. Yet it is important to recognize that electors do perform a
representative function. They cast ballots for President on behalf of the people
of their states-or, more precisely, on behalf of those voters who chose them.
I use the term "Asian-Americans," by contrast, to refer to the group of people classified by the census
as Asians or Pacific Islanders. Unlike Hispanics, the U.S. Census Bureau considers Asians and Pacific
Islanders to be an identifiable race. Again, however, the reader should be aware that Asian-Americans are
not a unitary group, but rather an aggregation of several ethnic and national groups.
7. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 n.12 (1963). Justice Douglas was describing Georgia's county-
unit method, similar to the electoral college system, for counting votes in a Democratic primary election
for U.S. Senator and for statewide offices.
8. Although the Constitution permits at-large elections for House seats, a federal statute now requires
election from districts. See 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1985) (requiring single-member congressional districts for all
states with more than one House seat); see also discussion infra note 143 and accompanying text.
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Voters who cannot participate effectively in choosing the electors realistically
have no voice in selecting the President.
This Article documents the severe racial polarization in American
presidential elections in the 1980s and 1990s through a detailed analysis of
primary and general election exit poll data. The fact that black and white
voters consistently tend to prefer different candidates is readily apparent from
national survey data. Exit polls indicate that, in the past five presidential
elections, between 82% and 90% of black voters nationwide have voted for the
Democratic candidate. By contrast, white voters have preferred the Republican
candidate in every election since 1976, by margins ranging from 2% in 1992
to 29% in 1984.9
Through an original analysis of exit poll data, this Article demonstrates
that similar patterns of racial polarization hold true at the statewide level as
well. This analysis also demonstrates that these divergent patterns cannot be
explained on mere partisan grounds. Indeed, polls indicate that similar patterns
hold true even among independent voters and among members of the same
political party.10 Furthermore, the results of the 1984 and 1988 presidential
primaries-in which an African-American candidate, Jesse Jackson, staged
prominent bids for the Democratic nomination-clearly indicate that even in
intraparty contests, black and white voters have distinct political preferences.
Jackson was the overwhelming favorite among African-American Democrats
in those races, frequently capturing more than 90% of the black vote, but he
seldom received more than 10% to 15% of the white vote.
In fact, these disparities are not surprising, given the prominent role that
race and race-related issues play in modem American presidential politics.
Racial appeals, some direct and some more covert, have been a recurring
feature of presidential campaigns during the last fifty years, from the
"Dixiecrat" campaign of Strom Thurmond in 1948 to the third-party challenge
of arch-segregationist George Wallace in 1968 to the infamous "Willie Horton"
advertisements of George Bush's campaign in 1988.
Such carefully orchestrated racial appeals virtually ensure that voting in
presidential elections will be polarized along racial lines. And the winner-take-
all system works in conjunction with that polarization to shut the voices of
African-American voters out of the political process. As noted above, this
problem is most acute in the states of the former Confederacy, where racially
polarized voting is particularly severe. In these states, African-American voters
have little or no hope of choosing even a single member of the electoral
9. See Portrait of the Electorate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at B9 (summarizing exit poll results from
1976-1992 and finding margin of 29% in 1984); see also ABC News Exit Poll Results, WASH. POST, Nov.
9, 1988, at A34 (finding margin of 1% in 1988); ABC News Exit Poll: Voting for President, WASH. POST,
Nov. 7, 1984, at A40 (finding margin of 27% in 1984).
10. See discussion infra Subsection IV.A.3.
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college." Although they can step into a booth and pull a lever, their votes
never really count. With respect to presidential elections, they are completely
disenfranchised-just as they were for so many years in the eras of slavery and
segregation.
The argument that the current electoral system tends to disadvantage voters
who are members of political minority groups has been made many times
before. 2 Several legal challenges based on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment have fallen on deaf ears.13 The argument in this
Article, however, rests on an alternative theory that addresses the system's
inequities with respect to voters who are members of racial minority groups.
The thread of this argument may seem initially to run counter to recent trends
in voting rights law that have limited the reach of the Voting Rights Act.
4
As this Article will demonstrate, however, application of the Voting Rights Act
to the electoral college is particularly appropriate in light of these decisions
because it does not require states to employ any race-conscious remedies.
In Part H of this Article, I outline the constitutional framework and
historical roots of the electoral system and describe the legal mechanisms by
which the winner-take-all system operates. I then turn to a discussion of some
comparatively recent history, focusing on the efforts of various politicians to
advance racist agendas, either explicitly or covertly, through the manipulation
of the electoral college. Thurmond's 1948 campaign and Wallace's 1968
campaign are the clearest examples of this phenomenon. This Article contends
that the legacy of these efforts lives on in the present day.
11. To be sure, the African-American candidate of choice, Bill Clinton, did win four Southern states
in 1992: Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Tennessee. That apparent success does not necessarily mean,
however, that African-American voters have a realistic opportunity to elect candidates of their choice in
those states. The vote-dilution inquiry focuses on patterns of voting over several elections, rather than on
the outcome of individual elections, and recognizes that "special circumstances ... may explain minority
electoral success in a polarized contest." Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 57 (1986).
Bill Clinton's Southern victories in 1992 must be analyzed in light of at least two such "special
circumstances." First, he ran in an unusual, three-way race. Because the white vote was splintered among
three candidates, the influence of black voters, who supported Clinton in overwhelming numbers, was
correspondingly greater. Second, Arkansas and Tennessee are, respectively, the home states of Clinton and
his vice-presidential running mate, Al Gore. Thus the Democratic ticket had a natural edge there.
To the extent that Clinton's victory in Louisiana and Georgia is not reflective of any special features
of the three-way race, it might indicate that African-Americans have a viable opportunity to elect candidates
of their choice. These results must be viewed in conjunction with the results of other elections, however.
See id. at 49 (holding that legally significant vote dilution requires that "a bloc voting majority must usually
be able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority group").
12. See, e.g., Michael J. O'Sullivan, Artificial Unit Voting and the Electoral College, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2421, 2431 (1992).
13. In 1966, the State of Delaware filed an original-jurisdiction action in the Supreme Court alleging,
among other things, that the winner-take-all system violated the Equal Protection Clause by "canceling"
the votes of political minorities. See Brief for Plaintiff at 56-68, Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895
(1966) (No. 28 Original). The Court declined to hear the case. In other cases, courts have explicitly rejected
equal protection challenges to the winner-take-all system. See Penton v. Humphrey, 264 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.
Miss. 1967); Gray v. Mississippi, 233 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. Miss. 1964).
14. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2485-94 (1995) (finding Georgia's race-based
districting invalid absent compelling state interest).
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Part I then turns to a discussion of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and its
application to the electoral system. After a brief overview of the statutory
language and its origin, I argue that § 2 places limits on state discretion over
the mode of appointment of presidential electors. First, I assert that Article II
of the Constitution, which appears to give states exclusive control over the
appointment of electors, does not preclude enforcement of the Voting Rights
Act. Second, I argue that minority vote dilution in the selection of presidential
electors falls within the scope of the practices that § 2 prohibits.
In Part IV, I employ the analytical framework developed by the federal
courts in Thornburg v. Gingles'5 and subsequent cases in an attempt to
identify which states might be vulnerable to a § 2 challenge. This part also
includes detailed analyses of voting behavior in four states with differing
demographic and political characteristics: Alabama, California, Illinois, and
New York. Part V then discusses the comparative strengths and weaknesses of
two remedial options that states might employ as alternatives to the winner-
take-all system. Finally, Part VI briefly discusses the effects that a move away
from the winner-take-all system might have on the structure of American
politics.
At the outset, I wish to make it clear that the purpose of this Article is not
to advocate any constitutional amendment that would modify or abolish the
electoral system.' 6 Instead, this Article considers the electoral system within
its current constitutional framework. My goal is simply to examine the
methods the states currently use to administer that system in light of the
national standards in § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. My analysis would be
incomplete, however, if I did not point out that a fair and nondiscriminatory
electoral system might well be superior to the alternative most frequently
proposed by modern-day critics of the current system: direct election of the
President by the people. More than 200 years ago, the Framers adopted the
electoral system in an effort to ensure a rough balance of interests between
various constituencies in the selection of our nation's Chief Executive.
Properly administered, the electoral system might help us to achieve a similar
balance today.
15. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
16. For arguments in favor of abolishing the electoral system and replacing it with a direct vote for
President, see ABBOT & LEVINE, supra note 3; PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3. For arguments in favor
of maintaining the current system, see BEST, supra note 4; MARTIN DIAMOND, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
AND THE AMERICAN IDEA OF DEMOCRACY (1977). See also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE NEW AGE OF
POLITICAL REFORM: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION, AND THE PARTY SYSTEM 8-20 (1968)
(discussing and critiquing arguments in favor of abolishing the present system).
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II. RACIAL POLITICS AND THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
To comprehend fully the way in which the winner-take-all system dilutes
minority voting strength, one must first come to terms with a simple, though
little-recognized, historical fact. For nearly fifty years, white Southern
politicians have repeatedly and deliberately attempted to manipulate the
machinery of the electoral college to influence national policy on race and civil
rights. This part details that history, with particular emphasis on the
presidential elections of 1948, 1960, and 1968-each of which saw a
significant bloc of Southern electoral votes cast for an openly racist third-party
candidate. A full consideration of this history is impossible, however, without
some understanding of the complex array of constitutional, federal statutory,
and state-law provisions that govern the selection of presidential electors.
Accordingly, Section A discusses the historical roots of the electoral system
and the constitutional framework in which it operates, while Section B
examines the mechanics of the winner-take-all system and explores the reasons
for its dominance. Section C then analyzes the peculiar interaction of race,
presidential politics, and the electoral college in the latter half of the twentieth
century.
A. The Constitutional Framework
To anyone who is at all familiar with modern American presidential
elections, what is perhaps most striking about the Constitution's discussion of
the electoral college is that it makes no mention of a "winner-take-all" rule.
Indeed, the constitutional text makes no explicit provision for the election of
the President by the people at all. Instead, Article II provides simply that:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an
Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed
an Elector.
17
In short, the Constitution simply provides that the President will be chosen by
a group of presidential electors and allocates the electors among the states. The
choice of how the electors are appointed is explicitly left to the legislatures of
the individual states.
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. cl. 2.
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Currently, the states are authorized to appoint a total of 538 presidential
electors. 8 People frequently speak of this group as the "electoral college,"
but, in reality, that term is something of a misnomer. In fact, it is hard to
imagine any body less collegial. Strictly speaking, the "electoral college" is not
a single body at all, but rather an aggregation of fifty-one different bodies,
each of which meets and votes separately. This configuration is not a historical
accident, but a well-considered constitutional requirement. Both Article II and
the Twelfth Amendment specifically mandate that the electors meet to cast
their ballots "in their respective states."' 9 In part, this requirement may be
seen as a holdover from the early days of the Republic, when interstate travel
was time-consuming, expensive, and potentially dangerous. As a practical
matter, it was much easier for the electors to travel to their state capitals than
to travel to the nation's capital. But the requirement that the electors meet
separately also served an important political function. Article II grants
Congress power to determine when the electors vote, but explicitly mandates
that they must all vote on the same day.20 By spreading the electors out over
a large geographic area and requiring them to vote at the same time, the
constitutional scheme theoretically minimizes the opportunity for individual
factions or interest groups to lobby for votes among the electors in an attempt
to influence the choice of President.2'
It was a desire to avoid precisely this kind of politicking that led the
Framers to adopt the electoral scheme. 22 At the time, it was common practice
for state legislatures to choose governors, and several delegates at the
18. Today, the size of the House of Representatives is set by law at 435 members. See generally 2
U.S.C. § 2a (1994) (providing reapportionment method whereby total number of House members remains
constant). There are 50 states, each with two Senators. The states are thus authorized to choose a total of
535 presidential electors. In addition, the Twenty-Third Amendment allows the District of Columbia to
appoint "[a] number of electors... equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress
to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous
state." U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § I. The least populous state is Wyoming, which has two Senators and
one Representative in Congress. Consequently, the District is authorized to appoint three electors, bringing
the grand total to 538.
19. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; id. amend. XII.
20. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 ("The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the
Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.").
21. See THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 393-94 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books
1987):
[A]s the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are
chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments,
which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened
at one time, in one place.
... The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men,
requires time as well as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed
as they would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives which, though
they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from
their duty.
22. For a detailed account of the process by which the Constitutional Convention settled on the
electoral scheme, see TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFN AMENDMENT: THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787-1804. at 7-15 (1994).
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Constitutional Convention initially argued that, in keeping with that practice,
Congress should choose the President.23 James Madison and others vigorously
objected to that idea, arguing that it would make the President entirely
beholden to the Congress that selected him. 24 The use of presidential electors,
who served no function other than to elect the President, would, the Framers
believed, reduce the opportunity for "cabal, intrigue, and corruption."
25
Article II reflects this concern over political corruption and deal making in
other places as well. For example, it specifically commands that "no Senator
or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the
United States, shall be appointed an Elector."26 In theory, then, the electors
were meant to form an independent body, beholden to no one, that could
"enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. 27
The concept of an "electoral college" is misleading in another way. Unlike,
say, the Vatican's College of Cardinals, which keeps voting until it settles on
a Pope, the electoral vote is a one-time proposition. Once the electors cast their
votes, the statewide tallies are sealed and sent to Washington, where the
President of the Senate opens them and counts them "in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives. 28 If no candidate receives a majority,
the House of Representatives chooses the President from among "the persons
having the highest numbers [of electoral votes] not exceeding three. ' 29 This
backup plan is a variation of the legislative-selection plan that the Framers had
earlier rejected-but with a twist. In a House contingency election, the
individual Members do not vote. Instead, Article II specifies that the House
will choose the President by majority vote of the states, with the delegation
from each state getting a single vote.30
Strange as this system may sound to the modern ear, the electoral scheme
was well received initially, even by some vigorous opponents of the
Constitution.3 Supportive comments from Anti-Federalists led Alexander
Hamilton to crow in Federalist No. 68 that "if the manner of [presidential
election] be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree
all the advantages the union of which was to be desired. 32 As it happened,
23. See id. at 8.
24. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, WHEN No MAJORITY RULES: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 7-8 (1992). The delegates also had difficulty agreeing whether, in a
congressional-selection scheme, the Senate and the House would make their choice by joint vote, with the
two houses meeting as a single body, or by concurrent vote, with each house voting separately. KURODA,
supra note 22, at 13-14.
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 393 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 1987).
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Krammnick ed., Penguin Books 1987).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
29. Id. It is unclear from the constitutional text whether the House must consider the top three
candidates, or whether it can limit itself to two.
30. See id. art. II, § I, cl. 3.
31. See KURODA, supra note 22, at 17, 21.
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 393 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 1987).
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Hamilton's enthusiasm was entirely uncalled for. The electoral scheme enacted
by the Framers was so deeply flawed that a constitutional amendment-the
Twelfth-was needed to shore up the system after only the fourth presidential
election.3 Rather than abolishing the electoral system, however, the framers
of the Twelfth Amendment were content merely to tinker with it. The basic
framework survives to this day.
B. The Winner-Take-All System
Although the winner-take-all rule is a familiar feature of modem-day
presidential elections, it is not required by the Constitution, and states are free
to adopt alternative systems. One can imagine a number of techniques by
which legislatures might exercise their constitutional authority. The simplest
of these is direct appointment, in which the legislature simply names the
electors on its own, without holding a popular election. This was a common
technique in early presidential elections; even as late as 1820, nine states still
chose presidential electors by legislative appointment.34
Alternatively, the legislature might exercise its power of appointment by
putting the choice to a popular vote. A number of such schemes are possible,
of which three are particularly important for the purposes of this Article. The
first is the winner-take-all, or general-ticket, system. In this system, each
33. The problem was that under the original electoral scheme prescribed by Article II, each elector
voted for two different candidates for President, instead of one candidate for President and one for Vice
President. The candidate with the most votes was elected President, and the runner-up became Vice
President. As long as George Washington remained the clear national consensus choice for President, this
system worked fine. But when Washington announced his intention to retire and the leaders of the nascent
Federalist and Republican parties began vying to succeed him, a problem emerged. Because of the
undifferentiated vote, a party had to manipulate the electoral machinery carefully to ensure that its vice-
presidential candidate did not defeat its presidential candidate. Certain electors had to be directed not to
cast their votes for their party's vice-presidential candidate to avoid a tie. That practice, however, created
the risk that the opposing party's presidential candidate would be elected Vice President. This is precisely
what happened in the election of 1796. John Adams, the Federalist candidate, won the election, but his
running mate, Thomas Pinckney, lost by nine votes to Adams's Republican opponent, Thomas Jefferson.
Thus Adams became President, and his chief rival, Jefferson, became Vice President.
The defects in the system became even more apparent in the election of 1800. In that campaign,
Jefferson and his running mate, Aaron Burr, ran against Adams and his new vice-presidential candidate,
Charles Pinckney, the brother of Thomas. The Republicans had a clear majority in the electoral college.
One elector in South Carolina, however, was instructed not to vote for Burr, to avoid the possibility of a
tie. The South Carolina elector failed to carry out these instructions, however, with the result that Jefferson
and Burr each received 73 electoral votes, forcing a contingency election in the House. Although the
Republicans had won a majority in the new Congress, the lame duck Federalist House controlled the
presidential selection. After bitter contention and 36 ballots, the House finally settled on Jefferson. This
tumultuous affair led to adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, which reformed the system by providing that,
in future elections, the electors would vote separately for President and Vice President.
For a detailed account of the early presidential elections and the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment,
see KURODA, supra note 22. See also GLENNON, supra note 24, at 14-15 (discussing election of 1800 and
Twelfth Amendment); PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 33-44 (discussing elections of 1792, 1796, and
1800 and Twelfth Amendment).
34. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 247. Florida also adopted legislative selection for the 1868
election, and Colorado did the same for the 1876 election. GLENNON. supra note 24, at 13.
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political party nominates a slate of candidates for the office of presidential
elector. Each voter then casts a vote for one of the slates. All of the members
of the slate that receives the most votes statewide are then elected.
Another alternative is frequently described as the "district system," but will
be referred to in this Article as the "congressional-district system" to
distinguish it from a "pure" system of single-member districts. In a pure
single-member-district scheme, a state would be divided into a number of
districts equal to the number of electors it appoints, and each district would
choose one elector. Under the congressional-district system, by contrast, two
electors are chosen at large to represent the state, and one additional elector is
chosen for each congressional district. As in the winner-take-all system, the
parties nominate a slate of candidates for the presidential-elector positions.
Once again, voters do not vote for individual candidates, but rather for one
slate or another. The difference lies in the way the votes are counted. A vote
for one party's slate is counted as a vote for that slate's two statewide
candidates and the slate's candidate for that district. The winning candidates
are the two at-large candidates who receive the most votes statewide, and the
district candidates who receive the most votes within each district. Thus, one
state may elect candidates from two or more different party slates.
A third alternative will be referred to in this Article as the "proportional
system." Under this system, the parties would choose slates of candidates for
elector and rank them in order of preference. Again, voters would not vote for
individual electors, but for party slates. Under this system, however, the
electoral seats would be allocated among the parties in proportion to the
statewide vote. Thus, if a state had ten electoral votes, and the Republican
presidential candidate received 60% of the vote, while the Democratic
presidential candidate received 40% of the vote, the first six electoral
candidates from the Republican slate and the first four from the Democratic
slate would be appointed as electors.35
In early presidential elections, the congressional-district system and the
winner-take-all system were both quite common.36 By 1832, however, the
winner-take-all system had become predominant. The only states that did not
use it were South Carolina, which retained the legislative-appointment system
until 1860, and Maryland, which retained the congressional-district system.37
35. The term "proportional system" is also used to describe a reform proposal sponsored in the Senate
by Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and in the House of Representatives by Texas Representative
Ed Gossett in 1950. Under that plan, the individual electors would have been abolished, but each state
would have retained its electoral votes. Those electoral votes would have been divided among the various
candidates based on the statewide vote, with the resulting possibility that candidates might receive fractions
of electoral votes. See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 289-90 (providing text of proposed
constitutional amendment). Since this version of the proportional plan requires a constitutional amendment,
it is beyond the scope of this Article.
36. Id. at 247.
37. See id. at 248-49 (describing methods used in various states from 1789 to 1836).
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The growth of the winner-take-all system is generally attributed to two factors.
First, the system tends to benefit the political party in power in any given state
by ensuring that the minority party will get none of that state's electoral votes.
More generally, the system tends to favor established political parties over
smaller, fringe parties and independent candidates. 8 Second, use of the
winner-take-all system tends to increase the voting power of citizens within a
state.39 Consequently, once some of the states began to adopt the winner-take-
all scheme, voters in the other states were at a competitive disadvantage, which
placed pressure on their legislatures to adopt the winner-take-all method.40
With a few variations, the winner-take-all system is currently in use in
forty-eight of the fifty states, as well as the District of Columbia.4' The
remaining two states, Maine and Nebraska, use congressional-district systems
for appointing electors.42 The Supreme Court has expressly held that both
methods are constitutional.43
How precisely does the statutory winner-take-all system work? With minor
variations, the system is essentially the same in all states. Take, for example,
the State of Alabama. Alabama law prescribes that presidential candidates can
be nominated by the national convention of a political party or a petition
signed by 5000 qualified Alabama voters. 4 To get on the ballot, the party or
other organization must deliver a certificate of nomination, or, in the
alternative, its nominating petition, to the Alabama secretary of state.45
Accompanying the petition must be a list of the names and addresses of
38. GLENNON, supra note 24, at 12.
39. This observation is based upon a mathematical analysis of the electoral college performed in the
1960s, which also demonstrated that citizens in larger states tend to have more influence over the outcome
of elections in a winner-take-all system than they would have in a direct election. See John F. Banzhaf H,
One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REv. 304, 315-16
(1968).
40. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REv. 913, 927-28 (1992)
(attributing predominance of winner-take-all system to "prisoners' dilemma" faced by states).
41. GLENNON, supra note 24, at 12.
42. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 802 (West 1994) ("One presidential elector shall be chosen
from each congressional district and 2 at large."); id. tit. 21-A, § 805(2):
The presidential electors at large shall cast their ballots for the presidential and vice-presidential
candidates who received the largest number of votes in the State. The presidential electors of
each congressional district shall cast their ballots for the presidential and vice-presidential
candidates who received the largest number of votes in each respective congressional district;
NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1038(l) (1994):
Receipt by the presidential electors of a party or a group of petitioners of the highest number
of votes statewide shall constitute election of the two at-large presidential electors of that party
or group of petitioners. Receipt by the presidential electors of a party or a group of petitioners
of the highest number of votes in a congressional district shall constitute election of the
congressional district presidential elector of that party or group of petitioners.
43. See McPherson v. Blacker. 146 U.S. 1 (1892) (holding that Michigan's use ofcongressional-district
system, rather than winner-take-all system, was constitutional). For further discussion of McPherson, see
infra Section III.A.
44. ALA. CODE § 17-19-2(a) (1995).
45. Id. § 17-19-2(b).
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candidates for the office of presidential elector equal in number to the state's
electoral vote.46
In Alabama, as in many states, candidates for the office of presidential
elector are required by law to sign a "pledge" promising to vote for the
presidential candidate supported by their party.4 7 In some states, the parties
themselves extract pledges from the electoral candidates, while in other states,
the electoral candidates are not pledged at all. Whether pledges are enforceable
under state law is an open question. 8 It is likewise unclear whether Congress
must count the vote of a "faithless" elector. From a constitutional standpoint,
electors are free to vote for whomever they choose.49 Although Congress does
have statutory authority to reject an electoral vote that is not "regularly
given,"50 it has never rejected a vote merely because it was cast for a
candidate other than the one for whom the elector was expected to vote.5' As
a practical matter, then, electors are bound primarily by their own consciences
and their political loyalties.
46. Id. § 17-19-2(c).
47. See id. (requiring pledge); see also GLENNON, supra note 24, at 32 (reporting that 24 states and
District of Columbia pledge their electors).
48. In Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952), the Supreme Court held that Alabama's statute requiring
electoral candidates to pledge their support for the party nominee did not violate the Constitution. The
Court reserved judgment, however, as to whether such promises are "legally unenforceable because
violative of an assumed constitutional freedom of the elector under the Constitution ... to vote as he may
choose in the electoral college." Id. at 230.
49. The Framers clearly contemplated that the electors would be prominent citizens who would
exercise some independent judgment. See THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 393 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac
Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 1987) ("[Ihe immediate election should be made by men most capable of
analyzing the qualities adapted to the station and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and
to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice.");
THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 376 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 1987) (arguing that
electors will be "the most enlightened and respectable citizens" and that their appointments will "bear at
least equal marks of discretion and discernment").
As a practical matter, however, electors have almost never exercised this kind of independent
judgment. Since they serve only a single, limited function, the only useful criterion for selecting one
electoral candidate as opposed to another is the way in which that candidate plans to vote. Whatever
authority makes the selection thus has a strong incentive to choose people who can reliably be expected
to vote a particular way. In Ray v. Blair, Justice Jackson, in dissent, described the electors' function with
an apt paraphrase from Gilbert and Sullivan's H.M.S. Pinafore:
They always voted at their Party's call
And never thought of thinking for themselves at all.
343 U.S. at 232 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
50. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (authorizing Congress to reject votes not "regularly given" by concurrent
vote). The constitutional authority for this provision is unclear, although the Twelfth Amendment does
specify that the President of the Senate shall count the electoral votes "in the presence of the Senate and
House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
51. It is unclear whether the vote of a faithless elector would be "regularly given" under the statute.
In the past, Congress has only rejected votes for technical or procedural violations, such as votes cast on
the wrong day or for candidates who had since died. GLENNON, supra note 24, at 36-37.
A significant dispute over this issue arose in the election of 1968, when Lloyd Bailey, an unpledged
elector from North Carolina, voted for the third-party ticket of George Wallace and Curtis Lemay instead
of the statewide winners, Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew. See id. at 37-39. Although some members of
Congress objected to the vote, neither the House nor the Senate sustained the objection. Id.
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In the Alabama general election, the names of the electoral candidates do
not appear on the ballot. 2 Instead, voters only see the name of the party and
its candidates for President and Vice President. 3 The statute provides that
"[a] vote for a candidate for President or Vice-President shall be counted as
a vote for the electors of the political party or independent body by which such
candidates were named, as listed on the certificate of nomination or nominating
petition." 4 In other words, what appears to the voter to be a direct vote for
President is in fact a vote for a single, indivisible slate of presidential electors.
Once the state tallies the results of the popular election, the governor
notifies the winning electoral candidates that they have been appointed to the
office of presidential elector.5 On the date fixed by Congress-the first
Monday after the second Wednesday in December-the electors meet at the
state capital to vote for President and Vice President. 6 In accordance with the
Constitution, the votes are then transmitted to Washington to the President of
the Senate. If for any reason, one or more electors fail to show up, the
remainder must choose a substitute by plurality vote.5 7 Since presidential
electors have overwhelmingly tended to cast their ballots for their party's
nominees,58 as a practical matter, the presidential candidate who receives the
most votes within a state will receive all of that state's electoral votes.
C. Race, Presidential Politics, and the Winner-Take-All Rule
The political realignment of the South is unquestionably the single most
striking development in American presidential politics since 1948. Once a solid
bloc of Democratic electoral votes,59 the South is now a more-or-less solid
bloc of Republican electoral votes. Although the reasons for this shift are
complex, it is beyond question that one of the principal forces driving it has
been the violent opposition of white Southern politicians to the civil rights
policies of the national Democratic party.60 This section argues that this shift
is intimately bound up with the politics of the electoral college, and in
52. ALA. CODE § 17-19-3 (1995).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 17-19-5. If the two leading candidates receive the same number of votes, the governor is
authorized to break the tie. Id. § 17-19-6.
56. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (1988) (fixing date of vote); ALA. CODE § 17-19-7 (1995) (instructing electors to vote
on date authorized by Congress); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (providing that day of choosing electors
shall be uniform throughout United States).
57. ALA. CODE § 17-19-7 (1995).
58. GLENNON, supra note 24, at 32 (noting that more than 99% of electors have voted in accordance
with pledges).
59. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO U.S. ELEcTIONS 286-303 (2d ed. 1985).
60. Thomas Byrne Edsall has identified several other factors that contributed to this shift, including
taxation and redistribution of income; a "rights revolution" mandating federal protection of the rights of
criminal defendants and other politically disempowered groups; and a procedural reform movement within
the Democratic party. THOMAS B. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES
ON AMERICAN POLITICS 3-4 (2d ed. 1992).
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particular with the dominance of the winner-take-all system, which tends to
ensure that the South will vote as a bloc. The national Republican party's
efforts to control this bloc have forced it to move much farther to the right on
issues of race, while the national Democratic party has scrambled to solidify
its base of African-American voters. 6' Modem presidential politics-not just
in the South, but in the nation as a whole-can therefore only be understood
in the context of this history. Accordingly, this section examines the ways in
which Southern politicians have attempted to use their influence in the
electoral college to exert control over national issues relating to race and civil
rights.
1. Strom Thurmond and the "Dixiecrat" Campaign of 1948
The presidential campaign of 1948 marked the first in a series of efforts
by white Southern politicians to manipulate the machinery of the electoral
college to influence the national debate on civil rights. In that year, Southern
Democrats in four states abandoned their party's nominee, President Harry S.
Truman, and threw their support behind a segregationist ticket headed by J.
Strom Thurmond, the Democratic governor of South Carolina.
62
Although "states' rights" was the rallying cry of the Southern
Democrats-or "Dixiecrats," as they became known in common parlance-the
true force that bound them together was their violent opposition to any
measure of social and political equality for African-Americans. In 1948, the
pressures that would ultimately crack the prevailing segregationist power
structure of the South were just beginning to mount. Late in December 1947,
the Fourth Circuit had upheld a federal court decision ordering the South
Carolina Democratic party to allow blacks to vote in its primary.63 In
February 1948, President Truman delivered a civil rights message to a joint
session of Congress, calling for abolition of poll taxes, enactment of a federal
anti-lynching law, creation of a permanent federal employment commission,
and new measures to end discrimination in interstate transportation facilities. 
6
White Southerners were enraged. They responded with angry denunciations
and threats to abandon the Democratic party, as well as with Ku Klux Klan
rallies and cross burnings throughout the South.65
Southern politicians were determined to use their influence in the electoral
college to defeat Truman's agenda. The intellectual blueprint for their strategy
61. See Edward G. Carmines & Robert Huckfeldt, Party Politics in the Wake of the Voting Rights Act,
in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 117. 127-34 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).
62. For an account of Thurmond's 1948 presidential campaign, see NADINE COHODAS. STROM
THURMOND AND THE POLmCS OF SOUTHERN CHANGE 126-93 (1993); PEIRCE & LONGLEY. supra note 3.
at 59-63.
63. See Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947). cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
64. COHODAS, supra note 62, at 129.
65. Id. at 129-35.
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was an unabashedly racist political manifesto by Charles Wallace Collins, a
Harvard-educated Alabama lawyer with an extensive background in federal
government service, including stints as the law librarian of Congress and the
librarian of the Supreme Court.6 6 His book, entitled Whither Solid South? A
Study in Politics and Race Relations, portrayed the South as a region under
legislative siege by a conspiracy of, among others, "the Negroes and the New
York City radicals." 67 With undeniable candor and considerable prescience,
Collins wrote that:
These groups, with ever increasing pressure during the past ten years,
are attempting to drive the South into a comer of moral isolation on
the Negro race question, as a vantage point for hostile action. I have
shown how these organizations ... are rallying to a new philosophy
the slogan of which is the word "democracy" which in its very
concept condemns in one breath the whole southern system, and how
the whole movement is anchored to a craftily conceived legislative
program to make the Negro equal to the white man economically,
politically and socially.68
Collins proposed that white Southerners should combat these efforts by
abandoning the Democratic party and allying themselves with conservative
Republicans in the North and West.69 Failing that, he called on Southern
Democrats simply to break away from the Northern Democrats and form their
own political party.
70
66. 32 WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA 614 (1963). On the influence of Collins's book, see COHODAS, supra
note 62, at 133. Collins apparently remained an influential figure in segregationist political circles well into
the next decade. Shortly after the Supreme Court's Brown decision, he offered quite cogent legal advice
to Judge Leander Perez, the political boss of Plaquemines Parish in Louisiana, on the methods of
circumventing school desegregation by abolishing public schools. GLEN JEANSONNE, LEANDER PEREZ: BOSS
OF THE DELTA 230-31 (2d ed. 1995). Perez, a figure noted in Louisiana history for both his vicious racism
and his remarkable career of political corruption, was apparently quite taken with Collins's books, and
quoted from them during a televised debate with William F. Buckley in 1968 to prove that he was not a
racist. Id. at 337, 428 nA5. Buckley, unpersuaded, was left more-or-less speechless, although he did
comment that Perez's ignorance was ""staggering."' Id. at 337.
67. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 258. The following passage is typical of the flavor of Collins's book:
In spite of the marked progress which they have made in the last twenty-five years, I do
not see any chance for the Negro people ever to attain the full gratification of their desires in
the American republic in the continental United States. There are now many happy Negroes in
this country but they are on the southern plantations. They are ignorant, carefree and
irresponsible--but happy. Last summer I saw on the streets of Los Angeles hundreds of these
gay and happy-go-lucky Negroes fresh from the cotton fields of the Deep South.... In San
Francisco I was riding in a crowded streetcar packed with standing passengers. I had to worm
my way through to get off. In my path was a little black pickaninny standing beside her jet
black fat young mother. I said: "Look out, little sister, I am coming through." They both
spontaneously looked me in the face and flashed a broad white-toothed smile as though happy
to hear the sound of a voice from back home.
Id. at 303. Among other things, Collins also proposed establishment of a forty-ninth state in Africa where
American blacks would be encouraged to live. Id. at 315-20.
68. Id. at vii.
69. Id. at 255-57.
70. Id. at 258.
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Manipulation of the electoral college was the crux of Collins's strategy.
He noted that:
[T]here are two ... weapons of respectability available to the South
which cannot be taken away from her without her consent-namely,
her almost certain ability to prevent the Constitution from being
amended and her power in the Electoral College. I have pointed out
the logic of the conversion of the present Republican-Southern
Democratic coalition into a new conservative political party. If that
cannot be done it would be better for the South to fight independently
in the Electoral College than to continue to keep political company
with the left-wing New Dealers who are at heart the South's most
bitter enemies.7'
Collins proposed three distinct methods by which the South might tinker with
the electoral machinery to block civil rights legislation. The first would be for
Southern Democrats simply to nominate their own candidates for President and
Vice President, along with slates of electors pledged to support them. By
controlling a large bloc of electoral votes, a Southern Democratic party could
force the election into the House of Representatives, and possibly control the
outcome.72 Collins acknowledged that this plan had drawbacks. The principal
one was that "the old Democratic Party in the North" might also try to run
candidates in the South, and that "old loyalties" might prevail.73 To avoid this
possibility, Collins proposed an alternative: abolition of the popular vote and
direct appointment by the states of presidential electors pledged to support a
Southern party nominee. 74 As a third strategy, he suggested that Southern
Democrats appoint electors who were not pledged to support the national
party's nominee. The unpledged electors would then hold a convention after
the popular vote in December and decide whom to support.76
The reaction of white Southern politicians to Truman's civil rights
initiatives bears the unmistakable imprint of Collins's ideas. Four days after
Truman's announcement, Southern governors met at Wakulla Springs, Florida,
and denounced the President's efforts to end segregation. They adopted a
resolution, written largely by Thurmond, which condemned efforts to
undermine "the racial integrity and purity of the white and the negro races
alike," and promised that white Southerners would not
71. Id. at ix.
72. Id. at 261-62.
73. Id. at 262.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 262-63.




stand idle and let all of this happen, for the sole purpose of enticing
an infinitesimal minority of organized pressure blocs to vote for one
or another candidate for the Presidency. It is thought that we have no
redress. This assumption ignores the electoral college set up in the
Constitution of the United States.77
Determined to use their influence in the electoral college to deny Truman
the Democratic nomination, party officials in Alabama, Mississippi, and South
Carolina were soon in open rebellion. The Alabama Democrats adopted a new
emblem for their state party: a rooster emblazoned with the words "White
Supremacy" and "For the Right. 78 Southern Democrats arrived at the
national party convention in Philadelphia intending to keep any pro-civil rights
language out of the party platform. When their efforts failed and a civil rights
plank was included in the platform, half of the Alabama delegation and the
entire Mississippi delegation walked out of the convention. 79 At a rump
convention in Birmingham, Southern Democrats nominated Thurmond as their
candidate for President. The new nominee delivered a fiery acceptance speech,
declaring, "'[T]here's not enough troops in the army to force the southern
people to break down segregation and admit the Negro race into our theaters,
into our swimming pools, into our homes, and into our churches."'
81
Thurmond's aim was to force the election into the House, where Southern
influence would either lead to his election as President or force the major
parties to adopt conciliatory policies on civil rights.8' The dominance of the
winner-take-all rule was crucial to this strategy. Rather than running Thurmond
as a third-party candidate, the Dixiecrats sought to use the existing Democratic
77. COHODAS, supra note 62, at 133 (quoting text of resolution).
78. Id. at 139; see also PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 284-85 (reproducing 1960 presidential
election ballot with rooster emblem on it, and noting that white supremacy slogan was discontinued in
1966).
79. COHODAS, supra note 62, at 167.
80. Id. at 177 (quoting Strom Thurmond, Acceptance of Presidential Candidacy at Southern
Democratic convention (July 17, 1948)).
81. This strategy had an important historical antecedent. In 1876, much of the South was still under
military control as part of Congress's Reconstruction program. In the presidential election that year,
Democrat Samuel J. Tilden won a popular-vote victory over Republican Rutherford B. Hayes. The electoral
vote results, however, were unclear-largely because of confusion and allegations of fraud in three
Southern states. A special commission consisting of five Senators, five members of the House of
Representatives and five Supreme Court Justices was set up to investigate the vote; it ultimately awarded
all of the disputed electoral votes to Hayes, making him the apparent winner. In order for Hayes to be
formally elected, however, Congress had to approve the count. With less than three days to go before the
inauguration, Democrats in the House threatened to block approval. Ultimately, Hayes agreed to remove
federal troops from the South and end Reconstruction in exchange for Democratic agreement to accept him
as President. Shortly after the election, Hayes kept his part of the bargain-resulting in the near-total loss
of all civil and political rights for Southern blacks. In 1948. a successful challenge by Thurmond could
have perpetuated that result. Southern civil rights opponents were well aware of the outcome of the 1876
election, even if some of them were a bit hazy as to the details of what had actually taken place. See
JEANSONNE, supra note 66, at 315-16.
On the election of 1876, see GLENNON, supra note 24, at 16-17; PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3,
at 52-57.
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party machinery. Because of the Democrats' nearly total domination of state
politics, its slate of electors was assured victory. Hence if the Democrats in a
Southern state nominated a slate of electors pledged to Thurmond, rather than
Truman, Thurmond would win that state.
By August, the Democratic party in four states-Alabama, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and South Carolina-had nominated slates of presidential electors
who were pledged to support Thurmond, rather than Truman. Truman did
get on the ballot in three of those states, but was shut out in Alabama.83 In
the general election, Thurmond won all four states, receiving a total of thirty-
nine electoral votes. Despite the Southern defection, however, Truman
managed to eke out an unexpected win over his Republican opponent, Thomas
E. Dewey.
Although these events may seem like ancient history, they are not. One
example of how recent they are in our nation's political development is the
fact that Thurmond, now a Republican and the senior Senator from South
Carolina, is currently serving as President of the Senate pro tem---a position
that, ironically enough, puts him fourth in line to succeed to the Presidency.85
The election of 1948 set the stage for a drama that was played out again in the
South in the presidential elections of 1960 and 1968 and that, in many respects
is still going on today.
2. The Free Elector Movement of 1960
By 1960, civil rights issues had erupted into the foreground of American
politics. With Congress beginning to place antidiscrimination laws at the top
of its agenda86 and the White House using federal troops to enforce the
Supreme Court's integration decree,87 the fears that Collins had expressed ten
years earlier of a "Second Reconstruction" seemed to be coming true.88 And
once again, Southerners attempted to use the electoral college to block it.
By 1958, white Southern politicians were laying the groundwork for what
they described as a "free elector" plan--essentially a variant of the third
82. COHODAS, supra note 62, at 181.
83. Id. at 182.
84. See S. Res. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REc. S418 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995) (enacted).
85. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (1988).
86. Congress enacted a civil rights bill in 1957 despite vigorous opposition from Southern Democrats,
including a record-length filibuster by Thurmond lasting 24 hours and 18 minutes. See COHODAS, supra
note 62, at 294-300; see also TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE 'WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS
1954-63, at 220-22 (1988).
87. In 1954, the Supreme Court had decided Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
holding that segregation in public schools was unconstitutional. Faced with widespread Southern resistance,
President Eisenhower had ordered federal troops into Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957 to carry out the
Court's integration decree. See, e.g., BRANCH, supra note 86, at 222-25 (1988); see also Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958) (upholding desegregation plan set out in Brown).
88. COLLINS, supra note 1, at 262-63; see supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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scheme proposed by Collins.89 Rather than running their own candidate for
President, however, proponents of this plan sought to change state law and
party rules to allow the Democrats in Southern states to nominate a slate of
presidential electors not pledged to support the national party nominee.90
Although support for the free-elector plan initially ran strong in several
Southern states,91 the Democratic nominee, John F. Kennedy, managed to
defuse the rebellion by selecting a Southerner, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon
B. Johnson of Texas, as his running mate.92
Even with Johnson on the ticket, however, the unpledged-elector
movement scored significant victories in two Southern states. In Alabama,
Democratic voters chose the eleven members of the Democratic electoral slate
in a primary election and a runoff. Only five of the winning candidates were
pledged to support the national party's nominee; the remaining six were
unpledged.93 In Mississippi, Governor Ross Barnett, a leading backer of the
free-elector plan and an ardent segregationist, succeeded in a move to have two
slates of Democratic electors-one pledged to Kennedy and Johnson and one
unpledged-placed on the ballot.9 4 All told, then, fourteen unpledged
89. See W.H. Lawrence, South Maps Move for 1960 Victory, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1958, at 26.
90. One of the leading backers of this plan in Louisiana was Judge Leander Perez, the political boss
of Plaquemines Parish and a vicious opponent of integration. See JEANSONNE, supra note 66, at 313-22.
As noted above, see discussion supra note 66, Perez was quite familiar with Collins's work. This suggests
that Collins's ideas had a direct influence on the 1960 unpledged-elector movement, as well as the
subsequent campaign of George Wallace, in which Perez also played an important role. JEANSONNE, supra
note 66, at 315, 344-45.
91. By the spring of 1960, the necessary changes had been adopted in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. See Arthur Krock, Growth of 'Free Elector' Movement in
South, N.Y. TiES, Mar. 4, 1960, at 24; Claude Sitton, Dixiecrat Move Gains Adherents, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
22, 1959, at I; see also Act of Mar. 21, 1958, § 6, 1958 Ga. Laws 208, 211 (amending prior law to provide
that names of candidates for elector and their party be placed on ballot, but that name of presidential
candidate be omitted).
92. See Most Southern Governors Cool to Suggestion They Bolt 71cket, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1960,
at 16 (reporting view of Georgia governor that choice of Johnson strengthened ticket in Georgia, as well
as increasing support for ticket from governors of Kentucky, Alabama, and Tennessee); see also PEIRCE
& LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 64 ("Johnson's presence on the ticket was probably an essential element in
holding most of the South behind Kennedy and effecting Democratic victory in one of the closest elections
of U.S. history.").
Had Kennedy chosen the more liberal Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, a strong supporter
of civil rights, Southern states would certainly have been more inclined to bolt the party, as they had in
1948. See Arthur Krock, Darkening Party Prospect for the South, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1960, at 30
(reporting "consternation" among Southern Democrats at prospect that Humphrey might be vice-presidential
nominee).
93. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 66.
94. Claude Sitton, Democrats to Offer 2 Mississippi Slates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1960, at 1.
In other Southern states, party loyalty prevailed over antipathy toward civil rights. In Georgia, voters
approved a referendum releasing electors from their pledges. Claude Sitton, Georgia Electors 'Freed' By
Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1960, at 22. The referendum was essentially an empty formality, however,
since it was nonbinding, and most electors on the Democratic slate had already expressed their loyalty to
Kennedy and Johnson. Id.; see also Vandiver Backs His Party Slate. N.Y. TIMES. Aug, 23, 1960, at 20.
In South Carolina, Governor Ernest F. Hollings, a Kennedy backer, initially supported the idea of having
both a pledged and an unpledged-elector slate on the ballot, as in Mississippi, but subsequently reversed
his position. Claude Sitton, South Carolina in Kennedy Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15. 1960. at 14 (noting that
Hollings endorsed Kennedy but submitted resolution providing for unpledged-elector slate to state party
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Democratic electors were elected from the South: six from Alabama, and eight
from Mississippi, where the unpledged slate defeated the Kennedy-Johnson
slate.95
Efforts to manipulate the electoral system to block civil rights initiatives
did not cease after the popular vote, however. Although Kennedy appeared to
have defeated Nixon in the popular vote and to have gained a slight electoral
vote majority, allegations of fraud and widespread irregularities at the polls
meant that the results were far from certain. If Kennedy had lost Illinois, he
would have had only 273 electoral votes-only four more than he needed to
win the election. In that scenario, if the unpledged electors could have
persuaded at least four other electors to join them, they could have denied
Kennedy the White House, or more likely, could have wrested concessions
from him on civil rights.96 Shortly after the election, an Alabama lawyer
called for all of the Southern electors to meet with Kennedy to point out the
"'vital importance of Southern electoral votes in his attaining the
Presidency."' 97 Alabama newspapers backed the idea of an electoral revolt on
openly segregationist grounds, condemning "[federal efforts to force racial
mixing in New Orleans" and the "enslavement" of Southern children as a
result of school integration efforts. 98 Mississippi Governor Barnett sent out
letters to electors in six other states asking them not to vote for Kennedy.99
In Louisiana, leaders of the White Citizens Council sought to have the state's
electors withhold votes from Kennedy, stating that he had "gone wild on
integration."' 00
Ultimately, the fourteen unpledged electors decided to cast their votes for
Senator Harry R Byrd of Virginia,' 0' the man who four years earlier had
pledged "massive resistance" to the Supreme Court's school desegregation
convention); Claude Sitton, South Carolina Assists Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1960, at 18 (observing
Hollings's reversal and plea for party unity and convention's defeat of resolution). State party officials
rejected a move to place unpledged electors on the ballot-but made it clear that Democrats unsatisfied
with the ticket were free to support the Republican ticket of Richard Nixon and Henry Cabot Lodge. Id.
In Louisiana, a sharply divided Democratic State Central Committee voted 51-49 to pledge its electors to
Kennedy and Johnson. Claude Sitton, Democrats Block Bolt in Louisiana, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 12, 1960, at
1.
95. See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 65-66, 69; see also Claude Sitton, Kennedy Scores
Heavily in South, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1960, at I ("Mississippi voters wandered off into an uncharted
political wasteland behind a slate of independent Democratic electors. Those pledged to Mr. Kennedy ran
second and the Republicans a poor third.").
96. See Mississippi Vote Held for 3d Man, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1960, at 11; see also PEIRCE &
LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 69.
97. Elector Parley Urged, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 13, 1960. at 86 (quoting Montgomery attorney Lea
Harris).
98. 2 Alabama Papers Ask Kennedy Upset, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1960, at 13.
99. See Kennedy Bolt Urged, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1960, at 31; see also PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra
note 3, at 69.
100. Louisianan Continues Fight, N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 6. 1960, at 30; see also PEIRCE & LONGLEY,
supra note 3, at 69; Louisiana Shift Blocked, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1960, at 25.
101. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 69.
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decisions.'0 2 Resistance to civil rights reforms was the guiding principle
behind their choice. Calling on electors from other states to join them, the
unpledged electors declared that Byrd's election would depend "upon whether
or not the people of the South who have expressed their dedication to the
principles of constitutional government and to the right of a state to determine
for itself the questions of segregation and freedom of association are sincere
in the continued expressions of such dedication."'0 3 In announcing their
decision not to vote for Kennedy, Alabama electors called for "the preservation
of racial and national integrity" and voiced vehement opposition to efforts to
"integrate our schools, do away withiliteracy tests as a qualification for voting
[and] otherwise undermine everything we hold dear in the South."'1 4
The free-elector movement of 1960 thus represents another deliberate
effort by Southern segregationists to use the electoral system to change the
course of the national debate over race and civil rights. Ultimately, of course,
Byrd received only fifteen electoral votes. 10 5 Kennedy won the election, with
303 electoral votes to Nixon's 219. Thus, the segregationist electors were not
able to alter the outcome of the election as they had hoped. However, they
were able to demonstrate the central importance of racial issues in controlling
the Southern vote in the electoral college-a lesson that Nixon would take to
heart eight years later in his next bid for the presidency.
3. The Wallace Campaign of 1968 and the Rise of the Republican South
Overt racist appeals and efforts to manipulate the electoral system
materialized again in the election of 1968. That election saw yet another
attempt by an openly segregationist third-party challenger to manipulate the
electoral system. This time the challenger was Alabama Governor George C.
Wallace, who had become notorious for his no-holds-barred stance against
integration when, in his 1963 inaugural address, he proclaimed that, "'In the
name of the greatest people that have ever trod this earth, I draw the line in
the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny ... and I say...
segregation now ... segregation tomorrow ... segregation forever."",
10 6
102. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, HARRY BYRD AND THE CHANGING FACE OF VIRGINIA POLITICS,
1945-1966, at 113 (1968).
103. 14 Electors Vow to Vote for Byrd, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1960, at 23.
104. Six Electors Bar Kennedy Support, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1960, at 56.
105. The 14 Democratic Byrd electors were joined by one Republican, an Oklahoma man from a
winning slate pledged to Nixon and Lodge. Shortly after the popular vote, the Oklahoma elector, Henry
Irwin, had telegraphed other Republican electors and suggested that they join forces with Southern
Democrats and support Byrd for President. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 70.
106. DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE. THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW
CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 11 (1995) (ellipses indicate purposeful
pauses in address); see also id. at 9-10, 109. Wallace's notoriety grew when, in a carefully arranged media
event, he defied President Kennedy's orders and physically blocked Assistant Attorney General Nicholas
Katzenbach from entering a campus building at the University of Alabama to register black students. See,
e.g., BRANCH, supra note 86, at 821-22 (noting that Alabama governor's "contemptuous nationwide
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Furthermore, the 1968 election marked the beginning of the modern period of
Republican domination of the South, as an increasing number of one-time
Dixiecrats began to shift their allegiance to Nixon and the GOP. 7
In many respects, Wallace's campaign was similar to Thurmond's
campaign in 1948. Blatant racism and continued support for segregation were
integral to the message delivered by both men. 0 8 There was one key
difference, however. Wallace, unlike Thurmond, was determined to wage a
nationwide campaign. His supporters were highly organized, and they managed
to get his name placed on the ballot in all fifty states-a logistical feat that
many had thought impossible for a third-party candidate. 0 9 Wallace was
aided in this effort by the fact that, by 1968, race was no longer simply a
Southern issue. Beginning with the 1965 Watts riots in Los Angeles, a series
of violent disturbances in urban black neighborhoods had forced race to the
forefront of the nation's political consciousness."t 0 In 1968, the assassination
of Martin Luther King touched off a wave of riots in more than 100 cities
throughout the nation, resulting in thirty-nine deaths and almost 20,000
arrests."' This tide of violence prompted both Wallace and the Republican
candidate, Richard Nixon, to make "law and order" a prominent theme of the
presidential campaign-a theme that in Wallace's rhetoric had none-too-subtle
racial overtones. 2 School desegregation efforts, once limited to the South,
were gathering strength in other areas, offering Wallace and Nixon another
campaign theme." 3
address... helped elevate Wallace from the marginal stature of a Ross Barnett into a presidential
contender"); CARTER, supra, at 142-53. Wallace's standing in racist political circles increased even further
with the brutal crackdowns by Alabama authorities on civil rights protesters in Birmingham in 1964, see
id. at 114-17, 124-28, and Selma in 1965, see id. at 246-50.
107. The beginnings of the Southern shift to the Republican party can actually be traced back to the
election of 1964, in which Republican Barry Goldwater carried five Southern states-Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina-as well as his home state of Arizona. See EDSALL, supra note
60, at 7, 32-46. Goldwater's popularity in the South was primarily due to his opposition to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and other federal efforts to end segregation. Id. at 38-41. Nixon, however, unlike Goldwater,
was able to integrate his Southern strategy into a successful national campaign.
108. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 106, at photo insert (reproducing flyer used by Wallace in 1970
gubernatorial campaign, containing photograph depicting white girl surrounded by African-American
children, with caption reading, "This Could Be Alabama Four Years From Now! Do You Want It?").
109. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 73-74; THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE
PRESIDENT, 1968, at 346-47 (1969); see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 26 (1968).
110. See CARTER, supra note 106, at 301-08; WHITE, supra note 109, at 23-29, 199-206.
111. WHITE, supra note 109, at 207-09.
112. See CARTER, supra note 106, at 347-49. With respect to Nixon's stance on the law-and-order
issue, Carter notes one occasion on which the candidate's carefully planned race-neutral facade slipped, and
he told his staff that a television commercial was "'all about law and order and the damn Negro-Puerto
Rican groups out there."' Id. at 348.
113. Id. at 349-50. Theodore H. White quotes an interview in which Wallace proclaimed:
"By the fall of 1968, the people of Cleveland and Chicago and Gary and St. Louis will be so
god-damned sick and tired of Federal interference in their local schools, they'll be ready to vote
for Wallace by the thousands. The people don't like this triflin' with their children, tellin' 'em
which teachers to have to teach in which schools, and bussing little boys and girls half across
a city just to achieve 'the proper racial mix."'
WHITE, supra note 109, at 346.
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Wallace's strategy was also similar to that of his Dixiecrat predecessor-
but with one important twist. As he revealed in an interview after the election,
he never had any intention of letting the election go into the House, where he
would not have controlled a single state delegation. If he had collected enough
electoral votes to block either of the two major party nominees-Hubert
Humphrey for the Democrats, or Richard Nixon for the Republicans-from
getting an electoral college majority, Wallace would have attempted to strike
a bargain with Nixon, throwing the support of Wallace's electors to the
Republican in exchange for concessions on civil rights.
14
The 1968 election also solidified Republican domination of the "Solid
South." Prodded by Thurmond, who had become a Republican in 1964," 5
the GOP began to bid heavily for-the support of the Dixiecrats.' 6 In the
presidential election, Thurmond and other one-time Democrats threw their
support behind Nixon."7 The "Southern strategy" paid off, not just for Nixon
in 1968, but for the Republican party. By appealing to the white segregationist
bloc that had controlled Southern politics since the end of Reconstruction,
Nixon captured six Southern states: Florida, Kentucky, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Wallace won another five states: Alabama,
Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Once again, the winner-take-all
system ensured that African-American voters, unlikely to support either
Wallace or the Thurmond-backed Nixon, could not choose a single elector in
these eleven states.
4. Racial Politics and Present-Day Campaigns
In the four most recent presidential elections, the South has been solidly
in the Republican camp, notwithstanding a dramatic surge in the number of
African-Americans registered to vote."' But as the gradual realignment of
white Southerners from 1948 to 1968 makes clear, the current Republican
domination of the electoral college in the South is no accident. Rather, it is in
large part the result of a conscious effort by white Southern politicians-first
by segregationist Democrats, and later by racially conservative Republicans-
to make race a focal point of presidential politics." 9
114. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 75.
115. COHODAS, supra note 62, at 318.
116. See id. at 385 (describing racial appeals by Republican party and pro-Thurmond "Independents"
in Thurmond's 1966 Senate campaign).
117. See id. at 396-400; WHITE, supra note 109, at 137-38.
118. See BERNARD GROFMAN E' AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING
EQUALITY 21-23 (1992) (describing surge in black political participation in South in wake of 1965 Voting
Rights Act and its 1970 and 1975 extensions).
119. See Carmines & Huckfeldt, supra note 61, at 120-25 (arguing that, while racial positions of
national Democratic and Republican parties were similar in 1960, parties and public perceptions of party
positions diverged starkly along racial lines after 1964).
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Today, race remains a polarizing force in presidential politics. 20 The
realignment of the bloc of white racial conservatives from the Democratic
party to the Republican party has altered the political picture, however.
Because of this shift, racial conservatives no longer need to manipulate the
electoral college in the manner that Thurmond and Wallace attempted. Instead,
they rely on the discriminatory mathematics of the winner-take-all system,
which ensures that racial minorities have no voice in determining the
composition of the electoral college. Republicans today often refer to their
party as having a "lock" on the electoral college by virtue of its dominance in
the South.'2' Such terminology echoes-though perhaps unconsciously-the
language used by Collins nearly fifty years ago.
Racial appeals continue to be a staple of presidential politics. Rather than
relying on overt racist imagery, as Thurmond did in 1948, modem politicians
generally play the "race card" through subtle use of code words and careful
manipulation of racial imagery. 22 For example, George Bush's victory over
Michael Dukakis in 1988 is frequently attributed to his campaign's skillful
handling of racial imagery-most notably the infamous "Willie Horton"
episode. 123 Indeed, many of the rhetorical devices and subtle racial images
employed by modern-day Republicans are essentially variations on themes
developed by Wallace in his 1968 campaign. 2 4 Issues of race are frequently
closely tied to a number of "social issues," ranging from crime to welfare to
affirmative action."
120. For a thorough account of the fundamental role race plays in modem presidential politics, see
EDSALL, supra note 60.
121. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne Jr., Analyzing the Electoral Vote: Does G.O.P. Have a 'Lock'?, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1988, at Al.
122. See, e.g., EDSALL, supra note 60, at 203-06, 213-14, 221-27.
123. Horton was a convicted murderer who had been released from a Massachusetts prison for a
weekend furlough during Dukakis's tenure as governor. While free, he fled the state and committed a
violent rape. See, e.g., JACK NV. GERMOND & JULES WITCOVER, WHOSE BROAD STRIPES AND BRIGHT
STARS? THE TRIVIAL PURSUIT OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1988, at 10-12 (1989). This incident subsequently
became the subject of a nationally broadcast Bush campaign commercial. Although the commercial did not
show a picture of Horton, it was well known that he was African-American, and his picture was
prominently displayed on flyers distributed by a state committee and in at least one television commercial
put out by an independent group. Bush also made frequent references to the Horton incident in campaign
appearances and speeches. Id. at 11, 357-58, 411, 422-23.
124. See EDSALL, supra note 60, at 10-11; see also CARTER, supra note 106, at 466-68. Carter ends
his analysis of Wallace's contribution to American political discourse with the pithy observation that the
Alabama governor is "the most influential loser in twentieth-century American politics." Id. at 468.
It is worth noting that even some of Thurmond's 1948 rhetoric survives to this day. A prominent
element of the Republican party's agenda in the 1994 campaign was support for "states' rights"-a term
that, from 1948 on, has been closely associated with supporters of segregation. I do not mean to suggest
that supporters of states' rights are necessarily racists-merely that the term has quite distinct racial
overtones.
125. Early in the 1996 presidential race, several Republican candidates said that ending affirmative
action was one of their primary goals. See, e.g., Richard L. Berke, Politicians Start Yearlong Siege of New
Hampshire, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at Al (noting Senator Robert Dole's, Senator Phil Gramm's, and
former Governor Lamar Alexander's statements that ending affirmative action is at top of their list of
goals).
The Illegitimate President
Race surfaces in other unexpected ways in our national politics. In the
current presidential campaign, many members of the media enthusiastically
touted General Colin Powell, a prominent African-American and the former
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a possible Republican candidate for
President. In many ways, this phenomenon was curious, because Powell had
never sought public office or offered any hint of a political agenda. While the
origins of the Powell noncandidacy are complex, it seems undeniable that one
of the primary reasons for the media fascination with him was his race. As an
African-American Republican (or at least, a presumed Republican), Powell did
not fit into established categories. He was seen as someone who might be able
to attract the support of both black Democrats and white Republicans. In this
respect, Powell's backers were tacitly acknowledging the stranglehold that race
has on the American electorate. Indeed, Powell acknowledged as much in his
speech announcing that he would not run for President, commenting that he
wanted "'to help the party of Lincoln move, once again, close to the spirit of
Lincoln.,"
112 6
Racial politics also play an important role on the other side of the political
aisle. Democratic candidates frequently try to walk an almost impossibly fine
line, desperately trying to distance themselves from black political interests
without alienating their African-American political base. 27
In short, race has by no means been a trivial or incidental issue in
presidential politics of the modem era. Far from it, race has been a central
issue in the most important political trend of the last fifty years: the conversion
of the South from a Democratic bastion to a Republican one, and the
126. Excerpts from General Powell's News Conference on Political Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995,
at B13. In response to a question, Powell amplified this comment by stating that:
[A] very large percentage of blacks don't believe the Republican party appeals to them and they
vote consistently Democratic. And I think it would be in the interest of minorities, and
especially for African-Americans, to have other choices. And I think it would be an important
thing for the Republican party to broaden its appeal.
Id.
In an earlier interview, Powell's wife made a comment that further highlights the central importance
of race in presidential politics. In response to the question, "'Do you fear for your husband's safety should
he run?' Alma Powell responded: ."Yes, he would probably be at much more risk than any other candidate
because of the--of being a black man in this society. There's a lot of crazy people out there."' 20120 (ABC
television broadcast, Sept. 15, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, ABCNews File. The suggestion
that an African-American running for President in the United States in 1995 would face special perils is
disturbing, and should not be lightly discounted. Indeed, threats and violence directed at potential African-
American candidates have historically been two of the principal methods by which Southerners deprived
minorities of political power. See Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in MINORITY
VOTE DILUTION 1, 3-4 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (discussing problem of candidate discouragement).
127. An interesting example of this phenomenon occurred in 1992, when Democratic candidate Bill
Clinton made a point of publicly criticizing remarks made by a black rap singer, Sister Souljah, at a
meeting of Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition shortly before the Democratic convention. The remarks were
widely viewed as part of a Clinton strategy to keep from being too closely identified with Jackson, and with
black interests, in the minds of white voters. See, e.g., R.W. Apple Jr., Jackson Sees a 'Character Flaw'
in Clinton's Remarks on Racism, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1992, at Al (describing Clinton's remarks as "part
of an effort to suggest that unlike the Democratic nominees who have lost five of the last six Presidential
elections, he could stand up to minorities and interest groups").
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Republican party's corresponding shift from a moderate stance on racial
policies to a much more extreme position. 128 In effect, the battle between the
parties for control of the South has led to their severe divergence with respect
to racial issues-a change that has been felt not just in the South, but
nationwide.
For nearly five decades, politicians have been relying on the primacy of
the winner-take-all scheme as a means of excluding African-American voters
from the political process. The efforts of Strom Thurmond and George Wallace
to inject race into the presidential contests in 1948 and 1968 help to illustrate
the logic of George Bush's attempts to do much the same thing in 1988. This
recurring emphasis on race all but guarantees the continued occurrence of
racially polarized voting, and consequently ensures that minority voters will
not enjoy an equal opportunity to participate in the selection of their Chief
Executive.
Im. APPLICATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT TO
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended by Congress in
1982, is one of the most powerful and far-reaching civil rights statutes enacted
in our nation's history. In its current form, the statute reads as follows:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color ... as provided in subsection (b) of this
section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if,
based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members
of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that
its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a
protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided,
That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.'29
128. See Carmines & Huckfeldt, supra note 61. at 121-25.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). The language I have omitted from subsection (a) stems from the 1975
amendments to the Act, which extended its protection to language minorities, such as Hispanics. as well
as to racial groups like African-Americans. See id. § 1973b(f)(2).
[Vol. 105: 935
The Illegitimate President
Congress designed this statute, with its heavy emphasis on results, to put an
end to the use of a category of discriminatory practices known as vote dilution.
Vote dilution occurs when an electoral scheme functions in such a way as to
limit the ability of members of a minority group to influence the political
process as a practical matter. Thus, even a scheme that appears to be fair from
a purely formal standpoint may violate § 2 if it tends to minimize minority
voting power in its operation.
For instance, consider a hypothetical town of 1000 voters, 700 of whom
are white and 300 of whom are black. Suppose that this town is governed by
a ten-member city council elected at large by majority vote. In any election,
each voter is entitled to vote for one candidate for each of the city council
seats to be filled. If the council terms are not staggered, each voter will thus
be able to cast one ballot for each of ten different candidates in the typical
election. At-large electoral schemes of this type were once quite common in
this country, and still exist in many places. 30 Municipal reformers at the turn
of the century argued that at-large systems would produce better governments
by forcing candidates to run for office citywide rather than trying to appeal to
one particular faction.'13 One problem with this argument is that voting is
often polarized along racial lines. 32 Suppose that the 700 white voters, or at
least a significant portion of them, tend to vote as a bloc. Under an at-large
electoral scheme, they will be able to pick all ten council members. African-
American voters may have very different preferences, but no matter how
strongly cohesive they are, they will never be able to elect any candidate other
than one supported by the white majority. They can vote, but they do not have
a real influence on the outcome of the election.
Congress enacted the 1982 amendments to § 2 in response to a 1980
Supreme Court decision dealing with just this type of discrimination. In City
of Mobile v. Bolden,133 the Court had held that neither the Fourteenth nor the
Fifteenth Amendment barred the use of a dilutive at-large system absent a
showing that it was adopted or maintained for a discriminatory purpose."
130. See Richard L. Engstrom & Michael D. McDonald, The Effect of At-Large Versus District
Elections on Racial Representation in U.S. Municipalities, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLInCAL
CONSEQUENCES 203, 204-05 (Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart eds., 1986); see also Holder v. Hall, 114
S. Ct. 2581, 2594-95 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that multimember districts were
once "a common feature of our political systems" and "continue to be a feature on the American political
landscape").
131. Engstrom & McDonald, supra note 130, at 203-04.
132. Many of the "reformers" who backed at-large government were quite aware of this drawback.
At-large election systems were seen as a way to keep recently arrived immigrant groups in the North and
African-Americans in the South from gaining political power. See Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman,
Editors' Introduction to QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 3, 7.
133. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
134. The Court later backtracked from this position in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613.620-22 (1982),
holding that the showing of intent could be evidenced indirectly through the type of evidence considered
in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) and Zimmer v. McKeithen. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd
on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per
curiam).
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Congress responded by adding § 2(b) and the "results" language of § 2(a),
creating a generally applicable statutory basis for vote-dilution claims.'
35
Four years later, in Thornburg v. Gingles,136 the Court held that the amended
§ 2 incorporated a results test, and invalidated a multimember system of
election to the North Carolina state legislature. In the wake of Gingles, courts
have routinely used § 2 to strike down at-large systems and multimember
districts where plaintiffs have been able to show sufficient levels of racially
polarized voting. 37 In recent years, courts have held the statute applicable
against single-member districts as well, ruling that it prohibits jurisdictions
from drawing plans that are intentionally or inadvertently gerrymandered in a
manner that unduly limits the ability of minority voters to elect candidates of
their choice. 38
Thus far, no court has faced a claim applying § 2 to the winner-take-all
system of choosing presidential electors. Certain functional similarities between
the winner-take-all system and the type of electoral scheme addressed in
Gingles are readily apparent, however. In both types of scheme, candidates run
for office at large. As a consequence, a cohesive voting majority can pick all
of the winning candidates, leaving the minority with no voice at all in the
system. Whether this will actually happen, of course, depends on the precise
135. See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1982) ("The proposed amendment to Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act is designed to restore the legal standard that governed voting discrimination cases
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bolden.").
Prior to the 1982 amendment, the primary statutory basis for vote-dilution claims was § 5 of the
'Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). Section 5 bars certain "covered" jurisdictions from enforcing
any change in their electoral laws without first obtaining "preclearance" from the U.S. Justice Department
or a declaratory judgment from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia stating that the proposed
change was not enacted for a discriminatory purpose and will not have a discriminatory effect. In Allen
v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), the Supreme Court interpreted this provision broadly to
apply to any change in an electoral scheme. It explicitly held that a covered jurisdiction could not change
its form of government from a single-member-district scheme to an at-large one without getting either
judicial or administrative preclearance. Id. at 569. The Court noted that
[vioters who are members of a racial minority might well be in the majority in one district, but
in a decided minority in the county as a whole. This type of change could therefore nullify their
ability to elect the candidate of their choice just as would prohibiting some of them from voting.
Id. Section 5, though a powerful weapon, is also a limited one. It applies only to changes in electoral
systems. Jurisdictions that had at-large systems prior to the effective dates of the Voting Rights Act are not
affected. Furthermore, § 5 applies only to "covered" jurisdictions-principally, but not exclusively, the
Southern states. By contrast, § 2 applies to all states and political subdivisions.
136. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
137. See, e.g., Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 985 F2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1993); Westwego
Citizens for Better Gov't v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1991); Campos v. City of Baytown,
840 F2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989); Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of
Gretna, 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1988); Brown v. Board of Comm'rs, 722
F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).
138. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2655-63 (1994) (applying Gingles analysis to
single-member-district scheme but finding no § 2 violation because scheme achieved rough proportionality).
Recent Supreme Court decisions may sharply curtail the applicability of § 2 to single-member-district
schemes. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (holding that redistricting plan violated
Constitution because drawn predominantly to benefit minorities and lacked compelling state interest). Thus




dynamics of the community: the racial preferences of its voters, the strength
of particular candidates, the importance of the office being sought, and so
forth. In one important respect, however, the winner-take-all system is
potentially much more discriminatory. In the typical at-large system, voters
have the freedom to split their vote among candidates from different parties.
For example, in an at-large city council election, a loyal Democrat might be
willing to support one or two strong Republican candidates, even if she
favored the Democratic slate overall.139 Under a winner-take-all rule, voters
do not have the option to split their vote. They must vote for one slate or
another as a unit. Consequently, if a sufficiently strong correlation exists
between race and voter preference, a racial minority will automatically be
denied the opportunity to choose even a single representative.
A question thus naturally arises: Does § 2 apply to a state's decision to
employ the winner-take-all system for choosing electors rather than one of the
alternative methods? This inquiry may be broken into two parts, one a question
of constitutional law and the other a question of statutory interpretation. First,
does Congress have any constitutional power to regulate the appointment of
electors? And second, if Congress does have authority to regulate the electoral
process, has it actually exercised that power in § 2? Section A addresses the
first of these questions, and Section B addresses the second.
A. Constitutional Authority
At the outset, it seems clear that nothing in the original Constitution gave
Congress any power to regulate the manner in which states appoint presidential
electors. As noted above, Article II appears to grant state legislatures exclusive
power over the appointment of electors. 40 Comparing Article II with Article
I, which governs the selection of Members of Congress, suggests that the
absence of congressional authority in Article II was no mere oversight on the
part of the Framers. Article I specifies how Representatives are to be
apportioned among the states, but does not specify a manner of election. 141
Instead, it leaves it in the first instance to the state legislatures to determine the
"Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives."'' 42 Hence, under the original constitutional framework,
states were free to adopt a winner-take-all or other at-large scheme for
choosing House Members. In fact, several states did use the general-ticket
139. Such "ticket splitting" is an increasingly important feature of American politics. See MARTIN P.
WATrENBERG, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES 1952-1992. at 17-23, 162-66, 177-78,
189-93 (1994); Amar & Amar, supra note 40, at 914-16.
140. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, ci. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors .... ).
141. Unlike presidential electors. however, Representatives must be chosen "by the People," and thus
may not be appointed by the state legislatures. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
142. Id. art. I, § 4. cl. 1.
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system for electing Representatives prior to 1842.143 Article I, however, gives
Congress a power with respect to the election of Representatives that Article
II does not grant with respect to presidential electors; it specifically states that
Congress may override state decisions concerning the times, places, and
manner of congressional elections. 44 By contrast, Article II gives Congress
the power to determine only the time of choosing the electors and the day on
which they vote. 45
But any reading of Article H must be tempered by the realization that we
no longer live under the original Constitution. The adoption of the Fourteenth,
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments has
vastly increased the power of Congress to regulate state elections. The
question, then, is whether these provisions, and in particular the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, give Congress any authority over the states' choices
of electoral systems. The Supreme Court's precedents on this subject clearly
suggest that, although the states' power to regulate the manner of appointment
of electors is extensive, it is not absolute.
The Court first considered the applicability of the Reconstruction
amendments to the electoral system in McPherson v. Blacker.146 That case
dealt with the constitutionality of the Michigan legislature's decision to
abandon the winner-take-all system of choosing presidential electors and to
adopt a congressional-district system. The plaintiffs argued that this decision
violated Article II and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. First, they
contended that Article H compelled the use of the winner-take-all system
because it specified that the "State" must appoint the electors, and that the
143. In early elections, Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and
Rhode Island used the general-ticket system for choosing House members. Joel . Paschal, The House of
Representatives: "Grand Depository of the Democratic Principle"?, 1952 LAW & CoNTENiP. PROBS. 276,
281; see also DE ALVA S. ALEXANDER, HISTORY AND PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
4 (1916); CLARENCE G. HOAG & GEORGE H. HALLETr JR., PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 34, 40
(1926). Concern that larger states might try to enhance their influence by adopting the system led Congress
to mandate in 1842 that states choose Representatives from contiguous single-member districts. Paschal,
supra, at 281. This decision touched off something of a constitutional crisis when four states, Georgia,
Mississippi, Missouri, and New Hampshire, refused to comply with the law. Id. at 281-82. Congress has
subsequently altered and amended the single-member-district requirement numerous times. The current
version, adopted in 1967, is codified at 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1988). Although states have in the past elected
Representatives at large in violation of these statutes, Congress has never refused to seat anyone so chosen.
Paschal, supra, at 285.
144. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. I. The one exception to this power is that Congress may not
determine the place of choosing Senators, who under the original Constitution were chosen by the
legislatures. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. I, amended by id. amend. XVII (providing for direct election
of Senate).
145. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
146. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
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state was an individual unit. The court soundly rejected this argument,
reasoning that:
If the legislature possesses plenary authority to direct the manner of
appointment, and might itself exercise the appointing power... it is
difficult to perceive why, if the legislature prescribes as a method of
appointment choice by vote, it must necessarily be by general ticket
and not by districts .... [T]he act of appointment is none the less the
act of the State in its entirety because arrived at by districts, for the
act is the act of political agencies duly authorized to speak for the
State, and the combined result is the expression of the voice of the
State, a result reached by direction of the legislature, to whom the
whole subject is committed.'47
Noting that the district system had been contemplated by the Framers and that
it and the legislative-selection method had been used in several past
elections, 4 ' the Court concluded that
the appointment and mode of appointment of electors belong
exclusively to the States under the Constitution of the United
States .... Congress is empowered to determine the time of choosing
the electors and the day on which they are to give their votes .... but
otherwise the power and jurisdiction of the State is exclusive. 149
If this language were the Supreme Court's final word on the interpretation
of Article II, it would clearly suggest that Congress has no power to regulate
the electoral process. Carried to its logical extreme, however, this argument
would produce some very dubious results. Suppose, for example, that a state
enacted a literacy test or poll tax for potential voters in presidential elections
expressly designed to disenfranchise racial minorities. Or, for that matter,
suppose that a state simply banned African-Americans from voting for
President. Such an enactment would clearly violate Section 1 of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Under Section 2 of the Amendment, Congress is empowered to
enforce Section 1 by "appropriate legislation." Such legislation is clearly
constitutional when applied to elections for other state offices. Yet, a strict
reading of McPherson would mean that the enforcement provision of the
Fifteenth Amendment is invalid in the case of presidential elections-surely
an anomalous result.
Indeed, in its analysis of the plaintiffs' Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendment claims, the McPherson Court immediately qualified its strict
147. Id. at 25-26.
148. Id. at 28-35.
149. Id. at 35.
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reading of Article II. Although it found no violation of either amendment,150
it left no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment does place limits on the Article
II powers of state legislatures:
Whenever presidential electors are appointed by popular election, then
the right to vote cannot be denied or abridged without invoking the
penalty [in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment], and so of the
right to vote for representatives in Congress, the executive and
judicial officers of a State, or the members of the legislature
thereof.'-"
The Court did not return to this issue for another seventy-six years. When
it did, however, it clearly confirmed the applicability of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the electoral system. In Williams v. Rhodes, 52 two
independent parties in Ohio--George Wallace's American Independent party
and the Socialist Labor party--challenged a series of election laws that made
it "virtually impossible" for minor parties to be placed on the presidential
ballot. 153 The plaintiffs argued that such restrictions violated the Equal
Protection Clause. In response, the state relied on McPherson, claiming that
Article II gave it "absolute power to put any burdens it please[d] on the
selection of electors."'' 54
The Williams Court rejected the state's argument for a broad interpretation
of its Article II power, reasoning that
[t]here, of course, can be no question but that this section does grant
extensive power to the States to pass laws regulating the selection of
electors. But the Constitution is filled with provisions that grant
Congress or the States specific power to legislate in certain areas;
these granted powers are always subject to the limitation that they
may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions
of the Constitution.... [I]t [cannot] be thought that the power to
select electors could be exercised in such a way as to violate express
constitutional commands that specifically bar States from passing
certain kinds of laws. Clearly, the Fifteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments were intended to bar the Federal Government and the
States from denying the right to vote on grounds of race and sex in
presidential elections. And the Twenty-fourth Amendment clearly and
literally bars any State from imposing a poll tax on the right to vote
"for electors for President or Vice President." Obviously, we must
150. The plaintiffs' argument was that the congressional-district system abridged the right of voting-
age male citizens to vote for electors, in that the winner-take-all system allowed them to vote for the entire
slate, rather than only for three electors. Id. at 17 (discussing argument for Plaintiffs in Error). The Court
rejected this argument on the grounds that the district system treated all voters equally. Id. at 40.
151. Id. at 39.
152. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
153. Id. at 25.
154. Id. at 28.
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reject the notion that Art. II, § 1 gives the States power to impose
burdens on the right to vote, where such burdens are expressly
prohibited in other constitutional provisions. We therefore hold that
no State can pass a law regulating elections that violates the
Fourteenth Amendment's command that "No State shall ... deny to
any person ... the equal protection of the laws.' ' 5
Williams thus leaves no room for doubt that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments place affirmative restrictions on states' discretion to choose the
manner in which they appoint presidential electors.
Neither Williams nor McPherson, however, directly addressed the scope
of Congress's power to regulate state selection of presidential electors under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The fact that the amendments do
place limits on state discretion, however, strongly suggests that Congress has
authority to enact "appropriate legislation" under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.
5 6
Does that authority extend to regulation of the electoral system? The most
logical reading of the Constitution suggests that it does. After all, under the
original Constitution, Congress had no explicit power to regulate any aspect
of state or local elections, whether for governor, city councillor, or dogcatcher.
The Framers certainly intended that such matters would remain the domain of
the states, and that the federal government would not get involved. 5 7 In this
respect, there is nothing unusual about Article I. Appointment of presidential
electors is the exclusive domain of the states to precisely the same degree as
is the election of legislators and other state officers.
Essentially, then, the question of the applicability of the Voting Rights Act
to the electoral system is no different from the question of the underlying
constitutionality of the Act as a whole-a question that the Court settled long
ago in Katzenbach v. Morgan.'58 In Katzenbach, voters in New York City
challenged the constitutionality of § 4(e) of the Act,'59 which restricted the
use of literacy tests as a prerequisite to voter registration. The state argued that
the Act exceeded the scope of Congress's enforcement power because the
155. Id. at 29 (final two omissions in original); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
794-95 n.18 (1983) (citing Williams approvingly).
156. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (noting that Congress
"has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment").
157. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (opinion of Black, J., announcing judgments
of the Court):
It is a plain fact of history that the Framers never imagined that the national Congress would
set the qualifications for voters in every election from President to local constable or village
alderman. It is obvious that the whole Constitution reserves to the States the power to set voter
qualifications in state and local elections, except to the limited extent that the people through
constitutional amendments have specifically narrowed the powers of the States.
158. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1988).
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judiciary had not found a Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment violation' 60
The Court soundly rejected that argument, holding that:
A construction of § 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] that would
require a judicial determination that the enforcement of the state law
precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, as a condition of
sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate both
congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for
implementing the Amendment. It would confine the legislative power
in this context to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state
laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional,
or of merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by
particularizing the majestic generalities of § 1 of the Amendment.
Instead, the Court held that Congress's power under the Fourteenth
Amendment is as broad as its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause
of Article I: "Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'6
Katzenbach, of course, does not deal specifically with congressional
protection of the right to vote in presidential elections, but rather with
protection of the right to vote in general. A strict interpretation of McPherson
would have required the Court to hold that, while Congress may ban literacy
tests as a prerequisite for voting in other state elections, it may not ban them
in presidential elections. Although this would be a strange result, it would
certainly be a plausible reading of Article II. Nowhere in Katzenbach,
however, does the Court explicitly state that its holding does not apply to
presidential elections.
Moreover, in Oregon v. Mitchell, a case involving the constitutionality of
several amendments that Congress added to the Voting Rights Act in 1970, the
Court reached just the opposite result, holding that Congress had more power
to regulate presidential and congressional elections than elections for state and
local office. 6 3 The 1970 amendments to the Act lowered the voting age to
eighteen in both state and federal elections, barred the use of literacy tests in
all elections, and barred states from disqualifying voters in national elections
for failure to meet state residency requirements. All of the Justices agreed that
160. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 648.
161. Id. at 648-49 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
162. Id. at 651; see also Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364. 373-75 (5th Cir. 1984) (upholding
constitutionality of 1982 amendments to § 2 of Voting Rights Act and noting that "Congressional power
to adopt prophylactic measures to vindicate the purposes of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments is
unquestioned"); United States v. Uvalde Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.. 625 F.2d 547, 553 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding pre-1982 language of § 2 to be within Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power).
163. 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970) (opinion of Black, J., announcing judgments of the Court).
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the ban on literacy tests was constitutional as applied to all elections. Eight of
the nine agreed that the regulations relating to residency requirements and
absentee voting in presidential elections were constitutionalI 64 Four Justices
held that the voting-age requirements were constitutional as applied to all
elections, while another four concluded that Congress had no authority to
override state voting-age requirements. Justice Black, who cast the deciding
vote, agreed with the first group with respect to "national elections, such as
congressional, senatorial, vice-presidential and presidential elections," but with
the second group concerning elections for state and local offices. 6 Hence
the majority was willing to extend more power to Congress over presidential
elections than over state elections.
Justice Black, who had written the majority opinion in Williams just two
years earlier, was not troubled by the notion that Article II constrains
congressional power over presidential elections. His Mitchell opinion dismissed
this proposition out of hand, claiming that "it cannot be seriously contended
that Congress has less power over the conduct of presidential elections than it
has over congressional elections."'' 66 Congressional power over presidential
elections, in Justice Black's view, is obvious since "inherent in the very
concept of a supreme national government ... is a residual power in Congress
to insure that those officers [electors] represent their national constituency as
responsively as possible. This power arises from the nature of our
constitutional system of government and from the Necessary and Proper
Clause."'
167
Justice Black's invocation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, rather than
the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, is
significant. His objection to the eighteen-year-old voting age was that it was
not sufficiently linked to race to come within the ambit of the Reconstruction
amendments. 68 Like all of the other Justices, however, he believed that
Congress's specific findings concerning the racially discriminatory impact of
164. Justice Harlan was the lone dissenter on this issue. Id. at 154, 213-16 (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
165. Id. at 117-18 (opinion of Black, J.). This holding was overturned by the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment, which provides: "The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or
older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age." U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
166. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 124 (opinion of Black, J.).
167. Id. at 124 n.7 (opinion of Black, J.). Justice Black also relied on the Court's opinion in Burroughs
v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), which held that Congress had the power to enact criminal statutes
requiring the treasurer of a political committee involved in a presidential election to report contributions
and other financial information.
168. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 130 (opinion of Black, J.) ("Congress made no legislative findings that the
21-year-old vote requirement was used by the States to disenfranchise voters on account of race. I seriously
doubt that such a finding, if made, could be supported by substantial evidence.").
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literacy tests provided an ample basis for a ban on these tests in all
elections-including, presumably, presidential elections.'
69
The absentee voting provisions-which applied exclusively to presidential
elections-similarly met with no objection from eight of the nine Justices.
Justice Black again concluded that the absentee voting provisions were justified
under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 70 Justice Stewart, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, agreed.17 1 With respect to Article II,
Justice Stewart noted that setting voter qualifications in presidential elections
is generally a state prerogative. 72 He concluded, however, that this provision
was "not sufficient to prevent Congress from protecting a person who exercises
his constitutional right to enter and abide in any State in the Union from losing
his opportunity to vote, when Congress may protect the right of interstate
travel from other less fundamental disabilities."'' 73 Justice Douglas considered
the provisions a valid exercise of congressional power under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 74 and Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall reached a similar
conclusion.' 75 Justice Harlan, dissenting on this point, argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not protect the right to vote.
76
The primary disagreements in Mitchell thus did not revolve around
whether Congress had the power to enact appropriate legislation that would
regulate state elections-including presidential elections. Rather, the split
among the Justices reflected disagreement as to whether the legislation that
Congress had enacted was, in fact, appropriate. All of the Justices agreed that
when Congress is acting to combat racial discrimination, it can legitimately
regulate state elections, and none of them expressed the slightest reservation
about extending the ban on literacy tests to presidential elections. In fact, the
ultimate outcome in Mitchell suggests that congressional power to regulate
presidential elections through the Voting Rights Act is, if anything, greater
than its power to regulate state elections. Mitchell thus presents a powerful
case for rejecting a strict reading of McPherson.1 77
169. Id. at 131-34 (opinion of Black, J.); see also id. at 144-47 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 216-17 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding literacy test
ban to be valid exercise of congressional power under Fifteenth Amendment); id. at 231-36 (Brennan,
White & Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 282-84 (Stewart, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
170. Id. at 134 (opinion of Black, J.).
171. Id. at 285-87 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172. Id. at 291 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173. Id. at 292 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. Id. at 150 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175. Id. at 236-39 (Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
176. Id. at 213-16 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
177. The continuing vitality of the holding in Mitchell is illustrated by two recent decisions upholding
the constitutionality of the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10 (Supp.
1993). popularly known as the "motor-voter" act. Under this statute, states are required to implement a
number of procedures designed to make it easier for people to register to vote in "federal elections," 42
U.S.C. § 1973gg-1(2) (1994), a term that is defined to include both congressional and presidential elections.
see 2 U.S.C. § 431(3) (1994).
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Of course, Article II does place some important limits on the power of the
federal government to determine the manner of appointment of presidential
electors. Even under a loose reading of McPherson, it would be hard to argue
that Congress or the federal courts have the authority to supersede the state
legislatures entirely and require a particular mode of election. The principle
that the ultimate responsibility for adopting a valid electoral scheme rests with
the state is well established in voting rights cases involving both the Voting
Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause.78 A court may find that a
particular scheme is illegal and enjoin its further use, but absent extraordinary
circumstances, such as a state's willful failure to remedy the problem, it may
not institute its own plan as a remedy. Proper respect for principles of
federalism would dictate that, while Congress might place restrictions on the
electoral system, neither Congress nor the federal courts could dictate that all
states employ a particular system-say, for example, the proportional
system. 79 Restricting the use of racially discriminatory voting systems,
however, is well within the scope of congressional power.
In both Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791 (7th Cir.
1995), and Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 .3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995), courts upheld the
constitutionality of these provisions. Both courts specifically held that congressional power to regulate
presidential elections is coextensive with its power to regulate congressional elections under Article 1. See
id. at 1414; Edgar, 56 F.3d at 793. Neither court relied on Mitchell, however. Instead, they relied, like
Justice Black in Mitchell, on Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934). As noted above, Burroughs
dealt with a federal statute requiring officials of political committees involved in presidential campaigns
to report contributions and other financial information, and providing criminal penalties for noncompliance.
The Court held that these provisions did not violate the language of Article II granting legislatures the
power to determine the manner of appointment of presidential electors. Id. at 544-45. The Court did not
mention Article I, but instead found that Congress had a residual power "to preserve the departments and
institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by
corruption." Id. at 545.
Burroughs thus does not appear to provide any strong support for Judge Posner's holding in Edgar
that congressional power over presidential elections is coextensive with its Article I power or the similar
pronouncement in Wilson. If these decisions are correct, then McPherson is no longer good law, and
Congress has essentially plenary power over the time, place, and manner of presidential elections, just as
it does over congressional elections.
Interestingly, the only reference to Mitchell in either Edgar or Wilson is a reference to Justice Black's
conclusion that Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution precludes Congress, as a general matter, from setting
voter qualifications for state offices. See Wilson, 60 F.3d at 1414 (citing Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 123-25).
178. See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1081 (1993) (holding that district court erred in § 2
case by enjoining state redistricting process); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975):
We say once again what has been said on many occasions: reapportionment is primarily the
duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body, rather than of a federal
court.... If [the legislature] fails in that task, the responsibility falls on the District Court and
it should proceed with dispatch to resolve... [the] problem.
179. This approach to congressional authority is similar to that taken by one recent commentator on
the electoral system, who concluded that Congress would have power under the Fourteenth Amendment
to enact a statute specifically banning the winner-take-all system. See O'Sullivan. supra note 12, at
2446-47. O'Sullivan's proposal, however, overlooks the possibility that Congress may already have passed
such a statute in § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
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B. Statutory Authority
The mere fact that Congress has constitutional authority to regulate the
electoral system does not, of course, imply that Congress has actually exercised
that authority. Whether § 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to these processes
involves questions of statutory interpretation. At the outset of this analysis,
however, it is worth reiterating that the winner-take-all system is precisely the
kind of electoral scheme that Congress was contemplating when it passed the
1982 amendments: an at-large scheme over which a majority faction can
exercise complete control.'8" Thus the case for applying § 2 to the winner-
take-all system is much stronger than the case for applying it to a
gerrymandered system of single-member districts, a practice the Supreme Court
has explicitly approved on several recent occasions.' 8 '
As noted above, the text of Article II authorizes the states to "appoint"
electors. Although all of the states have now instituted popular election as a
mode of appointment, the term "appoint" poses a possible problem for the § 2
analysis because most courts hold that the statute does not apply to appointive
offices.182 One might therefore argue that the statute does not apply to a
state's "appointment" of presidential electors, whether it exercises that
authority directly or delegates it to its citizens.
The logical response to this argument is that, while states need not exercise
their appointment power through a popular vote, when they do choose to hold
popular elections, they become subject to all of the constitutional and statutory
rules that govern elections-including the Voting Rights Act. The text of
§ 2(a) tends to support this analysis. Congress drafted § 2 in extremely broad
language, to apply to any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure."'' 83 In literal terms, the statute does not even
require that the "standard, practice, or procedure" be related to voting.
8 4
180. The legislative history of § 2 makes it clear that Congress primarily intended to overturn City
of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), and restore the "results" test that courts had previously employed.
See S. REP. No. 417, supra note 135, at 15-17. Like Mobile, the line of cases that Congress was attempting
to restore dealt exclusively with the problem of vote dilution in at-large systems. See White v. Regester,
412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F2d 1297
(5th Cir. 1973), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636
(1976); see also S. REP. No. 417, supra note 135, at 19-24 (analyzing these and other cases involving at-
large elections).
181. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., African-American Citizens for Change v. St. Louis Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 24 F.3d
1052, 1053-54 (8th Cir. 1994).
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act would apply in situations where a covered jurisdiction changed
the mode of selection for an office from election to appointment, or vice versa. See supra note 135.
Without preclearance from either the Justice Department or the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, such a change would be unenforceable. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,
549-50 (1969); see also Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 501 (1992) (reaffirming Allen
with respect to change from elective to appointive office).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994).
184. Cf. Voting Rights Act § 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994) (covering any "standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting").
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Does a binding election to fill the post of presidential elector meet this
standard? The Supreme Court's analysis of § 2's applications to judicial
elections provides a helpful comparison. Like presidential electors, judges do
not exercise a legislative function, and need not be elected. In general, a state
has absolute freedom to decide at any point that any judicial position on any
court be filled by appointment. One might therefore plausibly argue that
judicial elections do not come within the ambit of § 2.
The Supreme Court, however, soundly rejected that argument with respect
to both trial and appellate judges. In Chisom v. Roemer t85 and Houston
Lawyers' Association v. Attorney General,'t 6 the defendants argued that § 2
did not apply to at-large elections for judicial positions, on the theory that
judges are supposed to dispense justice evenhandedly, and hence are not
"representatives" within the meaning of § 2(b). In analyzing this argument, the
Court first concluded that § 2, including the 1983 amendments, applies to
judicial elections.'87 It then considered whether the use of the term
"representative" in § 2(b) operated to limit the applicability of the totality-of-
the-circumstances test in judicial elections. Noting that Congress modeled the
language of § 2(b) on the Court's language in White v. Regester,88 the Court
focused on a crucial distinction: the substitution-made at the behest of
Senator Robert Dole, a key backer of the 1982 amendments-of the word
"representatives" for the word "legislators."'' 9 The Court held that if the term
"representatives" applied to executive officers, as the state conceded it did,
then it should also apply to judicial officers.'90 The Court continued:
The [Fifth Circuit] was, of course, entirely correct in observing
that "judges need not be elected at all" and that ideally public opinion
should be irrelevant to the judge's role because the judge is often
called upon to disregard, or even to defy, popular sentiment....
Louisiana, however,. . . has decided to elect its judges and to compel
judicial candidates to vie for popular support just as other political
candidates do.
... When each of several members of a court must be a resident
of a separate district, and must be elected by the voters of that district,
Justice Thomas has recently expressed the view that the words "standard, practice, or procedure" in
§ 2 should be understood to mean "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting"--rather a
strange reading for a supposed textualist. See Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2603 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment).
185. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
186. 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
187. Chisom. 501 U.S. at 395-96. Prior to its decision in Chisom. the Court had held that § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, which requires judicial or administrative preclearance of any change in any "standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting," did apply to judicial elections. Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S.
646, 652 (1991).
188. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
189. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 398 & n.26.
190. Id. at 398-400.
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it seems both reasonable and realistic to characterize the winners as
representatives of that district.'9 '
The Court rejected an alternative interpretation of "representative" offered by
Justice Scalia, who, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy, argued that "the ordinary meaning of 'representatives' does not
include judges," because judges do not act "on behalf of the people"-at least
not in the ordinary sense of those words.1
92
Even under Justice Scalia's more restrictive definition, it is hard to see
how presidential electors would not be "representatives" when they are chosen
by popular vote. Unlike judges, electors do not customarily exercise any
independent judgment. Their sole function in the modem system is to serve as
proxies for actual voters. In Justice Scalia's language, they cast their ballots
"on behalf of' the people of their state. Chisom thus strongly suggests that
presidential electors are "representatives" within the meaning of the statute. So
long as the state chooses to exercise its appointment power through a popular
vote, it remains subject to the Voting Rights Act.
The Court faced a related question concerning the scope of § 2 in Holder
v. Hall.'93 That case involved the applicability of the Act to single-member
offices: specifically, a single-commissioner form of government used by a rural
county in central Georgia. Under this form of government, the commissioner
performs all legislative and executive functions.'94 With racially polarized
voting patterns, the single-commissioner form of government, like an at-large
system, can give the majority complete control over the political structure. The
typical remedy for vote dilution in an at-large system, however, is to break it
up into single-member districts. Obviously, that could not be done in Holder
without increasing the size of the governing body. That move, however, would
have raised potentially significant problems. Suppose, for example, that the
minority population of a county is big enough to enable it to constitute a
majority in one district in an eleven-member system, but not big enough to
enable it to constitute a majority in one district in a five-member system. Is
that county required to adopt an eleven-member system, rather than a five-
member system? If so, can the county next door, which already has a five-
member system, be compelled to adopt an eleven-member system? Can another
county with an even smaller black population be forced to adopt a twenty-
member system?
Faced with these questions, the Court rejected the Holder plaintiffs' claim
but divided sharply in its reasoning. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and joined in pertinent part by Justice O'Connor, held that plaintiffs
191. Id. at 400-01 (citation omitted).
192. Id. at 410 (Scalia. J.. dissenting).
193. 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994).
194. Id. at 2584 (plurality opinion).
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cannot challenge the size of a governing body under § 2 because there is no
"objective and workable standard for choosing a reasonable benchmark by
which to evaluate a challenged voting practice .... 195 Justice O'Connor,
in a separate opinion, reiterated the need for a "reasonable alternative practice
as a benchmark."' 196 Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor differed slightly
as to the threshold coverage of § 2, however. Noting that the Court's § 5 cases
may be interpreted to assert that a change in the size of a governing body is
a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" that must be
precleared in a jurisdiction covered by § 5, Justice Kennedy argued that a
voting practice that can be challenged under § 5 is not necessarily subject to
challenge under the similar language of § 2.197 Justice O'Connor, however,
argued that the similarity in language between § 2 and § 5198 of the Voting
Rights Act compelled the conclusion that the threshold coverage of the two is
the same: "As a textual matter, I cannot see how a practice can be a 'standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting,' yet not be a 'standard, practice,
or procedure."' 199 Justices Scalia and Thomas provided the two votes
necessary to complete the majority. In a lengthy opinion by Justice Thomas,
however, they endorsed a radically different interpretation of the Act. They
suggested that the words "standard, practice, or procedure" should apply only
to direct barriers to the right to vote, notwithstanding twenty-five years of
contrary precedent and Congress's repeated reenactment of the same language
during that period.20 The remaining four Justices, in a dissenting opinion by
Justice Blackmun, accepted in principle the requirement of a reasonable
alternative benchmark but felt that, under the particular facts of the case, a
five-member commission was an appropriate benchmark.20 ' They also agreed
with Justice O'Connor's conclusion that size was a "standard, practice, or
procedure" subject to challenge under § 2.202
Several holdings that relate to the electoral system can be drawn from this
rather tangled web of judicial explication. First, in the view of five Justices,
the "standard, practice, or procedure" language of § 2 is to be construed
broadly. Congress intended the statute to apply to any standard, practice, or
procedure, or at least to any standard, practice, or procedure within the
meaning of § 5. The winner-take-all system clearly falls within this statutory
language and hence within the ambit of the Act.
Second, elections for single-member offices generally cannot be challenged
under § 2. At first glance, this holding might seem to bar any challenge to
195. Id. at 2586 (plurality opinion).
196. Id. at 2589 (O'Connor. J.. concurring).
197. Holder. 114 S. Ct. at 2586-87 (plurality opinion).
198. For a description of § 5, see supra note 135.
199. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2589 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 2592 (Thomas, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 2622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 2621 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1996]
The Yale Law Journal
presidential elections. As a matter of law, however, ordinary citizens do not
and may not vote for President. They vote for presidential electors, to whom
our Constitution entrusts the task of choosing the Chief Executive. The office
of presidential elector is not a single-member office in any jurisdiction. Rather,
the number of electors to be chosen is fixed by the Constitution in a manner
that ensures that each state will choose at least three electors.
Third, a plaintiff challenging a "standard, practice, or procedure" under § 2
must be able to identify a reasonable alternative benchmark. In the case of a
winner-take-all system, either the proportional or the congressional-district
system will always be available as a benchmark. In some respects, the district
system might seem to be the most appropriate benchmark, since it is similar
to the single-member-district standard the Court has consistently used in other
challenges to at-large systems. Neither of these standards creates the kind of
open-ended problems that a challenge to the size of a governing body
necessitates. In the Court's language, both benchmarks are simple, objective,
workable, and reasonable.
In sum, there is no constitutional or statutory reason to think that § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act does not apply to a state's decision to use the winner-
take-all system for the appointment of presidential electors. The next question
to be answered is whether, and where, the winner-take-all system violates § 2.
IV. THE § 2 ANALYSIS
The mere fact that a jurisdiction operates an at-large or multimember
electoral system is not sufficient to establish a violation of § 2.203 Instead,
the amended statute directs courts to look at the totality of the circumstances
in making this determination. A finding of vote dilution must rest on specific
evidence that a particular electoral scheme actually operates to cancel or
minimize the voting strength of a protected minority group: "The essence of
a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with
social or historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities
enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives." 204
It is thus entirely possible for an electoral system to be legal in one state and
yet, as a result of different social, economic, or political characteristics, to be
illegal in another. Determining whether the winner-take-all system violates the
Act therefore requires a highly fact-specific inquiry that is intensely sensitive
to the peculiarities of various states.
203. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48 (1986) ("Multimember districts and at-large election
schemes ... are not per se violative of minority voters' rights."); see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613,
617 (1982) (holding that although at-large and multimember schemes may potentially violate rights of
minority voters, they are not per se violative of Equal Protection Clause).
204. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47.
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This Article does not attempt a definitive analysis of voting patterns in
each of the fifty states. It does, however, attempt to identify those states that
are potentially vulnerable to a § 2 challenge. To that end, this part makes use
of exit poll data from both nationwide and statewide surveys. It also provides
a somewhat more detailed analysis of voting patterns in four states: Alabama,
California, Illinois, and New York. These states differ from one another in
terms of demographics, history, and political characteristics. One might
therefore expect to see significant differences in voting behavior among them
that might affect the § 2 inquiry. Alabama, for example, lies in the heart of the
Deep South, where discrimination against African-Americans has been most
severe. It is one of only two states-Mississippi being the other-whose
electors cast votes for Strom Thurmond iin 1948, Harry Byrd in 1960, and
George Wallace in 1968. Moreover, in the last three elections, Alabama has
consistently voted Republican.
In contrast, the histories of official discrimination in California, Illinois,
and New York are not as extensive; however, each state has a large minority
community that historically has faced substantial barriers to social and political
equality. California and New York, moreover, both have significant Hispanic
populations-largely Mexican-Americans in the case of California, and Puerto
Ricans in the case of New York. The presence of two or more minority
groups, whose interests and voting behavior may or may not coincide, can pose
complicated questions for the vote-dilution inquiry. Moreover, the political
histories of these states are quite different. California and Illinois have
historically been "swing" states, considered crucial to the success of any
political campaign, while New York has tended to be a Democratic stronghold.
Before proceeding to an analysis of these states, however, it is necessary
to examine the legal framework that courts have developed for analyzing § 2
claims. Section A sets out these standards and analyzes voting behavior at the
national level in an attempt to determine which states, if any, might be
vulnerable to a § 2 challenge. Section B then examines statewide patterns in
the four states listed above and attempts to determine whether a § 2 challenge
in those states would be likely to succeed.
A. Legal Standards
The most important legal standards for analyzing vote-dilution claims
under § 2 derive from the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Thornburg v.
Gingles,0 5 the first case in which the Court addressed the scope of the 1982
amendments. In Gingles, the Court identified a set of three threshold
205. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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conditions that plaintiffs must meet in order to demonstrate a violation of the
Act. The three "Gingles factors" are as follows:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority
in a single-member district. If it is not, as would be the case in a
substantially integrated district, the multimemberforn of the district
cannot be responsible for minority voters' inability to elect candidates.
Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically
cohesive. If the minority group is not politically cohesive, it cannot
be said that the selection of a multimember electoral structure thwarts
distinctive minority group interests. Third, the minority group must be
able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc
to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate.0 6
The underlying rationale for these conditions is straightforward. The Gingles
analysis limits § 2 relief to those minority groups that can demonstrate a
potential to elect candidates: "Unless minority voters possess the potential to
elect representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, they
cannot claim to have been injured by that structure or practice. ' 207
The three-part Gingles analysis is now firmly established in the Court's
§ 2 jurisprudence. 08 Proof of the Gingles factors, however, is not sufficient
to establish liability under § 2. In accordance with the explicit language of
§ 2(b), plaintiffs must still demonstrate that, given the totality of the
circumstances, they have "'less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice."' 209 Accordingly, this section reviews the application of each
of the three Gingles factors as well as the "totality of the circumstances" test.
1. Numerosity and Geographical Compactness
The first of the three Gingles factors seems relatively straightforward. To
make out a § 2 violation, a minority group must be able to show that it is
possible to draw a single-member district in which members of the group
constitute a majority. In the background, however, lurk several complicated
206. Id. at 50-51 (footnotes and citations omitted). These factors were derived from a law review
article written in response to the Mobile decision. See James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From
Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth
Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 51-60 (1982).
207. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17.
208. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2657 (1994) (applying "now-familiar" Gingles
analysis to single-member districting scheme); Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1157-58 (1993)
(criticizing court for failure to apply Gingles factors); Growe v. Emison. 113 S. Ct. 1075. 1083-85 (1993)
(same).
209. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2656 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988)).
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questions of interpretation that bear directly on any analysis of the electoral
system.
The first question is what it means for a minority group to constitute a
"majority" in a district. Does that term mean a majority of the total
population-a figure that typically includes numerous people who are ineligible
to vote-or does it refer to a majority of some other population measurement?
In analyzing the first Gingles factor, courts have usually focused on voting-age
population (VAP) because of the Supreme Court's emphasis on the need for
minority groups to demonstrate an ability to elect candidates. Since VAP is
typically the best available indicator of the number of potential voters in a
jurisdiction, courts have reasoned that a minority group does not have an
independent ability to elect candidates if it does not constitute a voting-age
majority of a district.210 Although the Supreme Court has declined to rule
that VAP is always the appropriate criterion to use,2" it has tended in recent
years to go along with the holdings of lower courts on this issue.212
The second question is whether the establishment of single-member
districts is the only available remedy for a § 2 violation. The Court's
formulation of the first Gingles factor defines liability in terms of this
remedy,21 3 but nothing in the text of § 2 indicates that other remedies are not
permissible. Several other remedies are possible, and many advocates of
minority voting rights claim that these remedies are in fact preferable.
214
210. See, e.g., McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 .2d 937, 945 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1031 (1988); see also GROFMAN Er AL., supra note 118, at 62-64 (noting that VAP has generally
been found to be the appropriate measurement for purposes of first Gingles factor).
211. See De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2655-56. The De Grandy case involved a claim by Hispanic voters
in Florida. Unlike the Hispanic population in the Northeast, which is largely composed of Puerto Ricans
eligible to vote because of their status as U.S. citizens, the Hispanic population of Florida contains large
numbers of noncitizens who are ineligible to vote. The state contended in De Grandy that citizen voting-age
population, or "CVAP," was therefore the appropriate measurement for purposes of the first Gingles factor.
Id. The Court neither reached the issue of the appropriate measurement of population nor based its ruling
on the first Gingles factor, which it assumed had been satisfied in this case. See id.
212. Compare id. at 2658, 2663 (examining voting-age population figures) with Gingles, 478 U.S. at
74 n.35 (examining total population figures).
213. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17 ("The single-member district is generally the appropriate
standard against which to measure minority group potential to elect because it is the smallest political unit
from which representatives are elected.").
214. Perhaps the most prominent of these reformers is Lani Guinier, who has argued that single-
member districts tend to produce only token representation. Guinier has advocated a modified at-large
system known as cumulative voting as a remedy for vote dilution in at-large systems. See, e.g., Lani
Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REv. 1413, 1502-04 (1991).
Other modified at-large systems that could be used as remedies are limited voting and the single
transferable vote.
Under a cumulative voting system, candidates run for election at large, and each voter can cast as
many votes as there are seats to be filled. More than one vote can be cast for a single candidate. Thus, in
a nine-member city council race, each voter would receive nine votes and would have the option of casting
them all for one candidate or splitting them among several candidates. This system allows minority voters
to aggregate their votes behind a limited number of candidates.
Under a limited voting system, candidates also run for election at large. Each voter receives a fixed
number of votes, which is less than the total number of seats to be filled. Each ballot must be cast for a
different candidate, however. Thus, in a nine-member city council race, each voter might receive five votes,
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Although courts have generally adhered to the single-member-district remedy,
a few courts have begun to experiment with alternative remedies as settlement
options in § 2 challenges to local government election systems. Should the first
Gingles factor be modified to take account of the possibility of alternative
remedies?
This question is particularly pressing in the context of the electoral system.
A "pure" single-member-district system would be an impractical remedy for
vote dilution in a state's electoral college.215 It would require every state to
develop two redistricting plans: one for its House districts and one for its
presidential electors. Because every state has two more presidential electors
than it has Representatives, the two plans would have to be different. This
would be a very expensive proposition, for redistricting is almost always a
time-consuming, politically charged process, and it frequently leads to lengthy
litigation. By contrast, the congressional-district system and the proportional
system outlined above in Section lI.B impose almost no additional expense and
would not require states to develop new redistricting plans.
If a district system is the remedy, then any state that currently has a
congressional district with a majority of racial minorities in its voting-age
population would satisfy the first Gingles factor. Currently, sixteen states have
one or more majority-African-American House districts: Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Virginia.21 6 Five states have voting-age majority-Hispanic districts:
which could be cast for five different candidates. This limits the majority's ability to fill all nine council
seats.
Both cumulative voting and limited voting are usually described as "semiproportional" systems. By
contrast, the single transferable vote is frequently described as a "proportional" system. See, e.g., GROFMAN
ET AL., supra note 118, at 124-27. Under this method, candidates are elected at large, and voters rank their
choices in order of preference. Authorities then determine the threshold number of votes needed for
election, based on the number of votes cast. Candidates above the threshold are then declared elected, and
their surplus votes are transferred to other candidates, in order of preference, as expressed on the ballots.
For various methods of transferring surplus votes, see DOUGLAS J. AMY, REAL CHOICES, NEW VOICES
237-38 (1993). Votes from the remaining candidates with the lowest vote totals are then transferred as well,
and any candidate who reaches the threshold is elected. This process continues until the necessary number
of candidates are elected. For an interesting account of the use of this system in the United States, see Leon
Weaver, The Rise, Decline, and Resurrection of Proportional Representation in Local Governments in the
United States, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 130, at 139; see
also KATHLEEN L. BARBER, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION & ELECTORAL REFORM IN OHIO (1993).
One unifying feature of all of these systems is that they allow voters to vote for individual candidates,
rather than for parties. While this may be a virtue in the typical voting rights case, it is a defect if one is
seeking a remedy for vote dilution in a state's electoral college, where the identity of the party-and the
candidate at its head-is more important than the identity of the individual elector.
215. For the distinction between the pure single-member-district system and the congressional-district
system, see supra Section II.B.
216. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS IN THE 1990s: A PORTRAIT OF
AMERICA 19, 166, 203, 234, 318, 338, 373, 415, 465, 496-97, 549, 575, 627, 669, 686. 762 (1993)
[hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS IN THE 1990S].
The Supreme Court recently held that Georgia's congressional districts were unconstitutional because
the state intentionally drew the districts to benefit minorities and lacked any compelling state interest. See
Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). As a result, the state is currently revising its districts. Similar
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California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas. 17 Thus, at least eighteen
states satisfy the first Gingles criterion.2 t8
Considering the proportional system as a possible remedy requires a
redefinition of the first Gingles factor. To have the clear ability to elect a
candidate of choice as a presidential elector under a proportional system, a
minority group's proportion of a given state's voting-age population would
have to be greater than or equal to the total voting-age population divided by
the number of votes that state casts in the electoral college.219 Nineteen states
meet this criterion with respect to African-Americans: the eighteen states
previously identified, plus Missouri.220 Eight states meet the criterion with
respect to Hispanics: the five with majority-Hispanic congressional districts,
plus Arizona, New Jersey, and New Mexico.
22
All together, then, a total of twenty-one states potentially satisfy, the first
Gingles factor. Perhaps more significant than the number of states is the
number of electoral votes that these states represent: a grand total of
361-more than two-thirds of the 538 votes cast. A successful § 2 challenge
to the winner-take-all system would thus have the potential to alter
dramatically the way in which Presidents are chosen.
challenges are currently under way in several other states. Thus, many of these states may ultimately have
fewer majority-minority districts than it would otherwise be possible to draw. However, so long as each
of these states retains at least one such district, they will automatically satisfy the first Gingles criterion.
217. CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICrs IN THE 1990s, supra note 216, at 57-58, 166, 234, 496-97, 703.
218. These states also clearly satisfy the first Gingles factor under the traditional formulation. If it is
possible to draw a majority-minority district in an electoral scheme with N House districts, it is also
possible to draw a majority-minority district in an electoral scheme with N + 2 presidential-elector districts.
219. This formulation actually requires a larger statewide minority population than the traditional
Gingles formulation. Under the traditional formulation, a group need only be large enough to constitute a
majority in a single-member district. Theoretically, in a state of 1000 voters with 10 seats to be filled, a
district containing 51 minority voters, or 5.1% of the population, would be sufficient to satisfy the
traditional Gingles criterion. Under the proportional formulation, the minority group would need to make
up at least 10% of the population to be assured of gaining an elector, although it might be possible for a
smaller group to choose an elector under certain circumstances.
The difference between these two formulations is minimized, however, by the Court's recent gloss
on the first Gingles factor in Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994). In De Grandy, the Court held
that § 2 does not require states to draw the maximum possible number of majority-minority districts. Id.
at 2659-60. Instead, it usually only requires them to draw a number of majority-minority districts that is
roughly proportional to the number of members of the minority group in the relevant population. Id. at
2658 & n.l 1, 2660-63 (upholding redistricting plans that achieved substantial proportionality, but rejecting
rule that proportionality of plan automatically grants state a "safe harbor"); see also id. at 2664 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("[P]roportionality ... is always relevant evidence in determining vote dilution, but is never
itself dispositive. Lack of proportionality is probative evidence of vote dilution.").
220. CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS IN THE 1990S, supra note 216, at 425.
221. Arizona, New Jersey, and New Mexico would also probably satisfy the traditional formulation
of the first Gingles factor. Although none of them has a majority-minority House district, each of them has
at least one substantial minority-influence district. Arizona has a 44.8% Hispanic district; Missouri has a
48.0% African-American district; and each of New Mexico's three districts are roughly one-third Hispanic.
CONGRESSIONAL DISrRIcrs IN THE 1990s, supra note 216, at 35, 425, 487. It is thus very likely that one
could draw a pure single-member-district presidential-elector scheme with at least one majority-minority
district in each of these states. Because it is unlikely that any state would want to implement a pure single-
member-district scheme, the proportional formulation makes more sense.
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2. Political Cohesion
The political-cohesion prong of Gingles is satisfied by a showing that "a
significant number of minority group members usually vote for the same
candidates., 222 Thus, the political-cohesion inquiry focuses primarily on the
voting behavior of the minority group, rather than on the differences between
minority and majority voters. Although other factors may be relevant, such as
evidence of shared socioeconomic characteristics and efforts to engage in
concerted political activity, the most important data for determining whether
a minority group is cohesive are the results of past elections. Typically, a
showing that at least 60% of minority voters support the same candidate
establishes cohesion for the purposes of the Gingles inquiry.
223
Courts have generally held that the most probative elections for the
purposes of the Gingles analysis are contests involving viable minority
candidates.224 Similarly, elections for the office that is the subject of the
litigation ("endogenous" elections, to use the term that courts frequently
employ) are considered somewhat more probative than contests involving other
offices ("exogenous" elections). 225 Additionally, the Supreme Court held in
Gingles that "the fact that statistics from only one or a few elections are
available for examination does not foreclose a vote dilution claim. 226 In
jurisdictions with very few endogenous elections involving minority candidates,
courts have attached significant probative value to the results of exogenous
elections.227 Moreover, the § 2 analysis does not necessarily presume that a
candidate must be a member of a minority group in order to be a minority-
preferred candidate. Consequently, elections involving only white candidates
may also have significant probative weight, if the plaintiffs can establish that
a white candidate is truly the minority group's representative of choice. 28
222. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,56 (1986). The Court's opinion does not intimate that analysis
of voting patterns is the only way of demonstrating cohesiveness. Instead, it describes it as "one way." Id.
223. Allan J. Lichtman & J. Gerald Hebert, A General Theory of Vote Dilution, 6 LA RAZA L.J. I,
5 (1993) (noting that, based on American political history, 60% margin of support in two-way race
represents victory of "landslide proportions").
224. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1128 (3d Cir. 1993)
("As a general matter ... elections involving white candidates only are much less probative of racially
polarized voting than elections involving both black and white candidates."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2779
(1994); Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[W]e conclude
that Gingles is properly interpreted to hold that the race of the candidate is in general of less significance
than the race of the voter-but only within the context of an election that offers voters the choice of
supporting a viable minority candidate."), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989).
225. Magnolia Bar Ass'n v. Lee, 994 F.2d 1143, 1149 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Magnolia Bar
Ass'n v. Hawkins, 114 S. Ct. 555 (1993).
226. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57 n.25.
227. See Rangel v. Morales, 8 .3d 242, 246-47 (5th Cir. 1993); Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't
v. City of Westwego, 872 R2d 1201, 1208-10 (5th Cir. 1989); Citizens for a Better Gretna, 834 F2d at
502-03.
228. See Jenkins, 4 .3d at 1125 (noting that "there may be majority candidates who truly may be the
minority community's representative of choice"); Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F2d 1488, 1494-95 (10th Cir.
1989), cert denied, 498 U.S. 937 (1990); City of Carrollton Branch of the NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d
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How do courts determine the level of support among minority voters for
particular candidates? In Gingles, the Court relied on two basic statistical
techniques for measuring both political cohesion and racial bloc voting:
homogenous-precinct analysis (also known as extreme-case analysis) and
bivariate ecological regression analysis.229 These two techniques are now
standard features of § 2 cases.230 Homogeneous-precinct analysis involves
examining voting precincts that are almost entirely composed of voters from
one race. The total vote for a particular candidate in such a precinct is taken
to offer a rough estimate of how voters of that race cast their ballots. Of
course, it is quite possible that voters in racially mixed precincts have different
preferences from those in homogenous precincts.23'
Ecological regression analysis avoids this problem by examining all voting
precincts. A helpful way to visualize this process is to picture a scatter-
diagram, in which each precinct is represented by a point on a graph.232 The
X-axis of the graph measures the percentage of minority voters in that precinct,
and the Y-axis represents the percentage of voters in the precinct who voted
for a particular candidate. If a high correlation exists between race and voter
preference, the various precincts will be closely clustered about a line, as the
districts with higher proportions of minorities will yield higher numbers in
favor of the candidate. By running a regression analysis, one can determine the
slope of that line, and the point at which it intercepts the Y-axis. 233 From this
information, it is possible to estimate the proportion of minority voters who
voted for a particular candidate.2m
In the context of presidential elections, however, another very powerful
source of information about voting behavior is available. Newspapers and
television networks conduct extensive exit polls of voters throughout the
nation. In these surveys, investigators ask a random sample of voters to fill out
a questionnaire as they leave the polls. The questionnaire asks voters about
basic demographic information, such as age, sex, race, and party affiliation, as
well as how they voted in major elections. The responses are then weighted to
take account of differences in the probability that a particular respondent will
be selected. For example, if only 500 people vote at one polling location, and
1547, 1557 (11 th Cir. 1987) (adopting Justice Brennan's assertion in Gingles that "[u]nder Section 2, it is
the status of the candidate as the chosen representative of a particular racial group, not the race of the
candidate that is important"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936 (1988).
229. For a detailed description of these methods and their use in the racially polarized voting inquiry,
see GROFMAN Er AL., supra note 118, at 82-108.
230. See, e.g., id. at 74. Grofman, who has written and edited several books on techniques for
measuring vote dilution, was the principal expert witness in Gingles. See 478 U.S. at 52-53.
231. GROFMAN Er AL., supra note 118, at 89.
232. See id. at 91 (there is no substitute for careful visual inspection of the data in graphical form,
that is, a plot of votes for the minority candidates against percentage minority in the precinct.").
233. The regression analysis also produces a correlation coefficient, which measures how good a "fit"
exists between the hypothetical line and the observed data points.
234. The formula for these calculations is given in GROFMAN Er AL, supra note 118, at 86-90.
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1000 people vote at another, the likelihood that any particular respondent will
be selected at the first site is twice as great as the likelihood that a particular
respondent will be selected at the second. This imbalance can be corrected by
assigning a response at the second site twice the weight of a response at the
first. The accuracy of such polls depends on the sampling method used and on
the size of the sample.
235
When presented with relevant exit poll data, courts have shown no
reluctance to rely on them in the Gingles analysis. 6 Courts have indicated,
in fact, that such data, when available, are a reliable and perhaps superior
indicator of the degree of minority political cohesion and racially polarized
voting.237 Unfortunately, such data are rarely available for state and local
elections.2 38 Properly used, however, exit poll data can yield valuable insights
into a jurisdiction's voting patterns-patterns that, at the very least, are
strongly suggestive of the results that the more traditional forms of analysis
might reveal.
Elections for the position of presidential elector are unusual in one very
important respect. In nearly all of the states, the names of candidates for
presidential elector are not listed on the ballot. The overwhelming majority of
voters neither know nor care who those candidates are. In the context of
presidential elections, then, the relevant criterion is not the identity of the
candidates for the office of presidential elector, but the candidates for the
office of President. The post-Gingles case law thus suggests that the most
probative recent elections to examine are the 1984 and 1988 Democratic
presidential primaries, in which an African-American candidate, Jesse Jackson,
staged prominent campaigns for his party's nomination. There has never been
a viable minority candidate for President in a general election. Data from the
235. See generally WAYNE C. CURTIS, STATISTICAL CONCEPTS FOR ATrORNEYS: A REFERENCE GUIDE
93-96 (1983) (discussing effects of "systematic sampling," "stratified random sampling," and "cluster
sampling" on poll results); GARY T. HENRY, PRACTICAL SAMPLING 34-46 (1990) (noting potential sources
of error in sampling design).
236. See Hall v. Holder, 955 F.2d 1563, 1571 & nn.14-15 (11th Cir. 1992) (relying in part on exit
poll data to reach conclusion that county experienced racially polarized voting, and noting that regression
analysis figures were nearly identical to exit poll results), rev'd on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994);
Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1426-27 (9th Cir. 1989) (relying on exit poll from city council
primary election to conclude that district court had adequate basis to conclude that blacks and Hispanics
were not cohesive as single group); DeBaca v. County of San Diego, 794 F. Supp. 990, 999 (S.D. Cal.
1992) (relying on exit polls from 1988 presidential primary to conclude that blacks and Hispanics were not
cohesive as single group), aff'd, 5 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1993).
237. See Chisom v. Roemer, No. 86-4057, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10816, at *14-15 (E.D. La. Sept.
13, 1989) ("In analyzing statistical data, the Court finds that the best available data for estimating the
voting behavior of various groups in the electorate would come from exit polls ... but such evidence is
not available."), remanded, 917 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 501 U.S. 380 (1991);
Monroe v. City of Woodville, 688 F. Supp. 255, 258 (S.D. Miss. 1988) ("The best data would have been
actual tum-out data as might have been collected by exit polls. This data was non-existent."), aff'd, 881
F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1989). vacated on other grounds, 493 U.S. 915 (1989), modified, 897 F.2d 763 (5th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 822 (1990).
238. See GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 118, at 84 & n.6 (noting that relevant survey data is usually
only available in presidential or statewide contests).
[Vol. 105: 935
The Illegitimate President
general elections, however, should also be significant, provided that it provides
some adequate basis for demonstrating that a particular candidate is the
minority community's representative of choice. In addition, data from
exogenous elections, such as gubernatorial or senatorial contests involving
minority candidates, should be significant.
What do the presidential election exit polls tell us about minority political
cohesion? As noted in the introduction, exit polls from presidential elections
show that an overwhelming majority of African-American voters-ranging
from 82% to 90%---have preferred Democratic presidential candidates over the
last twenty years. By contrast, the majority of white voters nationally have
voted Republican during this same period. In the past three elections, white
voters have preferred George Bush to Bill Clinton by a margin of 41% to 39%,
Bush to Michael Dukakis by a margin of 59% to 40%, and Ronald Reagan to
Walter Mondale by a margin of 64% to 35%.239 As Section B of this part
demonstrates, similar patterns hold true in many statewide polls.
Results from the 1988 and 1984 presidential primaries also demonstrate a
high level of racial cohesion. In state after state in those races, African-
American candidate Jesse Jackson consistently outpolled his rivals for the
Democratic nomination by overwhelming margins among African-American
voters, frequently by as much as 90%.240 In 1988, these margins were large
enough to enable him to win primaries in several Southern states, as well as
a caucus in the key Northern state of Michigan.24' But he did very poorly
among white voters in nearly every state, rarely getting as much as 10% of the
vote.242 Courts have often used these sorts of results as evidence of political
cohesion in other elections. 243 Viewed in conjunction with the consistent and
overwhelming support of African-American voters for Democrats in the
general election, they leave little doubt as to the political cohesiveness of
African-American voters in presidential elections.244
239. See sources cited supra note 9.
240. For figures from specific states, see infra Section IV.B.
241. See, e.g., GERMOND & WITCOVER, supra note 123, at 289, 299-300.
242. For figures from specific states, see infra Section IV.B.
243. See, e.g., Hall v. Holder, 955 F.2d 1563, 1571-73 (11th Cir. 1992) (basing finding of racially
polarized voting and black political cohesion in part on showing that 60.8% of black voters supported
Jackson in 1984 and more than 90% supported him in 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 2581
(1994); Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 502 n.15 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding
black voter cohesion based in part on results of local exit poll showing more than 95% support among
African-Americans for Jackson in 1984 election).
244. It is harder to generalize about the cohesiveness of Hispanic voters, since the demographic
characteristics of these voters vary significantly from one region to the next. For example, Puerto Ricans
in the Northeast and Mexicans in the Southwest tend to be liberal Democrats, while Cubans in Florida are
generally conservative Republicans.
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3. White Bloc Voting
Proof of white bloc voting is perhaps the most complicated of the three
Gingles factors. Like the political-cohesion prong, it requires a careful analysis
of past voting patterns.245 The proper interpretation of these voting patterns,
however, is currently the subject of much dispute among the courts. Courts all
agree that, at a minimum, plaintiffs must show that white voters and minority
voters tend to prefer different candidates, and that as a result minority voters
are unable to elect their candidates of their choice. Still partially unresolved,
however, is the question of whether plaintiffs must also undertake some
investigation of the reasons why white voters reject minority-preferred
candidates and prove that those reasons are somehow linked to race.
Under Gingles, the standard for legally significant white bloc voting is that
"the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it-in the absence of
special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed-
usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.2 46 This much of Gingles
is binding law, announced in a section of the opinion that commanded majority
support, and twice reaffirmed by a unanimous Court.247
This standard is flexible and fact-intensive; the level of bloc voting
necessary to satisfy the § 2 threshold may vary significantly from one case to
the next.248 The key element is that the majority must usually-not
necessarily always-be able to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.
Hence, the white bloc voting inquiry generally requires courts to examine a
series of elections. The absence of legally significant racially polarized voting
in particular elections does not necessarily mean that it is not present in
others.249 Thus, the fact that minority voters are occasionally able to elect
candidates of their choice does not necessarily preclude them from § 2
relief? °0 Evidence of sustained proportional representation of minority voters
over a series of elections, however, demonstrates a lack of significant white
bloc voting.25'
One major section of Justice Brennan's opinion in Gingles dealing with the
standard for legally significant white bloc voting was signed by only three
245. Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 56 (1986) ("Mhe question whether a given district
experiences legally significant racially polarized voting requires discrete inquiries into minority and white
voting practices.").
246. Id. at 51 (citations omitted).
247. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1157 (1993); Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084
(1993); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2651 (1994).
248. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 55-56 ("[Ihe degree of bloc voting which constitutes the threshold of legal
significance will vary from district to district.").
249. Id. at 57.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 77 (Brennan, J.), see also id. at 101-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (agreeing
with Justice Brennan's conclusion that no § 2 violation occurred in district with "sustained and virtually
proportional minority electoral success").
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other Justices, however. In that section, Justice Brennan expressed the view
that, under the results test of § 2, the reasons why white voters reject minority-
preferred candidates are legally irrelevant. In his view, what matters is simply
evidence of a significant correlation between race and voting preference. 2
Thus, evidence that voting patterns are motivated by racial animus is not
required.z 3 Similarly, in Justice Brennan's view, the race of a candidate is
irrelevant to the white bloc voting inquiry.254
Justice O'Connor, joined by three other Justices, concurred in Justice
Brennan's judgment, but expressed a somewhat different view of racially
polarized voting. She agreed that, under amended § 2, plaintiffs need not
demonstrate that a particular jurisdiction adopted or maintained a political
system with any intent to discriminate.' 5 She expressed some reservations,
however, as to whether the statute's emphasis on results implies that evidence
concerning the causes of voter behavior is irrelevant:
Insofar as statistical evidence of divergent racial voting patterns is
admitted solely to establish that the minority group is politically
cohesive and to assess its prospects for electoral success, I agree that
defendants cannot rebut this showing by offering evidence that the
divergent racial voting patterns may be explained in part by causes
other than race .... I do not agree, however, that such evidence can
never affect the overall vote dilution inquiry. Evidence that a
candidate preferred by the minority group in a particular election was
rejected by white voters for reasons other than those which made that
candidate the preferred choice of the minority group would seem
clearly relevant in answering the question whether bloc voting by
white voters will consistently defeat minority candidates. Such
evidence would suggest that another candidate, equally preferred by
the minority group, might be able to attract greater white support in
future elections.'
Justice O'Connor's analysis thus suggests that legally cognizable vote dilution
occurs only when white voters reject a candidate because of race. To pick a
realistic example, suppose that African-American voters overwhelmingly
preferred Jesse Jackson for a particular office, but that white voters
consistently voted against him. Justice O'Connor's model of vote dilution
would then ask whether white voters rejected Jackson because of his race, or
252. Id. at 63 ("C[V]e reject (the] argument that racially polarized voting refers to voting patterns that
are in some way caused by race, rather than to voting patterns that are merely correlated with the race of.
the voter .... ).
253. Id. at 70-73.
254. Id. at 68 (Brennan, J., with three Justices concurring) ("Under § 2, it is the status of the candidate
as the chosen representative of a particular racial group, not the race of the candidate, that is important.").
255. See id. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("Amended § 2 is intended to codify the
'results' test ... and to reject the 'intent' test .... ); id. at 43-44.
256. Id. at 100 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
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whether some other factor, such as his lack of political experience, was the
decisive factor. If the latter were the case, then another candidate-Colin
Powell, for example-might fare equally well among African-American and
white voters. z 7 Thus, Justice O'Connor's opinion clearly suggests that courts
may have to undertake some inquiry into the reasons why different racial
groups have different voting preferences. The precise scope of this inquiry is
unclear, however.
Several interpretations of Justice O'Connor's language are possible. The
most extreme interpretation---one that, thus far, no court has adopted-would
be that minority plaintiffs must affirmatively prove that their candidate's defeat
at the polls was "on account of race or color," that is, that white voters reject
the minority-preferred candidate for reasons related to race. s There is an
important methodological corollary to this position. Under Justice Brennan's
analysis, plaintiffs may prove white bloc voting by a bivariate ecological
regression analysis of the sort discussed above. The extreme interpretation of
Justice O'Connor's position, in contrast, would require plaintiffs to perform a
multivariate regression analysis, examining the correlation between voter
preference and other factors in addition to race.259
Thus far, however, courts have almost uniformly relied on bivariate
regression analysis to demonstrate vote dilution. Justice Brennan's opinion in
Gingles remains the predominant analytical framework for evaluating white
bloc voting. Nevertheless, both the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits have shown
signs recently that they are moving toward a vote-dilution standard based on
slightly less extreme interpretations of Justice O'Connor's language. A
minority of the Eleventh Circuit recently argued that plaintiffs may make out
a prima facie case of vote dilution merely by showing significant disparities
in voting patterns, but that defendants can rebut that showing by demonstrating
that racial animus is not responsible for the defeat of minority-preferred
candidates. 60 This position is directly contrary to Justice Brennan's
257. It should be noted, however, that Colin Powell's experience in elective office is precisely the
same as Jesse Jackson's. Neither man has any.
258. This view was advocated by the defendants in Gingles, and rejected by Justice Brennan. Gingles,
478 U.S. at 62 n.31 (Brennan, J., with three Justices concurring).
259. As a minority of the Fifth Circuit has noted, this approach is problematic from a social science
perspective. Although a regression analysis can identify a correlation between race and other variables, on
one hand, and voter preference, on the other, it cannot determine whether that correlation results from a
causal relationship. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 907-09 (5th Cir.
1993) (King, J., dissenting).
260. See Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1513 (11th Cir. 1994) (Tjoflat, CJ.) ("A defendant in a vote
dilution case may always attempt to rebut the plaintiff's claim by introducing evidence of objective, non-
racial factors under the totality of the circumstances standard."), cert. denied. 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995);
Solomon v. Liberty County, 899 F.2d 1012, 1022 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Tjoflat. C.J., specially
concurring) ("[I]f a section 2 defendant can affirmatively show. under the totality of the circumstances, that
the community is not motivated by racial bias in its voting, a case of vote dilution has not been made
out.").
Defendants have attempted to introduce the results of multivariate analysis to rebut evidence of
racially polarized voting in several cases. Most of these efforts have been unsuccessful. See. e.g., Romero
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conclusion in Gingles that "defendants may not rebut [plaintiffs'] case with
evidence of causation or intent."
261
The leading case that holds expressly that proof of disparities in voting
patterns is not sufficient to demonstrate legally significant white bloc voting
comes from the Fifth Circuit. In League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Clements (LULAC), 262 an en banc court overturned a finding of vote dilution
in judicial elections in several Texas counties, notwithstanding significant
disparities between the preferences of minority voters and white voters. It
concluded that "the evidence in most instances unmistakably shows that
divergent voting patterns among white and minority voters are best explained
by partisan affiliation," not race.263 The LULAC court carefully stopped short
of holding that plaintiffs must demonstrate that their inability to elect
candidates is the result of racial animus. 264 Nor did it explain whether it was
placing a new burden on the plaintiffs, or simply allowing defendants to rebut
their showing of racial disparities with evidence of partisan influence.265
LULAC appears to hold, however, that plaintiffs in § 2 cases must be prepared
to prove, either directly or in rebuttal, that minority-preferred candidates do not
lose elections primarily as a result of partisan preferences-or, if they do, that
party affiliation is a mere "proxy" for race.266 Thus far no other circuit has
endorsed this analysis.267
At a minimum, then, minority plaintiffs challenging the winner-take-all
feature of the electoral system must demonstrate that white voters and minority
voters tend to have different preferences. They must also demonstrate that as
a result of this disparity, minority voters are usually-but not necessarily
v. City of Pomona, 665 F. Supp. 853, 859-60 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (rejecting validity of multivariate analysis),
aff'd, 883 F2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989); see also GROFMAN sr AL., supra note 118, at 75 (noting that "lower
courts have thus far concluded that a regression analysis that considers explanatory factors other than race
is irrelevant to a Section 2 vote dilution claim"). But see Sanchez v. Colorado, 861 F. Supp. 1516, 1527
(D. Colo. 1994) (accepting multivariate analysis as rebuttal evidence).
261. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 74 (Brennan, J.).
262. 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994).
263. Id. at 861.
264. See id. at 859 ("We need not hold that plaintiffs must supply conclusive proof that a minority
group's failure to elect representatives of its choice is caused by racial animus in the white
electorate .... ).
265. See id. at 860 ("[W]e need not resolve the debate today. Whether or not the burden of plaintiffs
to prove bloc voting includes the burden to explain partisan influence, the result is the same.").
266. See id. (noting that "even partisan affiliation may serve as a proxy for illegitimate racial
considerations").
267. Chief Judge Tjoflat's opinion in Nipper adopts a similar analysis, and cites LULAC with approval.
See 39 F.3d at 1524-25 (holding that defendants may rebut showing of disparities in voting behavior with
evidence of causation in totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry). However. that section of the en banc opinion
was not joined by the four concurring judges. See id. at 1547 (Edmonson, J., concurring in part and
concurring in result) (concurring in part of Chief Judge Tjoflat's opinion, but expressing no opinion as to
whether the remainder is correct, arguing that conclusions reached in that section were not essential to
deciding case).
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always-unable to elect candidates of their choice to the office of presidential
elector. Under the holding of LULAC, they may also be required to show that
the disparities in voting behavior are not simply the result of partisan
affiliation. Again, however, it should be noted that LULAC remains something
of an outlier in § 2 caselaw, and that the prevailing mode of analysis is that
employed by Justice Brennan in Gingles.
The exit poll results cited in the previous discussion clearly establish that,
at least at the national level, white voters do tend to have substantially
different preferences from minority voters. These figures strongly suggest, in
fact, that many states are experiencing legally significant white bloc voting in
presidential elections. Accordingly, the remainder of this subsection will
examine whether partisan affiliations can adequately explain these disparities.
The extent of racially polarized voting in specific states will then be considered
in Section B.
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that it would be extremely
anomalous for a court to find that a pattern of disparities in presidential voting
could be better explained by partisan preferences than by race. Indeed, one of
the dominant trends in presidential politics of the past half century has been
the decline of political party influence. Presidential campaigns are increasingly
marked by what political scientist Martin P. Wattenberg and others have
termed "candidate-centered politics," emphasizing a candidate's character and
record rather than party affiliation.26
One symptom of this decline in party influence has been a decrease in the
number of people who strongly identify with one political party or the other,
and a corresponding rise in the number of people who consider themselves
independents.2 69 A 1990 Gallup poll showed that some 30% of respondents
identified themselves as independents, compared to 39% who considered
themselves Democrats and 31% who considered themselves Republicans.270
A 1992 study revealed a continuation of this trend, with nonpartisans
outnumbering both major political parties for the first time: 38% independent,
36% Democrat, and 25% Republican.27' Another symptom of waning party
allegiances is the increasing practice of "split ticket" voting.272 In 1952, only
12% of voters cast a ballot for a presidential candidate of a different party than
268. See MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED POLITICS: PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS OF THE 1980s (1991).
269. HAROLD W. STANLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS 159-60
(3d ed. 1992).
270. Id. at 161.
271. WATrENBERG, supra note 139, at 173.
272. See id. at 17-23, 177-78; Amar & Amar, supra note 40, at 915-16.
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their choice for the House of Representatives. By 1992, that number had
climbed to 36%.273 Perhaps the most significant indicator of the decline in
the importance of parties, however, is the success in the 1992 election of
independent candidate Ross Perot. Despite his lack of an established campaign
organization and his avoidance of traditional campaign methods, Perot received
19% of the national vote-the best popular vote showing by any third-party
candidate since Theodore Roosevelt in 1916.274
I do not mean to suggest that parties are irrelevant to contemporary
American political behavior. Indeed, partisan affiliation remains one of the best
predictors of individual voting behavior.275 This should not be surprising,
because individuals define their partisan identification on the basis of which
candidates they tend to favor. Rather, I am suggesting that, at least at the
national level, political parties are much less influential now than at any time
in recent history. At the same time, exit polls from the past three elections
indicate that racial polarization in voting has remained quite constant.
Indeed, at the national level, race and party identification appear to be
inextricably intertwined. In the 1992 presidential election, nearly 69% of black
voters surveyed in a national exit poll identified themselves as Democrats,
compared with only 7% who identified themselves as Republicans.276 As
discussed in Part II, the gap between black and white voters in terms of party
identification is no accident. Instead, it is in large part due to the positions that
the two major parties have taken on racial issues as a result of their efforts to
secure the Southern electoral vote.
Furthermore, data from the past three elections demonstrate that significant
racial disparities exist even among voters of the same party. Regardless of their
partisan identification, white voters in these elections have been much more
likely to support the Republican candidate for President, while black voters
273. VATTENBERG, supra note 139, at 174; see also Richard E. Cohen, What Coattails, 25 NAT'L J.
1285 (1993) (noting that 99 of 435 House districts in 1992 elected Representative from one party and voted
for candidate of other party for President).
274. WAT7ENBERG, supra note 139, at-170.
275. Id. at 7.
276. My calculations are based on data contained in VOTER RESEARCH & SURVEYS, GENERAL
ELECTION EXIT POLLS, 1992 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter GENERAL ELECTION EXIT POLL 1992] (surveying
1539 black voters). This exit poll is available as a computer file from the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
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have been more likely to support the Democratic candidate. Data from three
polls are summarized in the following table:
Democrats Republicans Independents
White Black White Black White Black
1984 Walter Mondale 69% 95% 6% 43% 33% 78%
Ronald Reagan 30% 3% 93% 51% 67% 18%
1988 Michael Dukakis 78% 94% 8% 34% 41% 73%
George Bush 21% 4% 92% 60% 57% 20%
1992 Bill Clinton 73% 91% 10% 28% 35% 64%
George Bush 11% 5% 72% 52% 32% 17%
Ross Perot 15% 4% 17% 17% 30% 18%
TABLE 1. National Election Results by Race277
As Table 1 indicates, the majority of both Democratic and Republican voters,
regardless of their race, do tend to support their party's nominee. The level of
crossover voting in both major parties, however, differs markedly according
to race. Black Democrats have remained overwhelmingly loyal to their party's
nominees, while anywhere from 21% to 30% of white Democrats have been
willing to cross party lines. Similarly, white Republicans have shown a high
degree of loyalty to their party and, in the case of the 1992 election, a strong
aversion to voting for Democrats. In each election, however, black Republicans
have shown a strong inclination to cross party lines to vote for the Democratic
nominee. Since these racial disparities occur within political parties, they
cannot be explained on partisan grounds.
Even among independent voters, similar patterns hold true. The common
thread among independents is that they do not identify themselves with any
political party, even though as individuals they may have distinct political
preferences. One might therefore expect not to see significant differences in
voting behavior between black and white independent voters. Even among
277. Id. (surveying 4350 white Democrats, 1086 black Democrats, 4377 white Republicans, 100 black
Republicans, 3637 white independents, and 236 black independents); CBS NEWS/NEW YORK TIMES,
GENERAL ELECTION EXIT POLL: NATIONAL FILE, 1988 [hereinafter CBS NEWS EXIT POLL 1988] (surveying
3052 white Democrats, 1067 black Democrats, 3339 white Republicans, 100 black Republicans, 2565 white
independents, and 189 black independents); CBS NEws/NEw YORK TIMES. ELECTION SURVEY, 1984:
ELECTION DAY NATIONAL SURVEY (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter CBS NEWS EXIT POLL 1984] (surveying
2532 white Democrats, 874 black Democrats, 2987 white Republicans, 71 black Republicans, 2148 white
independents, and 160 black independents).
My calculations are based on data contained in these three exit polls, which are available as computer
files from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
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independents, however, such differences do exist. Black voters who identify
themselves as independents have voted overwhelmingly for Democratic
presidential candidates, while strong majorities of white independents voted
Republican in both 1984 and 1988. In 1992, when the vote of white
independents was split among three candidates, black independents were
almost twice as likely as their white counterparts to vote for Bill Clinton.
Again, it is impossible to explain these disparities on partisan grounds, since
independents, by definition, do not identify with any political party.
Thus, while party identification appears to be a fairly good predictor of
voter preference, it cannot fully explain the consistent pattern of disparities
between black and white voter preferences in modem presidential elections.
Moreover, these statistics must be viewed in light of the fact that none of these
elections involved a viable minority candidate. The results of the 1984 and
1988 presidential primaries, which revealed wide disparities between black and
white voters in their support for Jesse Jackson, suggest that if an African-
American were in the general election, the pattern of racial polarization might
be much more pronounced. White Democrats, for example, would have been
even more likely to crossover to vote Republican in 1988 if Jackson had been
their party's nominee.278 The results of those elections suggest that the
disparities between white and black voters are in fact closely linked to race,
and that, at the national level at least, voting in presidential elections is highly
racially polarized. 7 9
4. The Totality of the Circumstances
Proof of the three Gingles factors is not sufficient to establish § 2 liability.
Courts must also examine the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether, in light of all the relevant facts, minority voters have an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process. 20 This inquiry can help to
determine whether, beyond statistical disparities that seem to support a claim
of vote dilution, a particular election practice shuts minorities out of the
political process.
278. See infra text accompanying note 326.
279. Because such analysis is, at present, legally irrelevant to the § 2 inquiry, this Article does not
undertake any analysis of race in comparison to other factors that might influence voting preference, such
as income level, age, or education. It is worth noting, however, that detailed multivariate studies of voting
behavior in congressional and state legislative elections indicate that race is the factor that best explains
the different levels of success enjoyed by white candidates and African-American candidates. See Richard
Pildes, 77e Politics of Rage, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1359, 1369-70 (1995) (reviewing QUIEr REVOLUTION.
supra note 2) (citing published and unpublished studies).
280. Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2657-58 (1994); NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65
F.3d 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding district court finding that plaintiffs failed to prove § 2 violation,
despite their proof of all three Gingles factors).
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The totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry typically focuses on several
factors that were enumerated in the Senate report accompanying the 1982
amendments to § 2:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state
or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the
democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or
political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-
single-shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority
group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of
the minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state
or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas
as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to
participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt
or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction.28'
The report identified two additional factors that may have some probative
value: a lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the
"particularized needs" of minority voters and a "tenuous" justification for the
policy underlying the challenged practice.8 2 These factors were initially
derived from the Supreme Court's decision in White v. Regester' 3 and the
subsequent decision of the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen.284
The totality-of-the-circumstances test occupies a somewhat nebulous
position in the overall vote-dilution inquiry. Gingles makes it clear that, with
the exception of those factors incorporated in the three-part threshold test, no
particular combination of the Senate factors is essential to a plaintiff's
case.285 Yet the Supreme Court's recent decision in De Grandy v. Johnson
makes it equally clear that courts cannot find vote dilution under § 2 without
some consideration of the totality of the circumstances.286 Courts have
generally recognized, however, that "it [will] be a highly unusual case in which
281. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 135, at 28-29.
282. Id. at 29.
283. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
284. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S.
636 (1976).
285. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-51 (1986).
286. See 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2657 (1994).
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a plaintiff successfully prove[s] the existence of the three Gingles factors and
still fail[s] to establish a violation [of § 2]. ''2s7
Whatever role the Senate factors play in the overall inquiry, it seems clear
that several of these elements are present in modem-day presidential elections.
First, as noted in Part II, presidential elections in the United States during the
last fifty years have repeatedly been marked by both overt and subtle racial
appeals, including three clear attempts to manipulate the electoral college
machinery to further an explicitly racist agenda. Although these efforts focused
on the South, their effects have been felt throughout the nation. Second, no
member of a minority group has ever been elected President or Vice President,
or won the nomination of a major party for either position. The one candidate
who has staged a credible run for a major party nomination, Jesse Jackson,
floundered due to his inability to attract the support of white voters. 2"8 Third,
minority citizens throughout the country "bear the effects of discrimination"
in many walks of life, including education, employment, health, and housing.
These persistent inequalities clearly have the potential to hinder minority
voters' ability to participate in the political process. Taken together, then,
several of the Senate factors suggest that, given the totality of the
circumstances, the winner-take-all system may operate to deprive minority
voters of an equal opportunity to participate in the selection of the nation's
Chief Executive.
One factor that could weigh against application of § 2 to the electoral
college under the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis is the legitimate interest
of a state in maintaining the winner-take-all rule. Here again the Voting Rights
Act case law regarding judicial elections provides an interesting analogy. In
Houston Lawyers' Association v. Attorney General,289 the Supreme Court
287. Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1116 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2779 (1994); accord NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002 (2d Cir. 1995).
Niagara Falls apparently was such an unusual case. The Second Circuit held there that, although the
plaintiffs had proved the three Gingles factors, the district court's determination that the totality of the
circumstances did not demonstrate vote dilution was not clearly erroneous. However, the court noted its
general agreement with the Third Circuit's observation in Jenkins. It also required that
[i]n such cases, the district court must explain with particularity why it has concluded.., that
an electoral system that routinely results in white voters voting as a bloc to defeat the candidate
of choice of a politically cohesive minority group is not violative of § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.
Id. at 1019 n.21.
288. Critics of this Article will no doubt point to General Colin Powell, whose flirtation with a
presidential bid is discussed above. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. Powell, however, has never
run for any office, and has now decided not to run for President in 1996. See, e.g., Francis X. Clines,
Powell Rules Out '96 Race; Cites Concerns for Family and His Lack of 'a Calling,' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
1995, at Al. It is certainly possible that, had Powell run, he would have been an attractive candidate to
both white and black voters. That is by no means certain, however. See, e.g., Richard L. Berke, Powell
Record is Criticized by Conservatives in GOP, N.Y. TIMEs. Nov. 2. 1995, at A26.
Since no American, black or white, has ever cast a ballot for Powell, the strength of his candidacy
remains a matter of pure conjecture. Political realities are often quite different from preliminary forecasts,
and § 2 requires an analysis of historical fact, rather than hypothetical possibility.
289. 501 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1991).
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noted that a state might have a legitimate interest in maintaining a link
between the area over which a judge exercised jurisdiction and the electoral
base from which that judge was selected. Lower courts have since amplified
this concept. In LULAC, however, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that
this "linkage" interest automatically precluded § 2 liability, but decided
nonetheless that Texas had a substantial interest in maintaining linkage and that
plaintiffs could not override this interest without an equally substantial
showing of legally significant vote dilution.290
In Nipper v. Smith,29' Chief Judge Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit took
a somewhat different tack. He concluded that the state's linkage interest was
of "little, if any" relevance to the totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry.292 He
joined the majority of the en banc panel, however, in concluding that the
state's linkage interest precluded the court from granting relief under § 2. The
rationale for this decision was that the remedies proposed by the
plaintiffs-including subdistricting and cumulative voting-would seriously
undermine the administration of justice in the state.293
"Linkage," of course, is a concept that does not make any sense outside
the context of judicial elections. Nonetheless, it is possible that states may have
a related interest in preserving the winner-take-all feature of the electoral
college. By casting their electoral votes in a bloc, states may arguably increase
their political influence relative to other states and maximize the voting power
of their individual citizens. This interest could conceivably be significant
enough to preclude implementation of any alternate system.
This argument has several significant flaws, however. First, in states that
experience significant vote dilution, use of the winner-take-all system does not
increase the voting power of the citizenry. Rather, it increases the voting power
of certain citizens, at the expense of others. In his mathematical analysis of the
electoral college in the 1960s, John F. Banzhaf pointedly noted that he had not
taken into account the dynamics of group behavior within states.94 Rather,
he assumed that all citizens within a state had equal voting power. As the
analysis in the next section suggests, however, in a state like Alabama, this
assumption is false. Because of severely racially polarized voting, African-
American voters in Alabama have virtually no influence over the outcome of
a statewide election.
Second, it is by no means clear that states necessarily increase their
political influence relative to other states by maintaining the winner-take-all
290. 999 F.2d 831, 876 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994) ("We hold that
proof of dilution, considering the totality of the circumstances, must be substantial in order to overcome
the state's interest in linkage established here.").
291. 39 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994).
292. Id. at 1542 (Tjoflat, C.J.). This portion of the Nipper opinion was not joined by the four
concurring judges. See id. at 1547 (Edmondson, J., concurring).
293. Id. at 1546-47 (Edmondson, J.. concurring).
294. Banzhaf, supra note 39, at 304, 308, 328.
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system. Quite the opposite may be true. If a state consistently tends to favor
one major party or the other, under a winner-take-all rule, candidates from both
parties may have an incentive to ignore that state.
In 1992, for example, the Florida legislature considered a bill that would
have replaced the winner-take-all rule with a congressional-district system.
295
Although one of the primary motives behind the bill was undoubtedly the
desire of Democratic lawmakers to break the Republican party's apparent
"lock" on Florida's electoral votes, supporters of the measure argued that it
would increase the state's political influence and ability to compete for federal
funds by giving both Democrats and Republicans an incentive to campaign in
Florida.29 Republicans in the legislature ultimately managed to block the
bill, which clearly ran counter to their party's interests. Thus, with respect to
Florida, it seems quite possible that the continued dominance of the winner-
take-all rule is the product of partisan maneuvering, rather than the result of
any concrete benefits it produces for the state.
Furthermore, it is important to remember that the totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis is a balancing test which, like the Gingles factors, may
lead to different results in different jurisdictions. Even if a state could
demonstrate a legitimate state interest in maintaining the winner-take-all rule,
that interest should be weighed against other factors-most significantly, the
degree to which race is a factor in campaigns and the ability of minority voters
to choose presidential electors. In a jurisdiction in which minority voters are
essentially denied any voice in the selection of the President, any policy
justifications offered by the state will have a hollow ring.
B. Some Specific Examples
Presidential electors are chosen at the state level. As a result, the ability
of minority voters to choose electors will necessarily vary from state to state.
Hence the winner-take-all system may be illegal in some states and perfectly
legal in others. 297 The preceding section established both that several states
contain enough minority voters to satisfy the first Gingles factor and that racial
bloc voting and minority political cohesion are evident in nationwide voting
patterns. This section examines patterns of racially polarized voting in a few
selected states to determine whether they meet the § 2 threshold for legally
significant bloc voting.
295. See GLENNON, supra note 24, at 12-13.
296. See, e.g., Electoral Reform: A Good Bill, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES. Mar. 2. 1992, at 10A.
297. See Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986) (requiring "intensely local" appraisal of
challenged scheme).
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1. Alabama
The South's long history of discrimination against African-Americans in
all walks of life suggests that the Southern states would be particularly
vulnerable to a § 2 challenge based on the use of the winner-take-all system.
This subsection undertakes a § 2 analysis of one state where racially polarized
voting has been particularly severe: Alabama.298 For the purposes of this
Article, Alabama provides a particularly interesting study because of the
central role it played in Strom Thurmond's 1948 campaign, the 1960 free-
elector movement, and George Wallace's 1968 campaign.
Alabama currently has seven congressional districts and therefore casts
nine electoral votes in presidential elections. At the time of the 1990 census,
the state had a voting-age population of 2,981,799, of which 75.9% was non-
Hispanic white and 22.7%-slightly more than two-ninths-was African-
American.299 Six of the congressional districts have substantial white voting-
age majorities; the seventh has a 63.4% African-American voting-age
majority.300 Thus, under a congressional-district scheme, African-American
voters would have the clear ability to choose one of the state's nine
presidential electors, while under a proportional scheme, they might be able to
choose two of the nine. Under any of the formulations outlined above,
Alabama therefore satisfies the first Gingles factor.
Furthermore, the evidence of racially polarized voting in Alabama is
unmistakable. African-American voters exhibit a high degree of political
cohesion, while white voters tend to vote sufficiently as a bloc to prevent
African-Americans from choosing even a single presidential elector. In the
1984 Democratic primary, the African-American vote was split between Jesse
Jackson and Walter Mondale.30' Jackson received approximately 50% of the
African-American vote, while Mondale received about 47%. The white vote
was split between Mondale, Senator John Glenn, and Senator Gary Hart. Hart
received 37% of the vote, Glenn received 32%, and Mondale received 29%.
Jackson received less than 1% of the white vote.302 These figures clearly
indicate a disparity between the preferences of African-American and white
298. For a detailed discussion of the history of vote-dilution litigation in Alabama and the persistence
of racially polarized voting patterns there, see Peyton McCrary et al., Alabama, in QUIET REVOLUTION,
supra note 2, at 38.
299. THE ELECTION DATA BOOK: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF VOTING IN AMERICA 1992, at 7
(Kimball W. Brace ed., 1993) [hereinafter ELECTION DATA BOOK].
300. Id. at 43.
301. Many Aflican-American political leaders had urged their constituents to support Mondale, rather
than Jackson. See JACK W. GERMOND & JULES WITCOVER, WAKE US WHEN IT'S OVER: PRESIDENTIAL
POLITICS OF 1984, at 68-85 (1985); Bill Peterson & Milton Coleman. Black Voters Back Jackson. Aid
Mondale, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 1984. at Al. A12.
302. My calculations are based on data contained in CBS NEws/NEW YORK TIMES, PRIMARY
ELECTION DAY EXIT POLLS, 1984 (1985) (computer file available from Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Mich.) [hereinafter CBS NEWS PRIMARY ELECTION EXIT POLLS
1984] (Alabama file) (surveying 704 white voters and 596 black voters).
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voters. Such a disparity is also evident in the results of the 1988 primary. In
that race, Jackson received 96% of the African-American vote, but only 6%
of the white vote. Among white voters, Tennessee Senator Al Gore was a clear
favorite, with 64% of the vote. About 12% of whites voted for Michael
Dukakis, and another 12% for Representative Richard Gephardt. 3 Jackson's
nearly unanimous support among African-American voters enabled him to win
the state.3°4
Results from these primary elections are perhaps the most relevant to the
vote-dilution inquiry because they were the only ones that offered African-
American voters an opportunity to support a viable African-American
candidate. They suggest that black Democrats in Alabama are highly cohesive
and that they have very different preferences from white Democrats. Data from
the past three general elections confirm this impression. In all three elections,
the Republican presidential candidate won the state despite near-unanimous
black support for the Democratic candidate. The margins of support for the
major party candidates by black and white voters in Alabama are summarized
in the following table:
White Black
Vote Vote
1984 Walter Mondale 14% 92%
Ronald Reagan 86% 8%
1988 Michael Dukakis 34% 89%
George Bush 64% 11%
1992 Bill Clinton 30% 91%
George Bush 56% 3%
Ross Perot 12% 4%
TABLE 2. Alabama Election Results by Race 5
303. My calculations are based on data contained in CBS NEWS/NEw YORK TIMEs, SUPER TUESDAY
PRIMARY ELECTION EXIT POLLS, 1988 (1989) (computer file available from Inter-University Consortium
for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Mich.) [hereinafter CBS NEWS SUPER TUESDAY EXIT POLLS
1988] (Alabama Democratic primary file) (surveying 835 white voters and 486 black voters).
304. Jackson also won the primaries in Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia, all
with strong support from African-American voters. See, e.g., GERMOND & WITCOVER, supra note 123, at
289.
305. My calculations are based on data contained in GENERAL ELECTION EXIT POLL 1992, supra note
276 (Alabama file) (surveying 597 white voters and 200 black voters); CBS NEWS EXIT POLL 1988, supra
note 277 (national file) (surveying 161 white voters and 41 black voters); CBS NEWS EXIT POLL 1984,
supra note 277 (national file) (surveying 168 white voters and 117 black voters).
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These figures indicate a pattern of severely racially polarized voting, with
nearly unanimous African-American support for Democratic candidates and
extremely strong white support for Republican candidates. Moreover, under
Gingles, the figures clearly indicate a legally significant level of white bloc
voting. A large number of African-American voters tend to vote for the same
candidate, and white voters vote sufficiently as a bloc to enable them
consistently to defeat all of the minority's preferred candidates.0 6
It is worth pausing a moment to consider the implications of these figures.
They demonstrate that, no matter how strong African-American support for a
particular presidential candidate may be in Alabama, African-American voters
have no opportunity to elect even a single presidential elector pledged to
support that candidate. They also suggest that a candidate who hopes to win
in Alabama has virtually no incentive to court black voters. Their votes simply
do not figure in the selection of presidential electors. The overall effect is the
same as it would be if the Alabama authorities simply took the presidential
ballots of black voters and threw them into the trash heap.
Can this situation be dismissed as an unfortunate accident, a necessary
consequence of majority rule? In Alabama, where state authorities for decades
resorted to the most horrific forms of brutality to keep African-Americans from
voting, such explanations are hard to swallow. They become even more suspect
when one considers that three times in the past fifty years, Alabama electors
have cast their ballots for overtly racist and segregationist candidates. Viewed
in this context, the winner-take-all rule appears little different from literacy
tests, the white primary, and the poll tax-nothing more nor less than an
instrument of white supremacy.
2. California
In California, the evidence of racially polarized voting is clearly not as
strong as it is in Alabama. Nonetheless, the available evidence strongly
suggests that California meets all three of the Gingles conditions with respect
to African-American voters. With respect to Hispanics, the state's largest
minority group, the evidence is much less conclusive, although it provides
some basis for a finding of vote dilution.
California is currently our nation's largest state, with fifty-four electoral
votes-twenty-one more than its closest rival, New York-and it has been
carried by the winning presidential candidate in every election since 1980. Like
the South, California has a large African-American population. Unlike most of
the Southern states, however, it also has significant Asian-American and
306. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,56 (1986) (discussing inquiries relevant to finding legally
significant levels of racially polarized voting).
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Hispanic populations.30 7 According to the 1990 census, 61.2% of the state's
VAP is non-Hispanic white, 6.7% is African-American, 8.9% is non-Hispanic
Asian, and 22.5% is Hispanic.30 8 Of the state's fifty-two congressional
districts, five have Hispanic voting-age majorities, and several others have
large Hispanic influence blocs.309 None of the fifty-two has an African-
American or Asian-American voting-age majority. There are, however, four
districts with large African-American influence blocs, ranging from 28.5% of
the VAP to 41.9% of the VAP,3 0 and several districts have elected African-
American members of Congress.
It is thus clear that California satisfies the first Gingles factor with respect
to Hispanics. It is somewhat less clear with respect to African-Americans or
Asian-Americans, since the state has not actually drawn any majority-African-
American or majority-Asian-American districts. Nonetheless, it seems almost
obvious that it would be possible to draw a majority-black district in either a
fifty-two or a fifty-four member scheme, thereby satisfying the first Gingles
factor in its traditional formulation. If one employs the alternative proportional
formulation outlined above, California meets the first Gingles factor with
respect to both Asian-Americans and African-Americans. Since the state has
fifty-four electoral votes, a group only needs to constitute one fifty-fourth of
the VAP, or about 1.9%, in order to have the clear opportunity to choose one
elector. Both minority groups easily meet this threshold.
Because no viable Hispanic or Asian-American candidate has run for
President, it is difficult to draw accurate conclusions about the cohesiveness
of these groups. African-Americans, however, exhibited strong political
cohesion in both the 1984 and 1988 presidential primaries. In 1984, Jackson
received 78% of the black vote, compared to only 9% of the white vote.31" '
In 1988, he received 89% of the black vote and 14% of the white vote. 2
These figures provide an ample basis for a finding of African-American
political cohesion.
General election results again confirm the political cohesiveness of
African-Americans in California and provide some basis for a finding of
307. The Hispanic population in California is largely comprised of Mexican-Americans, some of whom
are non citizens and thus ineligible to vote. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 2 (restricting right to vote to U.S.
citizens).
308. ELECTION DATA BOOK, supra note 299, at 7.
309. Id. at 113-14.
310. Id.
311. My calculations are based on data contained in CBS NEws PRIMARY ELECTION EXIT POLLS 1984,
supra note 302 (California file) (surveying 1768 white voters and 390 black voters).
312. My calculations are based on data contained in CBS NEvslNEv YORK TIMES, PRIMARY
ELECTION EXIT POLLS, 1988 (1989) (computer file available from Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Mich.) [hereinafter CBS NEws PRIMARY ELECTION EXIT POLLS 1988]
(California file) (surveying 2274 white voters and 504 black voters).
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1984 Walter Mondale 35% 80% 63%
Ronald Reagan 64% 16% 37%
1988 Michael Dukakis 41% 85% 70%
George Bush 57% 11% 28%
1992 Bill Clinton 42% 81% 64%
George Bush 35% 8% 23%
Ross Perot 23% 8% 12%
TABLE 3. California Election Results by Race313
Although African-American support for the Democratic candidates is not quite
as high as it is in Alabama, black voters in California remain overwhelmingly
partial to the Democratic ticket. Hispanic voters also appear to be extremely
loyal Democrats, but not to the same degree as black voters.
The third Gingles factor, white bloc voting, is more problematic. The
results of the 1992 election indicate that, at least in certain circumstances,
enough white voters will vote for the minority-preferred candidate to enable
that candidate to win the state contest. Thus, in 1992, African-American voters
did get to elect their candidates of choice as presidential electors.
Do the results of the 1992 election foreclose a finding of vote dilution in
California? Under the prevailing § 2 analysis, they clearly do not. Under
Gingles and its progeny, the relevant inquiry in any § 2 vote-dilution case is
not what happened in any one election, but what usually happens.314 The
inquiry does not look to isolated instances, but to patterns. Indeed, the Court
specifically noted that "the success of a minority candidate in a particular
313. My calculations are based on data contained in GENERAL ELECTION EXIT POLL 1992, supra note
276 (California file) (surveying 1618 white voters, 264 black voters and 268 Hispanic voters); CBS NEWS
EXIT POLL 1988, supra note 277 (national file) (surveying 856 white voters, 210 black voters and 102
Hispanic voters); CBS NEws EXIT POLL 1984, supra note 277 (national file) (surveying 693 white voters,
215 black voters and 121 Hispanic voters).
Asian-Americans were not included as a separate category in the 1984 or 1988 CBS general election
polls. In 1992, Asian-Americans in Califomia were split among the three candidates, with 39% voting for
Clinton, 39% for Bush, and 22% for Perot. My calculations are based on data contained in GENERAL
ELECTION EXIT POLL 1992, supra note 276 (California file) (surveying 81 Asian-American voters).
314. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-49 (1986) ("Stated succinctly, a bloc voting majority must
usually be able to defeat candidates sponsored by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority
group."); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2657 (1994) (quoting same language).
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election does not necessarily prove that the district did not experience polarized
voting in that election; special circumstances ... may explain minority
electoral success in a polarized contest." 31
5
The unusual three-way race of 1992 provides a good example of the kind
of "special circumstances" that can influence the outcome of a particular
election. Whereas, in 1984 and 1988, a solid majority of whites voted
Republican, in 1992, white voters were split between three candidates. Bill
Clinton received roughly the same percentage of the white vote as Michael
Dukakis did in 1988, but was able to win because of this split. Thus, even
though the majority of whites did not vote for the minority-preferred candidate,
his margin of support among whites was high enough to enable him to win a
three-way race. Since three-way races are, for the moment, an anomaly in
presidential politics, and since the Republican candidate has won California in
every other presidential election since 1968, the pattern strongly suggests that
the minority-preferred candidate usually loses.
The underlying problem is that, in California, white support for the
Republican candidates, while far from unanimous, is strong enough to negate
the African-American vote. If white "crossover" voting for Democrats were
stronger, African-Americans might potentially be able to act as a bloc of swing
voters, pushing the election one way or the other. However, the results of the
1984 and 1988 elections suggest that, in a two-way race, there simply are not





Illinois has historically been a bellwether state in American presidential
elections. It has voted for the winning presidential candidate in every
presidential election for the last 100 years, with two significant exceptions:
Jimmy Carter in 1976 and Woodrow Wilson in 1916. From a political
standpoint, then, it is in some ways similar to California, functioning as an
important "swing" state. With twenty-two electoral votes, it is currently the
fifth largest state, after California, New York, Texas, and Pennsylvania.
315. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57. The Court cited the absence of an opponent, incumbency, and the
utilization of bullet voting as factors that might constitute special circumstances, but cautioned that this list
is "illustrative, not exclusive." Id. at 57 n.26.
316. Furthermore, the general election results may not reflect the true level of racially polarized voting,
since none of these elections offered minority voters an opportunity to support a viable minority candidate.
If, for example, Jesse Jackson had run as a third-party candidate in any of these elections, the primary
election exit polls suggest that he might have received overwhelming black support, but almost no white
support.
Indeed, the fact that there are no general elections involving minority candidates itself suggests that
there is a problem. In a state where voting is polarized along racial lines, the winner-take-all rule tends to
discourage members of racial minorities from running as third-party candidates, since they have little hope
of winning the plurality that they need to gain a seat in the electoral college.
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Like those states, Illinois has a large African-American population. The
1990 census indicates that 13.3% of the state's VAP is African-American and
6.8% is Hispanic.317 Of the state's twenty congressional districts, three-or
15%-have African-American voting-age majorities, and one--or 5%---has a
Hispanic voting-age majority.3I8 The number of districts each group controls
is thus roughly proportional to its percentage of the state's VAR Illinois
therefore clearly satisfies the first Gingles factor in either its traditional
formulation or the alternative formulation with respect to both African-
American and Hispanic voters.
Again, it is difficult to draw any clear conclusions about the cohesiveness
of Hispanic voters in Illinois elections. African-American voters, however, are
strongly cohesive-perhaps slightly more so than in California. Exit polls
indicate that Jesse Jackson was the overwhelming favorite among black voters
in the 1984 and 1988 primaries, garnering 81% of the black vote in his first
bid for the Democratic nomination and 90% in his second. By contrast,
Jackson won only 3% of the white vote in 1984 and 7% in 1988.3 19 The past
three general elections also show signs of racially polarized voting:
White Black
Vote Vote
1984 Walter Mondale 33% 96%
Ronald Reagan 65% 0%
1988 Michael Dukakis 36% 88%
George Bush 63% 13%
1992 Bill Clinton 42% 88%
George Bush 38% 5%
Ross Perot 18% 4%
TABLE 4. Illinois Election Results by Race 320
317. ELECTION DATA BOOK, supra note 299, at 7.
318. Id. at 271.
319. My calculations are based on data contained in CBS NEWS PRIMARY ELECTION EXIT POLLS 1984,
supra note 302 (Illinois file) (surveying 937 white voters and 280 black voters); CBS NEWS PRIMARY
ELECTION Exrr POLLS 1988, supra note 312 (Illinois file) (surveying 1196 white voters and 374 black
voters).
320. My calculations are based on data contained in GENERAL ELECTION EXIT POLL 1992, supra note
276 (Illinois file) (surveying 1402 white voters and 232 black voters); CBS NEws EXIT POLL 1988, supra
note 277 (national file) (surveying 528 white voters and 69 black voters); CBS NEWS Exrr POLL 1984,
supra note 277 (national file) (surveying 432 white voters and 83 black voters).
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With respect to the white bloc voting prong of Gingles, Illinois appears very
similar to California. The only recent election in which minority voters have
been able to elect presidential electors is the three-way race of 1992. In that
election, the white vote split between the three candidates, allowing Bill
Clinton to win the state. That race, however, is clearly something of an
anomaly, given the fact that Republicans have won the state in two-way races
in every other election since 1968. Based on the 1984 and 1988 results, white
support for the Republican candidate is extremely high, and in neither of these
elections did black voters operate as a swing constituency. Thus, the pattern
of election results in Illinois suggests that it is really the white voters whose
choices determine the outcome of the election. Again, African-Americans can
vote, but their votes do not play any role in determining the outcome of the
election.
4. New York
New York, unlike either California or Illinois, is frequently considered a
Democratic bastion. Although Ronald Reagan won the state in 1980 and 1984,
New York was the only big state to vote for Michael Dukakis in 1988, and
Bill Clinton carried it handily in 1992. In those two most recent elections,
minority voters arguably did elect the candidates of their choice. Thus New
York, at first glance, would appear to be much less vulnerable to a § 2
challenge.
Nonetheless, like the other states considered thus far, New York satisfies
the first Gingles factor fairly easily. The 1990 census indicates that the state's
population is 71.5% non-Hispanic white, 13.3% African-American, and 11.2%
Hispanic. 2' Of the state's thirty-one congressional districts, three have
African-American voting-age majorities, and two have Hispanic majorities. In
another two districts, no single racial or ethnic group constitutes a majority,
but African-Americans and Hispanics combined do form a voting-age
majority."2 Using either the traditional formulation or the proportional
alternative, it is therefore clear that minority voters could control the choice of
several presidential electors in a non-winner-take-all system.
New York elections also show strong signs of African-American political
cohesion. Jesse Jackson received 85% of the black vote in 1984, but only 6%
321. ELECTION DATA BOOK, supra note 299, at 7.
322. Id.
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of the white vote.323 And in 1988, he received 93% of the black vote, and
15% of the white vote.324 (Jackson also ran strongly among New York's
Hispanic voters-largely Puerto Ricans-in the 1988 race, receiving 61% of
the Hispanic vote.)325
An exit poll in the 1988 primary also asked Democrats how they would
vote in three hypothetical general election matchups: Dukakis vs. Bush, Gore
vs. Bush, and Jackson vs. Bush. The disparities between white and black
voters in response to these questions are highly suggestive of a pattern of
racially polarized voting. When asked to choose between Jackson and Bush,
36% of white Democrats said they would vote for Bush, and only 33% said
they would vote for Jackson.326 Among black Democrats, 86% said they
would vote for Jackson, and only 3% said they would vote for Bush.327 But
when asked to choose between Dukakis and Bush, 79% of white Democrats
said they would vote for Dukakis and only 11% said they would vote for
Bush. Similarly, when asked to choose between Gore and Bush, 61% of white
Democrats said they would vote for Gore, and only 16% said they would vote
for Bush.328 Black Democrats, however, showed no inclination to vote for
Bush under any circumstances. Only 5% of respondents said they would vote
for Bush in a Dukakis-Bush race, and only 8% said they would vote for him
in a Gore-Bush race. 329 These figures do not just demonstrate that black and
white Democrats have different presidential preferences. They suggest that
those preferences, along with the degree of party loyalty that a Democratic
candidate in New York can expect, are closely tied to that candidate's race. In
the 1988 election, at least, white Democrats in that state would have preferred
to cross party lines or to sit the election out entirely, rather than vote for the
lone African-American in the race.
323. My calculations are based on data contained in CBS NEws PRIMARY ELECTION EXIT POLLS 1984,
supra note 302 (New York file) (surveying 1483 white voters and 400 black voters).
324. My calculations are based on data contained in CBS NEws PRIMARY ELECTION EXIT POLLS 1988,
supra note 312 (New York file) (surveying 1482 white voters and 491 black voters).
325. My calculations are based on data contained in id. (surveying 80 Hispanic voters).
326. My calculations are based on data contained in id. (surveying 1482 white voters and 491 black
voters). In response to this question, 19% of white Democrats said they would not vote. Id.
327. Id. Only 2% of black respondents said they would not vote in a Bush-Jackson race. Another 9%
failed to answer the question, which was on the back of the questionnaire.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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With respect to the white bloc voting prong of Gingles, however, New
York presents a somewhat different picture than either California or Illinois:
White Black
Vote Vote
1984 Walter Mondale 45% 94%
Ronald Reagan 54% 6%
1988 Michael Dukakis 47% 85%
George Bush 53% 10%
1992 Bill Clinton 45% 85%
George Bush 36% 8%
Ross Perot 17% 6%
TABLE 5. New York Election Results by Race330
As in both California and Illinois, white voters in New York tended to favor
the Republican candidate in both the 1984 and 1988 races. The margin of
support among these voters for the Republican candidate, however, was much
smaller: 54% for Ronald Reagan in 1984, compared with 65% in Illinois and
64% in California, and 53% for George Bush in 1988, compared with 63% in
Illinois and 57% in California.
The generally higher level of white support for the minority-preferred
candidates in New York indicates that it should be easier for African-American
voters in that state to choose presidential electors. The results of the 1988
election confirm this. In New York, as in California and Illinois, George Bush
was the favorite among white voters, though only by a slim margin.
Nonetheless, he lost the state, in large part because of the overwhelming
support of African-American voters for Michael Dukakis. Thus in this election,
African-American voters did function as a swing constituency, and their votes
were not irrelevant to the outcome of the election. Taken in conjunction with
the results of the 1992 election, the evidence of a pattern of vote dilution
seems much weaker than it does in either California or Illinois.
This sort of § 2 analysis might seem unfair from a purely partisan
standpoint. One likely short-term effect of a successful vote-dilution case in the
South would be to peel a few electoral votes away from the Republicans and
place them in the Democratic column. It would certainly seem anomalous if
330. My calculations are based on data contained in GENERAL ELECTION EXIT POLL 1992, supra note
276 (New York file) (surveying 1676 white voters and 172 black voters); CBS NEWs EXIT POLL 1988,
supra note 277 (national file) (surveying 473 white voters and 88 black voters); CBS NEws EXIT POLL
1984, supra note 277 (national file) (surveying 611 white voters and 109 black voters).
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courts were unwilling to make a finding of vote dilution in New York, which
has tended to vote Democratic. It is important to remember, however, that
partisan fairness is not the object of § 2. Instead, the statute is expressly
directed toward racial discrimination in voting. What makes New York
different from California or Illinois is not that it votes Democratic, but that its
level of racially polarized voting is much less severe.
V. REMEDIES
The preceding analysis indicates that severe racially polarized voting is a
hallmark of presidential elections in states throughout the nation. Moreover, in
many states, this racially polarized voting works in combination with the
winner-take-all system to deny minority voters any opportunity to choose
presidential electors-a clear violation of § 2. But what is the proper remedy
for this vote dilution? Under the prevailing § 2 analytical framework, this
question is difficult to answer. The Gingles test presumes that courts will
address vote dilution in at-large voting schemes by dividing states up into
congressional districts, with a single elector representing each district. But
states are unlikely to favor a pure single-member-district system as a means
of choosing presidential electors, for reasons already discussed.33" '
In an age in which citizens are accustomed to voting for President,
legislative appointment is no longer a viable system for choosing electors.332
That leaves two basic remedial possibilities: the congressional-district system
and the proportional system. The congressional-district system is in many ways
similar to the single-member-district system, but it retains an at-large
component and it does not require states to develop new districting plans.
Under this system, each congressional district would choose one presidential
elector, and an additional two would be chosen according to the statewide vote.
In a proportional system, electors would be allocated to the various candidates
according to their statewide popular vote.333 As we shall see, each of these
331. See supra Section I.B.
332. Furthermore, a state's decision to resort to legislative appointment specifically to avoid
compliance with the Voting Rights Act would be highly questionable, reminiscent of the decision by some
Southern counties to close their public schools rather than comply with the integration decrees of the
federal courts. See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). In states covered by § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, such a move would require preclearance either from the Justice Department or from the U.S
District Court for the District of Columbia.
333. The proportional system that this Article envisions works as follows: The total number of votes
cast in a state would be divided by the number of electoral votes to which that state is entitled, yielding
a threshold figure. Each candidate's vote total could then be uniquely expressed as a constant multiplied
by the threshold figure, plus a remainder, where the remainder would be smaller than the threshold. Each
candidate would then be entitled to a number of electors equal to that constant, and any remaining electors
would be allotted to the candidates with the greatest remainders.
As an example, assume that in a state with 10 electoral votes, 1000 votes are cast. Candidate A
receives 320 votes, candidate B receives 545 votes, and candidate C receives 135 votes. Candidate A would
then be entitled to three electors, B to six, and C to one. On the other hand, if B received 535 votes and
C received 145, then B would get only five electors and C would get two.
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systems has its own virtues and defects. From a Voting Rights Act perspective,
however, either method is superior to the winner-take-all system.
One point needs to be reemphasized here. Article II of the Constitution
specifically vests the states with the power to choose the manner of
appointment of presidential electors.' 34 While I have argued that Congress
has authority to place limits on state discretion over the appointment of
electors, it is important to recognize that Congress may not entirely supersede
that discretion by requiring a particular mode of election.335 Federal courts,
therefore, should ordinarily allow states to choose the remedy they feel is most
appropriate-provided, of course, that it sufficiently addresses the § 2
violation.
A. The Congressional-District System
One of the principal virtues of the congressional-district system is that it
is firmly rooted in historical precedent. Prior to 1836, at least one state selected
electors by the district method in every presidential election,336 and two
states-Maine and Nebraska-use it today.337 One recent commentator on
the electoral college has argued that more states should be encouraged to adopt
the congressional-district system, as a superior alternative to a direct vote.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has expressly upheld the constitutionality of the
congressional-district system,339 and good historical evidence suggests that
the Framers contemplated that a district system would be the prevalent mode
of election in states that instituted a popular vote.30 Finally, the
congressional-district system is, at its root, little different from the single-
member-district electoral schemes that are familiar to most Americans.
From a Voting Rights Act perspective, the greatest strength of the district
system as a remedy is that it can be tailored specifically to address racial
minorities' vote dilution, rather than barriers faced by other minority political
interest groups. In a majority-black district, African-American voters would be
able to elect a presidential elector of their choice. Other interest groups-such
as environmentalists or anti-tax protesters-would enjoy no such protection,
since states typically do not draw congressional-district lines so as to give
those groups a majority. Indeed, under the Voting Rights Act as currently
334. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 2.
335. See supra Section IM.A.
336. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 247.
337. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
338. See GLENNON, supra note 24, at 74-75. Interestingly, the congressional-district system was also
supported by some Southern segregationists after the failure of the free-elector movement of 1960. See
JEANSONNE, supra note 66, at 323-25.
339. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892); see also supra notes 146-51 and accompanying
text.
340. See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3. at 45-46 (noting that Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison,
Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and Daniel Webster favored congressional-district system).
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interpreted, states have an obligation to draw congressional districts in a way
that does not dilute minority voting strength.
The corresponding defect in the district system is that it is potentially
inadequate as a remedy. The problem lies in the fact that each state has two
more electoral votes than it does congressional districts. The district system
addresses this disparity by providing that two electors will be chosen statewide.
Thus, for two of a state's electoral votes, a winner-take-all system would be
in effect. To the extent that the winner-take-all system dilutes minority voting
strength, the district system would retain a discriminatory component. Hence
the remedy would be incomplete.
How severe is the dilutive impact of those two statewide votes? Like any
question of vote dilution, that depends on the circumstances. Although single-
member districts are the preferred remedy for dilutive at-large systems, courts
have often approved "hybrid" remedial plans that involve some combination
of district-based and at-large voting. One objective factor that is critical to any
assessment of the district system as a remedy is the size of the state. The
smaller the state, the fewer congressional districts it will have. Consequently,
the two statewide electoral votes will constitute a larger portion of the state's
electoral vote. Under a district system in Alabama, two-ninths of the state's
electoral votes would be chosen statewide. In New York, only two-thirty-thirds
would be chosen statewide. Hence the discriminatory impact of the district
system would be smaller. This suggests that the district system may be a more
appropriate remedy for large states than for smaller ones.
Another potential flaw of the district system is that it depends on the
existence of viable majority-minority districts. If there are no such districts, the
system will not work. In the 1990s, states have gone to great lengths to draw
majority-minority congressional districts. During the past two years, however,
courts have struck down several of these districts as unconstitutional "racial
gerrymanders."" The Supreme Court's recent decision in Miller v.
Johnson,3 42 holding that Georgia's congressional districts violated the Equal
Protection Clause, now threatens to place severe limits on the ability of states
to create majority-minority districts. Without such districts, the congressional-
district system will cease to be fully effective as a remedy.
The district system may also be problematic in states with two or more
distinct minority groups. Redistricting efforts in those states are sometimes
characterized by competition between minority groups. In Florida voting rights
cases, for example, courts have documented a "keen hostility" between
African-American and Hispanic voters?4 In such a situation, a court's or a
legislature's decision to draw a majority-minority district for one group may
341. See Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475,2483, 2494 (1995); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304,
1309, 1311 n.7 (S.D. Tex. 1994), prob. juris noted sub nom. Bush v. Vera, 115 S. Ct. 2639 (1995).
342. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
343. See Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 985 E2d 1471, 1481-82 (11th Cir. 1993).
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result in a failure to draw a majority-minority district for another group.'
California, for example, has five majority-Hispanic districts, but no majority-
African-American districts, despite a significant African-American voting-age
population.345
B. The Proportional System
The proportional system of choosing presidential electors has been
advocated by various reformers for more than a century. 6 Its basic virtue
is its fairness. A proportional system treats every voter within a state almost
exactly alike. 347 The dilutive effect of the two at-large seats is eliminated.
Every voter has roughly the same ability as every other voter in that state to
influence the outcome of the election.348 By contrast, even the fairest
possible district system results in significant inequalities among voters.
Congressional districts, for example, must be roughly equal in total population.
The number of eligible voters in each district may vary significantly, and the
proportion of those voters who actually vote in any given election may
fluctuate wildly. Furthermore, the district system requires states to manipulate
district lines in order to achieve a racially "fair" result-a process that clearly
has left a bitter taste in the mouths of many of the Justices.
The principal virtue of the proportional system is also its greatest defect
as a § 2 remedy. Where the district system is carefully tailored to address the
effects of racial vote dilution, the proportional system is wildly overbroad. It
potentially would allow members of any cohesive political minority-not just
racial minorities-within a state to gain a seat in that state's electoral college.
Environmentalists, anti-abortion activists, gay rights groups, and white
supremacists all could benefit, as could numerous other political special
interest groups.
The three-way election of 1992 illustrates this problem. In that race,
independent candidate Ross Perot garnered 19% of the vote nationwide.
344. See De Grandy v. Wetherell, 815 R Supp. 1550, 1578 (N.D. Fla. 1992) (three-judge court)
(finding that remedy for Hispanic vote-dilution claim and remedy for African-American vote-dilution claim
were mutually exclusive), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647
(1994).
345. CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTs IN THE 1990s, supra note 216, at 57-58. The most heavily black
districts in California have 44.0% and 39.9% African-American voting-age pluralities, respectively. Id.
346. See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 144-57 (detailing proposals to adopt proportional
system by constitutional amendment from 1878 through 1960s). For a 1926 proposal urging adoption of
the proportional system, written by two advocates of proportional representation, see HOAG & HALLErr,
supra note 143, at 320-28.
347. Because electoral votes cannot be divided, the "proportional method" will not produce exact
proportionality, but only rough proportionality. See discussion supra note 333. In theory, these variations
might be thought to violate the one-person-one-vote rule mandated by the Equal Protection Clause. The
Supreme Court. however, has never interpreted this Clause to require absolute equality of votes.
348. Voters in different states, of course, would not have equal voting power. See Banzhaf, supra note
39, at 318-19. This is a basic inequality that cannot be changed without a constitutional amendment.
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Because of the prevalence of the winner-take-all system, however, he failed to
receive a single electoral vote. (Ironically, Perot had his best showing in
Maine, one of the two states that does not employ the winner-take-all system.)
Bill Clinton won the election with 370 electoral votes to George Bush's 168.
A congressional-district scheme would have led to a similar result. Perot did
not win any of the nation's 435 congressional districts. Clinton won 32 states,
or 257 districts, as well as the District of Columbia. Bush won the remaining
18 states, or 178 congressional districts. 49 Under a congressional-district
scheme, then, Clinton would have received 324 electoral votes to Bush's 214.
Perot, once again, would have gotten nothing.
Under a proportional system, however, the fifty states and the District of
Columbia would have appointed 197 Bush electors, 236 Clinton electors, and
105 Perot electors.350 These results would be roughly proportional to the
nationwide popular vote. But while this might be a more democratic
alternative, it certainly is not what Congress had in mind when it passed the
1982 amendments to § 2. The Voting Rights Act exists specifically for the
benefit of racial and language minorities, not to help political special interest
groups more generally. The proportional system would thus potentially reach
much further than Congress ever intended.
How serious a flaw is the overbreadth problem? Again, that depends on
specific factual circumstances, most notably the size of the state. One of the
key limitations on the electoral system is that it depends on actual electors to
cast votes. Thus there can be no fractional votes. In this respect, the smaller
the state, the more difficult it will be for a political fringe group to capture an
electoral college seat. In a state with 40 electoral votes, for example, a
candidate receiving 2.5% of the vote would be entitled to one elector. In a
state with 10 electoral votes, that same candidate might need to receive as
much as 10% of the vote.35' This places an important limitation on the
ability of fringe groups to receive votes in small states, but not in large ones,
suggesting that the proportional system might be appropriate in Alabama or
Mississippi, but not in California or New York.
349. ALICE V. MCGILLIVRAY & RICHARD M. SCAMMON, AMERICA AT THE POLLS, 1960-1992, at 3
(1994) (reporting state-by-state election results); Cohen, supra note 273, at 1285 (reporting results of 1992
election by district).
350. My calculations are based on election results reported in MCGILLIVRAY & SCAMMON, supra note
349, at 3.
The distinction between electors and electoral votes is crucial here, since it is by no means certain
that all of these electors would vote as planned under these circumstances. In this situation, Perot might
well have chosen to throw his electors to one candidate or the other, in exchange for particular concessions.
Alternatively, he might have released them to vote as they pleased. If the electors were to vote faithfully,
however, each candidate would have received roughly the same percentage of the electoral vote as he did
of the popular vote. No one candidate would have had a majority, and the election would have gone to the
House.
351. Under the proportional system I have described, a group might be able to capture a single elector
with less than 10% of the vote. However, it would need to receive at least 10% to be assured of getting
one elector.
1014 [Vol. 105: 935
The Illegitimate President
Of course, given a choice between the two systems, one might expect that
most states would opt for a congressional-district scheme. Several factors
suggest this conclusion. First, the congressional-district system allows a state
to keep a bloc of two statewide votes, thus increasing that state's influence in
the electoral college, if only marginally. As Akhil Amar and Vik Amar have
argued, the dominance of the winner-take-all scheme can largely be attributed
to a "prisoners' dilemma." No state wants to be the first to break up its bloc
of electoral votes.352 Thus, the same factors that have led states to prefer the
winner-take-all system over the congressional-district system might lead them
to favor the congressional-district system over the proportional system. Second,
the congressional-district system would tend to be less disruptive of the
existing two-party system. The two major political parties are therefore likely
to see it as less of a threat.
Nonetheless, the potential defects of a congressional-district scheme as a
remedial plan in a small Southern state are worrisome. In those states, courts
should be extremely wary of approving the congressional-district method as a
§ 2 remedy because of its potentially dilutive effect. I have previously argued
that, under Article II, states may not be compelled to adopt a particular
remedial scheme. It would therefore be inappropriate for a court to mandate
that Alabama, Mississippi, and similarly situated states adopt a proportional
system, on the grounds that it would provide the most complete remedy for
minority vote dilution. It might not be inappropriate, however, for a court to
find that the congressional-district system would not afford a complete remedy,
leaving the state with the alternative of instituting a proportional district
system, a pure single-member-district scheme, or a legislative-appointment
scheme.353 Given this choice, states would be likely to opt for the
proportional scheme, for reasons I have already described. Nonetheless, a
court's decision to offer such a limited menu of remedial options would clearly
be treading very close to the constitutional boundary line set by Article II.
VI. RETHINKING WINNER-TAKE-ALL: SOME POSSIBLE EFFECTS
The analysis in the preceding part suggests that different methods of
choosing presidential electors might be appropriate in different states. Several
states, for example, are immune from § 2 challenge because they do not have
enough minority voters to enable them to satisfy the Gingles numerosity
requirement. These states have a strong incentive to retain the winner-take-all
system. The smaller Southern states might conceivably be compelled to adopt
the proportional method, while the largest states-California, New York,
352. See Amar & Amar. supra note 40, at 927-29.
353. See supra Section V.A. A pure single-member-district scheme would eliminate the dilutive effect
of the two at-large seats involved in the congressional-district scheme.
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Texas, and so on-might prefer to adopt the congressional-district system. The
result would be not a uniform plan, but a patchwork of different plans in
different states.
What effect would such a system have on our political culture? If the
experience of the Framers teaches us anything, it is that we should be wary of
making such predictions. As we have seen, the Framers initially failed to
anticipate the development of a national two-party system, leading to a serious
breakdown of the electoral machinery in the election of 1800.311 Changes in
complex systems invariably bring about results that cannot be predicted with
any degree of accuracy. Nonetheless, it is possible to hazard some rough
guesses about the effects that a move away from the winner-take-all system
might have on the American political system.
A. Political Realignments
The short-term partisan beneficiaries of the patchwork system I have
described would likely be the Democrats. Elimination of the winner-take-all
rule in the South would tend to peel some electoral votes away from the
Republicans and place them in the Democratic column. Whether such an effect
would continue into the long term, however, is uncertain. A move to a
proportional system in the South, for example, might give Republican
presidential candidates an incentive to court African-American voters more
aggressively, while encouraging Democratic candidates to be less protective of
their base. A moderation in the racial policies of the two major parties could
lead to a significant political realignment. 5
Alternatively, a move away from the winner-take-all system might give
minority voters an incentive to break away from the Democratic party and run
their own candidates for President. The formation of a new political party to
represent minority interests might serve to further weaken the Democrats in
presidential contests.
Of course, there can only be one President at any given time. And it is
highly unlikely that a third party representing minority political interests would
ever be able to attract enough support to allow its candidate to win the
Presidency. But in a close election, a minority political party might be able to
elect enough presidential electors to deprive either of the major-party
354. See supra note 33.
355. See EDSALL, supra note 60, at 30:
Partisan competition for the votes of black America has been absent for over a generation, and
its absence has corrupted both parties. For the Democratic party, a secure base of support
among black voters has stifled innovation, and has eliminated pressure to develop policies that
productively reinforce the loyalty of the party's most reliable electorate. The GOP, in turn, has
built its success for the past twenty-five years on the basis of racial and cultural flight from the
Democratic party, becoming in the process a de facto white party.
This lack of competition can be attributed in large part to the dominance of the winner-take-all system.
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candidates of an electoral majority. Electors from the minority party would
then be in a position to throw their support to one major-party candidate or the
other in exchange for particular political concessions: a Cabinet seat for their
candidate, perhaps, or a promise to pursue particular legislative initiatives. In
effect, this would be a variation on the strategy employed by George Wallace
in 1968,356 this time used to advance minority political interests rather than
to stifle them. The concept of deal making between political parties to
determine who will become President may seem alien to many Americans. Of
course, similar arrangements take place all the time in multiparty parliamentary
systems such as those in Europe. If we are to have a government that truly
represents all of the people, we must be willing to accept some occasional
accommodation of minority interests.
Critics of proportional representation systems frequently claim that efforts
to accommodate multiple political interests tend to have a detrimental impact,
producing political fragmentation and government instability.35 7 Although
these charges may be overstated-certainly the sky has not fallen in Germany,
Ireland, Australia, or many other democracies that incorporate an element of
proportional representation 35 -- they represent important concerns about the
kind of coalition governments that a hybrid electoral scheme might produce in
a three-party race.359
With respect to our presidential election scheme, however, these concerns
are somewhat misplaced. Presidential electors do not exercise any
governmental function other than the selection of the President. The separation
of their function from all of the other tasks of government is an integral part
of the electoral scheme envisioned by the Framers.360 This tends to minimize
the risk of government instability. Once the electors vote, they go home.
Whether they choose a President or not, they exercise no further influence. In
356. See supra text accompanying note 114.
357. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial
Regulation of Politics, 87 COLuM. L. REv. 1325, 1363 (1987) (arguing that proportional representation
produces "fragmenting effect on the party system and the legislative process,... encouragement of
ideological, single-issue political appeals .... promotion of coalition government and instability, and ...
relative unresponsiveness to local constituents and individual voters' needs").
358. See, e.g., Maurice Duverger, Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later, in ELECTORAL LAVS AND
THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 130, at 69,71-76 (noting tendency toward two-party system
despite elements of proportional representation in West Germany, Austria, and Ireland); Peter Mair,
Districting Choices under the Single-Transferable Vote, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 130, at 289, 294-99 (discussing stability of PR government in Ireland); Jack
F.H. Wright, Australian Experience with Majority-Preferential and Quota-Preferential Systems, in
ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 130, at 124, 134-37 (noting that
proportional representation methods probably reduce confrontational style of politics). With the exception
of France and Britain, every single European democracy now includes some element of proportional
representation in its parliament. MATrHEIW COSSOLOTO, THE ALMANAC OF EUROPEAN POLITICS 1995, at
4 (1995).
359. For a response to the most common objections to proportional representation, see AMY, supra
note 214, at 153-82.
360. See supra text accompanying note 25.
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a typical parliamentary system, the government depends on the sustained
support of the legislators for its continuance in office. By contrast, a new
President chosen by a divided electoral college would still exercise all of the
constitutional prerogatives of his office for the full duration of his term.
Furthermore, voters in this country are widely dissatisfied with the existing
two-party system, as evidenced by the strong 1992 showing of Ross Perot. In
one recent poll, 57% of those surveyed said they favored creation of a third
party to compete with the Democrats and Republicans.36' In keeping with
this mood, Perot recently announced the formation of a new "Independence
Party. '362 The two-party model of government has been dominant for nearly
two centuries in this country. Perhaps it is time for a different model of
government--one that gives minority voters some voice in the executive
branch.
My comments in this section should not be misconstrued. I am not
advocating a system in which electors would exercise independent judgment.
Such a system would run contrary both to common sense and American
political tradition. Rather, I am suggesting that the candidates, in their
capacities as representatives of the voters, might be able to strike deals after
the popular vote for the support of their electors. Electors would then merely
cast their votes according to the instructions of the candidate to whom they
were pledged.363 Absent extraordinary circumstances, the electors would
remain ciphers.
Nor am I suggesting that such deal making would, or should, become a
commonplace occurrence in our presidential elections. Even if the winner-take-
all system were to be abandoned in a large number of states, minority voters
would only be in a position to affect the outcome of the election if the race
were relatively close in the electoral college. Thus, in the typical election,
minority voters might do much better by casting their lot with one of the two
major parties than by running their own candidate. My suggestion here is that
the mere possibility of a minority-backed candidate being able to attract
electoral votes could significantly alter the dynamics of the American political
system.
361. David Broder, Country May Be Ripe for a Third Party, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 23, 1995,
at 5J; see also Debbie Howlett, 'Perot Movement' for Third Party Growing, USA TODAY, Apr. 12, 1995,
at 8A.
362. See, e.g., B.'Drummond Ayres Jr., Perot is Starting Third-Party Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
1995, at Al. It is as yet unclear whether this new organization, with its somewhat self-contradictory title,
will function as a true political party or merely as a vehicle for Perot to seek the presidency a second time.
363. In many states, electors are pledged by either party rule or state law to vote for a particular
candidate. In the system I am envisioning, these pledges would be slightly modified. Rather than pledging
to votefor a candidate, electors would pledge to vote in accordance with that candidate's instructions.
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B. Biases, "Wrong Winners," and the Direct-Vote Alternative
No system of voting is perfect. A move away from the winner-take-all
system would fail to remedy two of the most frequently criticized quirks of the
current electoral system. First, under a winner-take-all system, voters in large
states have a greater ability to affect the outcome of presidential races than do
voters in small states.3 4 Under a proportional or a district system, that
inequality would be reversed, and votes in small states would count for more
than votes in large states.365 To some degree this might be an improvement,
since the small states do not represent enough electoral votes to determine the
outcome of elections on their own. Nonetheless, some inequality would remain.
Furthermore, a hybrid system would not ensure that the winner of the
popular vote would always be elected President. Quite the opposite, in fact. By
encouraging third-party candidates to run, it might increase the possibility that
a runner-up in the popular vote would receive a majority of the electoral vote.
Under the winner-take-all system, this has happened at least twice, in the
elections of 1876 and 1888.366 Whether this is actually a flaw is subject to
debate. There can be no doubt, however, that a scheme designed to give
minorities an effective voice in the selection of the President is fundamentally
incompatible with a view of democracy premised on absolute majority rule.
These problems-to the extent that they are really problems--can be
remedied, but only by a constitutional amendment to eliminate the electoral
system entirely and substitute a direct popular vote for President. A direct vote
would ensure that every voter would have the same opportunity-at least on
364. See Banzhaf, supra note 39, at 306. Banzhaf demonstrates mathematically that any winner-take-all
system will create inequalities among voters. This is not simply a consequence of the way in which votes
are allocated among states, but derives from the fact that an individual voter's ability to influence the
outcome of an election varies inversely with the square root of the state's population. Id. at 314.
365. See id. at 319, 321. The inequalities under the congressional-district system and the proportional
system arise from the fact that electoral votes are not allocated in proportion to population. Each state, large
or small, is allowed to elect two Senators, and thus has two corresponding electoral votes. Banzhaf notes
that if electoral votes were allocated on a strict population basis, the inequalities in the proportional system
would disappear. ld. at 319. That analysis is not entirely accurate, however, because it assumes that
everyone counted in the population will actually vote or will vote at the same rate in every state. For
extensive criticisms of the winner-take-all rule, see ABBOTT & LEVINE, supra note 3; PEIRCE & LONGLEY,
supra note 3.
366. ABBOTT & LEVINE, supra note 3, at 25-26. John Quincy Adams, who won a House contingency
election in 1824, finished second in both the electoral and the popular vote. Since many states still
employed legislative selection of electors at that time, id. at 51, the popular vote did not reflect the
preferences of the entire electorate.
The 1960 election may also have produced a "wrong winner"--to use the somewhat loaded term
employed by Abbott and Levine. Because of the difficulty in interpreting votes cast for uncommitted
electors in Alabama, the popular vote total that John F. Kennedy received is subject to dispute. See PEIRCE
& LONGLEY, supra note 3, at 65-67. Under either a proportional system or a district system, Nixon would
have defeated Kennedy in 1960. ABBOTI & LEVINE, supra note 3, at 123; PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note
3, app.M at 294-95. A proportional system would have produced "wrong winner" outcomes in 1880 and
1896, but not in 1876 or 1888. Id. app.M at 294. Figures on the district system are not available prior to
1952. In 1976, however, a district system would have created an electoral college tie between Jimmy Carter
and Gerald Ford. Id. app.M at 295.
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paper-to influence the outcome of an election, and it would ensure that the
popular vote winner would always be elected President.
No electoral system, however, is perfect. Many arguments against the
direct-vote scheme have been made, and they need not be repeated here.367
But one point requires special emphasis because it relates directly to the
question of minority vote dilution. As a result of the strong patterns of racially
polarized voting in presidential elections, a direct vote could work to minimize
minority voting strength almost as severely as the winner-take-all system. This
problem is illustrated by the facts of Holder v. Hall,368 the recent Supreme
Court case involving a challenge to a single-member-commissioner form of
government in a rural Georgia county.3 69 In Holder, the Eleventh Circuit
found that racially polarized voting prevented African-Americans from having
any significant voice in the selection of their sole local governmental officer.
Direct election of the President could have similar consequences. If voting
continued to be polarized along racial lines, the white majority would always
be able to choose the President. A direct vote might simply be a winner-take-
all scheme on a national scale, in which African-Americans would be able to
vote, but their votes would never affect the outcome.
VII. CONCLUSION
The winner-take-all method now used to select presidential electors in
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia severely dilutes African-
American voting power. In the Southern states, where racially polarized voting
patterns are particularly intense, this system effectively denies minority voters
an opportunity to choose even a single presidential elector. In effect, these
voters have no voice in the selection of the President. Nor is this problem
necessarily limited to the South-or to African-American voters. The winner-
take-all system denies minority voters in states throughout the country a full
and fair opportunity to participate in presidential elections.
In many states, this type of discriminatory voting system is not only
undemocratic, but potentially illegal. The winner-take-all rule is precisely the
kind of discriminatory electoral scheme that Congress had in mind when it
amended § 2 in 1982. Under the now-accepted statutory framework for
analyzing § 2 claims, twenty-one states are potentially susceptible to § 2
challenges: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
and Virginia. Altogether, these states appoint 361 of the 538 presidential
367. See GLENNON, supra note 24, at 73 (arguing that direct vote could unleash "chaos and potential
for electoral fraud"); see also BEST, supra note 4. DIAMOND, supra note 16.
368. 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994).
369. See supra Section III.B.
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electors. While the winner-take-all system is not necessarily illegal in all of
these states, patterns of racially polarized voting across the country are
remarkably constant, suggesting that many states are, at the very least, skirting
the edge of the law.
There are at least two viable remedies for this problem: a proportional
system of choosing electors and a system based on existing congressional
districts. From a § 2 perspective, these methods have complementary strengths
and weaknesses. The proportional remedy is more appropriate for smaller
states, such as those in the South, while the congressional-district system is
better suited to larger states. Except in the most extreme cases, however,
established principles of equity dictate that states should have discretion to
choose the appropriate remedy, subject to a court's determination that a
proposed remedy will give minority voters an equal opportunity to participate
in the selection of presidential electors.
Implementation of these remedies would likely have far-reaching effects
on our political system. It would almost certainly lead to a significant political
realignment, and possibly to the creation of one or more new political parties.
The long-term effects of such a change are difficult to foresee.
Defenders of the status quo will doubtless point out that the alternative
electoral schemes contemplated in this Article will undercut the principle of
majority rule. This view is correct, but it is a critique premised on the notion
that majority rule is the ultimate goal of democratic government. The very fact
that we currently do not select a President in a manner that assures majority
rule-witness the elections of 1876 and 1888-suggests that majority rule is
merely one of many principles on which our democracy rests. The Framers
recognized this, and provided for a form of government in which the interests
of states were balanced with the interests of the people. The electoral college
reflects this balancing act. Perhaps today's political climate calls for a different
kind of balancing, based not on regional ties, but on recognition of the
different interests that different segments of society have consistently expressed
in voting booths across the nation. If administered in a fair and
nondiscriminatory manner, the electoral college system might help us to find
that balance.
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